

VIOLENCE AGAINST ETHNIC MINORITIES: THE REEMERGENCE OF EXTREME
RIGHT PARTIES IN EUROPE

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ABSTRACT

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In recent years, violence against ethnic minorities has risen dramatically in Europe, highlighted by a total of 47,210 racist crimes being reported across the European Union in 2014, with an anti-racism organization (ENAR, 2014) warning that this is only the "tip of the iceberg," as many crimes go unreported. This violence comes on the heels of unprecedented extreme right party electoral success on the continent. In the past thirty years, European right-wing parties have made considerable electoral gains at the national, state, and local levels of government. The Swiss People's Party (SVP) is currently the most popular party in Switzerland. It controls 26.6% of the seats in the National Council, while other right-wing populist parties also currently have significant parliamentary vote shares in Norway (16.3%), Belgium (7.8%), Denmark (13.5%), and Austria (20.5%) (European Election Dataset, 2014). The vast majority of the existing literature on the topic investigates both forms of violence at the same time. The problem the research is finding is that there is a speechless, clandestine, and covert nature in both forms of violence, and it becomes severely difficult to separate them. Moreover, the available statistics for several countries do not systematically distinguish both forms of violence. This paper seeks to examine the relationship between the rise of the extreme right sentiment and political activity in Europe and the growing reports of violence against ethnic minorities in Europe. To answer the question, this paper examines the extreme right phenomenon in Europe and its causal relationship to the reported cases of violence against Ethnic Minorities. It explains that while, directly, the parties may not be responsible for the rise in violence, the implications of its indirect actions are motivating factors for others to enact violence upon these target groups. In this paper's attempts to unequivocally demonstrate such a relationship, it locates and thoroughly investigates the socioeconomic factors they manipulate to encourage violence.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

In recent years, the question of violence against racial and ethnic minorities has become a major issue of public concern in some European countries, with the growth of racist and extreme nationalist movements in both Eastern and Western Europe seemingly rising. A total of 47,210 racist crimes were reported across the European Union in 2014, with an anti-racism organization (ENAR, 2014) warning that this is only the "tip of the iceberg," as many crimes go unreported. This violence comes on the heels of unprecedented extreme right party electoral success on the continent.

In the past thirty years, European right-wing parties have made considerable electoral gains at the national, state, and local levels of government. The Swiss People's Party (SVP) is currently the most popular party in Switzerland. It controls 26.6% of the seats in the National Council, while other right-wing populist parties also currently have significant parliamentary vote shares in Norway (16.3%), Belgium (7.8%), Denmark (13.5%), and Austria (20.5%) (European Election Dataset, 2014). Largely due to these factors, political scholars have had renewed discussion about how to understand the recent rise of violence against minorities in the face of the mounting evidence that extreme right parties are growing in popularity. With Europe's rich history of extreme right political hostilities towards minorities, the new era of these parties will have no shortage of theoretical explanations from the academic community.

This paper seeks to examine the relationship between the rise of the extreme right sentiment and political activity in Europe and the growing reports of violence against ethnic minorities in Europe. More specifically I ask:

Is the growing extreme right political movement in Europe responsible for the increased violence against ethnic minorities on the continent?

To answer the question, this paper examines the extreme right phenomenon in Europe and its causal relationship to the reported cases of violence against Ethnic Minorities. It explains that while, directly, the parties may not be responsible for the rise in violence, the implications of its indirect actions are motivating factors for others to enact violence upon these target groups. In this paper's attempts to unequivocally demonstrate such a relationship, it locates and thoroughly investigates the socioeconomic factors they manipulate to encourage violence.

CHAPTER II

LITERATURE REVIEW - HISTORY

Since the reemergence of both extreme right parties and violence against ethnic minorities in Europe, political scholars have had renewed discussion about how to understand the recent rise of violence against minorities with the reality that mounting evidence exists that demonstrates extreme right parties are growing in popularity. With Europe's rich history of extreme right political hostilities towards minorities, the long term prospects for theoretical explanations for the phenomenon will be markedly improved. The history of the literature review in the field is rooted in both social and economic theory starting at the end of WWI and indeed, encompassed these issues during and post-WWII. Because of this, many scholars utilize old theory that doesn't add in any meaningful way to the current climate.

The post-WWII research focused on the role of the economy in shaping the rhetoric and successes of extreme right political parties and movements. Early theorists on the topic looked at Christian fundamentalists and poor economic conditions as the bedrock of any successful extreme right party movement against ethnic minorities and other at-risk groups (Yves-Camus, 2007). The pre and post-WWII socioeconomic atmosphere proved this general notion to be accurate. As the socioeconomic conditions began to change, the framework used to describe this phenomenon remained the same in the vast majority of the research conducted (Laruelle, 2015). This reliance on old theory would leave the community as a whole unprepared to predict or explain the reemergence of extreme right parties and the uptick in violence. Because while poor economic conditions, statistically, remain a motivating factor for violence and extreme right ideology, data also indicates that extreme right activity is also prevalent in countries whose economies are strong (Ramet, 2010). And there are countries with large numbers of Christian fundamentalists who do not have high numbers of extreme right parties or electoral support, such as Belgium, Finland, and Ireland.

In light of mounting challenges to the way we analyze the reemergence of right-wing extremism and racist violence in Europe, the way researchers define and approach preconditioned notions of extreme right and racist violence must be reevaluated. So too did their analysis for the motivations behind not only these particular forms of violence but the precise nature of their targets.

CHAPTER III

EXISTING LITERATURE

Existing research on the reemergence of right-wing extremism and racist violence in Europe provides three main arguments that cover the comprehensive information on what is causing these types of violence on the continent. This literature review will include those three reasons. The particular theoretical research that will be analyzed in this literature review is social, economic, and religious theories as for the cause of Extreme Right and Racist violence in Europe. As the bulk of the existing literature points to, a great deal of enduring argument is found wanting, and outdated in its ability to explain the phenomenon occurring on the continent. What is also evident, is that there is a validity argument on whether or not a cross-national dataset would represent the actual nature of the violence in Europe, due to the lack of systematic differentiation between extreme right, and racist violence.

The vast majority of the existing literature on the topic investigates both forms of violence at the same time. The problem the research is finding is that there is a speechless, clandestine, and covert nature in both forms of violence, and it becomes severely difficult to separate them. Moreover, the available statistics for several countries do not systematically distinguish both forms of violence (Koopmans, 2014). So, as we see in the existing literature, creating a cross-national dataset is vital to explaining both extreme-right and racist violence, but the creation of such a dataset creates a multitude of validity concerns. Therefore, operational definitions of racist and extreme right violence are not just missing, but desperately needed. With such definitions in hand, cross-national datasets can better explain the types of violence and their motivations. In doing so, the validity of such a data set would not be in question by those who find difficulty in data which does not traditionally separate the two forms of violence.

CHAPTER IV

SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY/GRIEVANCE MODEL ARGUMENT

For the social movement theory and its place in the literature, it was first useful to understand how scholars defined it. The definitions come from two sociologist researchers, who utilized the social movements of the 1950's as a foundation for their theoretical foundation. Firstly, that collective behavior comprises the area of sociological interest. This acknowledgment deals with relatively ephemeral, unstructured, and spontaneous instances of social interaction-e.g., crowds, mobs, publics, fads, social movements (Adler, du Gay, Morgan, Reed, 2013). And that it is a stark divergence of permanent and formulaic structures of socioeconomic group life, which contain the body of general social organizations (2013). "And the second, there is an intensely organized, cohesive, collection of persons in a sociological group. In this extreme, we have a mob of individuals characterized by anonymity, disturbed leadership, motivated by emotion, and in some cases representing a destructive collectivity located within the system. (King, Weber, Yablonsky, 1959)"

European focused social movement theorists, though in disagreement about the theory's usefulness, view today's social movements as wholly different from actions and programs from past years. Gone are labor movements and notions of class conflicts, here are anti-immigrant, anti-war, and other grievances steeped in political motivation. What is also found to be essential to understanding the impulses for social movement involvement, is an adaptation of post-modern, post-material politics and newly created identities, particularly those from the new middle class. In the light of these changing dynamics, existing literature on social movement theory about extreme right and racist violence in Europe focuses on the opportunity and grievance models.

In the literature, we see that the grievance model is one in which the causes of violence in grievances relate to the main target groups of the extreme right (foreigners and asylum seekers) and develop more general feelings of anomie among the socially marginal, such as the working poor and the unemployed. The opportunity model emphasizes the role of political elites in shaping mobilization opportunities for social movements, mainly anti-immigration or anti-globalization. As we see in both Kehrberg (2014) and Bjørge (2013), racial-nationalist leaders in Europe can exploit the new political conditions and widespread fears to their advantage. By advocating White-European privilege and

heritage, racial-nationalists can formulate a troubling but potent transnational message. That the political elite, radical right political platform contained an anti-immigrant, anti-establishment message. This message is viewed as a classic example of a fear appeal, defined as a compelling communication that attempts to appeal to people's sense of lost national identity and place in society (2013).

CHAPTER V

ECONOMIC THEORY

At the heart of economic theory as the driving factor of Extreme Right and racist violence in Europe is an assumption that populist right-wing parties (PRWPs) thrive when the economy slows down thus historically pushing resentment against various minority groups. The 2008 economic downturn the world experienced is thought to be the tipping point in both the start of higher levels of violence against target groups and the beginning of the electoral success of extreme-right parties. What the existing literature points to, is that in the recession of 2008, election results showed Extreme Right parties enjoyed the relatively large success that could be attached to the economy being weak. Two examples used were the Golden Dawn Party in Greece, and the Sweden Democrats (Mols, Jetten, 2015). It should not be ignored, however, that numerous examples are showing PRWPs can thrive in times of unprecedented economic growth and low levels of unemployment (Germany, Poland, and England). What the literature in this field also indicates, is that neo-conservatism within extreme-right parties is growing, and it is manipulating economic concerns for personal gain (Boltanski, 2014). In their commercial platforms, they stress nationalism, supported by an active state, and valorization of moral authority and tradition. That above all else, again, even in economic factors, they are above all, strongly xenophobic and racist.

Outside of an extreme-right party perspective, extreme right groups such as neo-Nazi's and white supremacists are growing in number due to the economic downturn (ENAR, 2015). A key finding is that changing social and economic conditions along with personal initiatives are promoting a convergence of right-wing activity and many groups and beginning to look and sound similar (Whine, 2014). Also indicated in the literature, is the first ever cross-national report on racist violence on the continent, ENAR (European Network Against Racism). This report suggests that countries, with weaker economies experience the highest level of violence against ethnic minorities and target groups are (ENAR, 2015). The report says that there has been a "considerable rise in violence over these last few years, attributing the increase to the economic crisis, and the growth of far-right parties and hate speech in political discourse utilizing financial concerns." (2015)

CHAPTER VI

RELIGIOUS THEORY

The body of literature, until recently, has focused on the “deprivatisation” of religion (Casanova 1994), and the persistence of religious belief and the rise in Europeans’ spirituality (Inglehart and Baker 2000; Halman and Draulans 2004). It has also focused on the role of the church as a political interest group (Warner, 2000), and the impact of confessional heritages and levels of religiosity on policy outcomes (Minkenberg 2002). Given the recent influx of asylum seekers and immigrants to the continent escaping war and tyranny, research has focused on religious factors, which researchers view as a significant motivator in violence against ethnic minorities. Islamophobia in Europe is a considerably tangible measurable among theorists across all sectors of scholarship on the topic. In the current body of literature, religion comes across as a driving factor of violence against ethnic minorities (UNHRC, 2014). Due to the massive increase of Muslims into the continent, like economic concerns, religious concerns are also used as a motivating factor for violence.

What the existing research also indicates is that among Catholics and Protestants in Europe, the more frequently one attended church, the more likely they are to entertain prejudices. Those who subscribed to doctrinal beliefs, however, were less likely to hold prejudices (Scheepers, Gijsberts, Nijmegen, 2009). In the literature, these are deemed significant findings due to the shared history and values that European countries enjoy; by respecting their unique similarities, a better understanding of the phenomenon can be added to combat what is considered to be a growing problem.

Because there is a religious bias against Muslims on the continent (Koopmans, 2015), existing literature also precludes that this bias is even worse against women of the Muslim faith. A key finding in this work is that there is a narrative prevalent that there is a supposed “regime of gender violence” in the Islamic religion that a systematically produced set of statements that insists on the representation of Muslim women as the victims of Muslim violence (Weberly, 2013). Regardless of national heritage or country of origin, Muslim women tend to be homogenized and offered two narratives: either reject Islam or suffer oppression through maintaining a Muslim identity. Not only does this description depict Muslim culture as violent and static, but it also ignores other forms of violence Muslim women may experience,

including structural and racialized violence, and further results in obscuring or excluding their roles as agents in the public sphere.

Another essential element in the existing body of literature focusing on religion is about the role the Catholic Church in advocating for middle-right candidates, while also pushing for immigration reform (Lipka, Martinez, 2013). Creating a sharp contrast on the continent between the Catholic Church and its Protestant counterparts. In creating this contrast, it is expected that European countries with demonstrably high Catholic populations could experience less violence that is solely motivated by extreme right sentiment. Further indicated by the 2001 Royal Economic Study of Western European Countries, in which the study finds that “women appear significantly less prejudiced than men, and Catholic less prejudiced than other religious groups.” (Dustmann, Preston, 2001)

CHAPTER VII

EXPECTED CONTRIBUTION

The current state of the literature on Extreme Right and racist violence in Europe provides an individual researcher with a solid foundation of understanding on the topic. It is directly focused on the causes and correlations of the violence and its relationship to key socioeconomic and political factors such as social movements, economic, and religiosity factors. What is lacking in the literature, however, is the ability to differentiate between extreme-right and racist violence. As explained in the literature, most data and theoretical explanations do not systematically discern between the two. Since the two types of violence share many characteristics, the existing research, has, in my opinion, not added to the knowledge of the phenomenon by any visible means.

Since any cross-national dataset would suffer from validity concerns due to the issues of similarity, further research and operational definitions are needed. It is through further conceptualized definitions of both the extreme right and racist violence those new ways in which we conceptualize the two types of violence must be constructed. Establishing a methodological vehicle capable of addressing these concerns requires the ability to differentiate between the two types of violence. In doing so, a better, more thorough understanding of the phenomenon can be agreed-upon. Therefore, my anticipated addition to the literature is a cross-national dataset that distinguishes between the two types of violence, into categories in which better describe both the crime and the motivation behind the crime.

CHAPTER VIII

THEORETICAL ARGUMENT

Having examined the current body of literature, it is the belief of this author that violence against ethnic minorities is largely based upon observable variables. While the existing literature points to the grievance model, economics, and religion for the rise in violence, the outdated nature of the collective theory warrants further examination. As a result, this paper has decided to further investigate the relationship between the dependent variable and these independent variables. Because there remains a degree of validity concerns among datasets that do not separate extreme right and racist violence, a better understanding of the differentiation of the two types of violence is critical. When the two forms of violence are adequately separated, the exact nature of the relationship extreme right parties have to rising violence against ethnic minorities can be understood, and not suffer from lingering validity questions.

Because relative extreme right political activity has an impact on the entire sociopolitical spectrum, a better understanding of how to measure extreme right support is important. Therefore, the inclusion of variables measuring extreme right parties per country, and the percentage of the vote these parties received is crucial when determining extreme right support in a respective country. The extreme right party per country variable is measured by the total number of extreme right labeled parties that each country contains. These parties have been labeled as such by the UNHRC (United Nations Human Rights Council) because they met the criteria and strict definition of conditions associated with extreme right parties. Total extreme right parties per country is a strong way of representing relative support for the ideology with respect to the country because more extreme right parties indicate growing support for the platform (Funke, Schularick, Trebesch, 2015). The other variable being utilized in this paper represents the percentage of the overall vote per country that extreme right parties received in the 2015 elections in Europe.

This leads to my first hypothesis, which is

H¹: Countries with higher extreme right support are more likely to have higher reported cases of violence against ethnic minorities.

Based on the design of the variable by the hypothesis, it is the belief of this author, that this data will provide a strong measure of the relationship between the degree of extreme right party support and rising violence per individual country, as well as the continent as a whole. Data for this variable was collected from World Book, Pew Research Center, and European Election Center.

Having examined variables concerning extreme right party support, it is important to move to move forward toward examining economic variables as they relate to violence in Europe. It is this paper's belief of this paper that nations with higher levels of unemployment are more likely to have higher reported cases of violence against ethnic minorities. To examine this, the unemployment rate of each country will be analyzed to determine relative impact economic variables have on the growing rates of violence. In addition to unemployment, other economic variables such as GDP per capita, Income Inequality rates, and Purchasing Power Parity will also be utilized to examine the exact nature of the relationship. As a result, my second hypothesis is:

H²: Countries with higher unemployment rates are more likely to have higher reported cases against ethnic minorities

Based on the existing literature, these economic variables represent the relative importance of economic factors and their relationship to violence against ethnic minorities on the continent. Data for this variable was collected from the 2015 World Bank and Global Development Indices.

With Europe currently undergoing a refugee crisis stemming from Middle Eastern political, and violent tumult, what is being shared by nearly all European countries is a degree of cultural infusion, challenging European identity at its core. The existing body, in its focus on social movement, economic and religious theoretical foundations, finds the refugee crisis having an impact in all areas of understanding. Drawing on the current body of literature and its focus on negative perceptions of Muslims (Koopmans, 2015), it is the belief of this author that the refugee crisis has a direct relationship to the current rise of electoral support for extreme right parties on the continent. As the refugee crisis continues to grow more problematic, this will only increase these parties attempt to use the crisis as a means to gain support as the party who maintains Europe's shared identity; the party who will maintain their safety and security. Therefore, my third hypothesis is:

H³: Countries with higher refugee populations are more likely to have higher electoral support for extreme right parties.

Data for this variable was collected from the UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees) database, and the European Election Center.

With a relatively high amount of the existing literature focusing on religious factors being a motivation for violent actions against ethnic minorities, an understanding of this variable is needed. To analyze the relationship between religion and violence, this paper will look at the percentage of self-identified Muslims in each European country, to examine its relationship to the reported cases of violence on the continent. As a result, my second hypothesis is:

H⁴: Countries with larger populations of Muslims are more likely to have higher reported cases of violence against ethnic minorities.

Taking into account the existing literature, Muslim population provides the most accurate variable to determine if religious motivations correlate to violence against ethnic minorities, given that extreme right parties have risen to greater popularity on the backs of candidates who utilize fear of Muslims as a means to gain support (Guibernau, 2010).

In keeping with the literature focus on religious factors playing a role in reported cases against ethnic minorities in Europe, this paper will examine the potential role that the religion of those who commit these acts of violence. As the literature indicates, the Catholic Church has recently pushed middle right candidates in countries throughout Europe. The hope is for these candidates to preserve Catholic social teachings, but also to curb extremism that leads to violence that the Church does not wish to see. As a result, my fifth and final hypothesis is:

H⁵: Countries with larger populations of Catholics are more likely to have lower reported cases of violence against ethnic minorities.

The combination of these three hypotheses supports my theory that extreme-right parties across the continent are in large part responsible for the rising number of reported cases against ethnic minorities. These hypotheses also strengthen how these extreme right parties use highly public, and problematic occurrences such as the refugee crisis as a means in which to garner support. This paper establishes a basis for the future direction of the role extreme right sentiment may play in relation to the

reported cases of violence. That will also establish the future of the rise or fall of the reported cases of violence, and if the motivations will remain the same.

CHAPTER IX

METHODOLOGY

To display these relationships in tangible terms, a multivariate regression will be utilized. In the case of this research, multiple independent variables included in this paper, are best understood utilizing a multivariate regression and will provide the findings with more fruitful conclusions, in hopes of adding further explanatory might to my theoretical basis. The multivariate regression model provides the best method in investigating the interrelationships of two or more variables because the technique uses a wide variety of statistics to find and measure associations between variables when additional sets of factors have been introduced. It is especially appropriate for causal analysis (Johnson, et. Al, 2008). The dependent variable, Violence (Violence), utilizes data from the DirexIndex, Anne Frank Violence Database, UNHCR, and the European Spallation Source. The measure of relative violence is determined by the overall total of threats, discrimination, killings, and destruction of property that are reported by the ethnic minority populations of individual European countries, and are believed to be motivated by extreme right political sentiment. Because these reported cases of violence were recorded as extreme right violence by the authorities, only these violence measures will be utilized in this paper, so as to systematically separate racist and extreme right violence for overlapping in the data.

The first independent variable, Muslim population (MuslimPop), is measured by the percentage of the population of any given European country that is Muslim. Data for this variable was collected from the Pew Research Center. Extreme right (ExtSup) support is measured by the total number of extreme right parties contained within each European country. It is also measured by the percentage of the overall vote these parties obtained in the election. Data for this variable was retrieved from the European Election Center. Refugee population (RefPop) is a simple measure of the total refugee population in each respective European country. Unemployment rate (UnEmploy) is the rate of unemployment each European country currently faces. The data from this variable was collected from World Bank. The variable GDP per capita population (GDPPERCap) is the country's total gross domestic product divided by their population. This data was gathered from the World Bank. The purchasing power parity (PPP) is the relative value of a set of typical consumer goods in each country as compared to their value in US dollars. The independent variable income inequality (IncomeIneq) is based on the World Bank's Gini Index

values. These values are ascertained from the area between the country's Lorenz Curve, measuring the distribution of income in the country's population, and a measure of perfect income distribution. The Catholic population (CathPop) was collected from the Vatican database and Catholic Hierarchy.

The total number of cases in this project stands at 26, and it consists of countries in which there was available data for the variables included in this paper. Although Europe presents a very Small-N case, its data, under current circumstances, cannot be ignored, given the need for fruitful findings that explain what has come to be a growing problem, that could soon consume not just at risk groups Europe, but similar groups across the globe.

Results

Table 1. Violence Indicators

| Independent Variables | Model 1 Unstandardized B | T Value | Statistical Significance |
|-----------------------|-----------------------------|---------|-----------------------------|
| MuslimPop | 18.235 | 2.415 | .028*** |
| ElecSup | 3.549 | .760 | .458 |
| CathPop | -1.337 | -1.035 | .316 |
| RefPop | .001 | .278 | .374 |
| ExtRigPar | .12.728 | 1.044 | .312 |
| Unemploy | -17.169 | -1.884 | .078 |
| GDPPERCap | -.005 | -2.149 | .047*** |
| IncomeIneq | -3.040 | -.227 | .823 |
| PPP | .065 | .764 | .456 |
| N | 26 | | |
| R Square | .651 | | |

Note: Coefficients are unstandardized. Significant at .05***

CHAPTER X

ECONOMIC FACTORS

As stated in the methodology section, this paper utilized a multiple regression analysis to examine the relationship between socioeconomic variables and violence predictors. Table 1 encapsulates these results. In the first examination of the overall model, it displays a 65.1% R square value indicating that this model has a relatively high degree of explanatory power. With a relatively high R Square value, the first set of data provides interesting results, in that there are findings that speak to a significant portion of existing literature. What the findings also demonstrate, is that there are variables which do not add to the explanatory power of the table, which are PPP, and Incomelneq, which may indicate that a better variable within those variables exists. The unstandardized coefficients in this model, and their ability to hold other predictors in this model as constants, display fascinating unit changes. With a B value of -17.169, the relationship between unemployment (Unemploy) and the number of reported cases of violence against ethnic minorities appears to be a causal one. With an unstandardized B value of this nature, the findings display non-unique results, most notably that as unemployment increases, reported cases of violence against minorities increase. GDPPerCap shows a remarkable causal effect on violence, given its relationship to the rest of the economic variables. With a unstandardized coefficient of -.005, this variable demonstrates a markedly different story than the seemingly outdated grievance model theory. Indicating, that as GDPPerCap goes down, reported cases of violence against ethnic minorities rise significantly.

What is also important within this variable is that it also speaks to upheaval at the federal level and the future of the EU (European Union). After Brexit (England's departure from the EU), exit polling (Financial Times, 2016) indicated trade, and immigration as key factors for voters favoring leaving the EU. Both of these factors play significant roles in determining a country's GDPPerCapita. In understanding the basic tenants of the grievance model, violence against immigrants, who can play substantial roles in deterring GDP, would face an increased chance of violence in such a created climate. This would be exacerbated by another element of the grievance model, wherein which these extreme right parties would prey on this uncertainty and fear of the economic uncertainty by finding an easy target in which to place blame. Even a cursory glance at the extreme right platforms in Europe, such as France's Marie Le Pen,

the Netherlands Geert Wilders, and Sweden's Jimmie Akesson, see these grievance model, political opportunist strategies at work (Stokes, 2016). Because the GDPPerCapita variable presents such a drastic change in statistical significance, running this against a variable such as reported cases of violence against ethnic minorities per ten thousand would add further explanatory power.

Table 2. GDP and Violence

| Independent Variables | Model 2 Unstandardized B | t Value | Statistical Significance |
|-----------------------|-----------------------------|---------|-----------------------------|
| (Constant) | | 3.761 | .001 |
| GDPPerCap | -1.568E-5 | -1.969 | .061 |

Because of the recent political opportunism surrounding immigration and its effect on the economy, and the body of existing literature, it was the belief of this author that the data would more than show the relationship between economic variables and reported cases of violence against ethnic minorities in Europe. What is indicated is that existing theoretical foundation is still relevant. Although the motivations for violence could be slightly altered, it breaks around foundational lines. What this could denote a movement towards renewing such economic theory as foundations and call for action in creating expanded variables, and theoretical framework based more on current happenings and environments. Since a strong relationship between these presented economic variables and reported cases of violence is supported by the results, the data displays that economic variables play a demonstrably large role in violence on the continent.

Since the data indicates that countries with higher populations (UK, France, Netherlands, and Germany) experience higher frequencies of reported cases of violence against ethnic minorities, this measure may not have the highest degree of explanatory power. A larger population of possible targets in which to inflict violence upon skews the data towards countries with larger populations. Therefore, running a regression that instead measures violence per ten thousand people could add to the explanatory power of the study.

Table 3. Unemployment and Violence

| Independent Variables | Model 3 Unstandardized B | t Value | Statistical Significance |
|-----------------------|-----------------------------|---------|-----------------------------|
| (Constant) | .162 | .529 | .602 |
| Unemployment | .050 | 2.288 | .031*** |

a. Dependent Variable: (violence/population)*10000




Figure 1. Unemployment in Europe

When the dependent variable is changed to violence per ten thousand, a causal relationship between unemployment and violence is evident. This change can also be witnessed in the scatter plot, as higher population countries with similar unemployment rates demonstrate a trend of decreased violence. As the reported cases of violence per ten thousand increase, the countries present demonstrate higher reported cases of violence, but relative employment rates. As the chart denotes, countries such as Montenegro, Bosnia, Lithuania, Slovenia, and Croatia have high reported cases of violence per ten thousand. Not only does this indicate a trend among countries with a higher population, but also displays relative rates of unemployment that are below 20%.

CHAPTER XI

REFUGEE CRISIS IMPACT

Given that the number of refugees an individual country can absorb varies drastically due to a myriad of circumstances, the relatively minimal effect RefPop had as a causal factor of violence was not unexpected. While future causal relationship between Refpop and reported cases of violence may rise drastically as the refugee crisis worsens, the results did not indicate that it was a determiner for reported cases of violence against ethnic minorities. Given that population sizes in Europe can differ drastically, again, a measure of violence per ten thousand people gives this variable increased explanatory power.

Table 4. Refugee Impact

| Independent Variables | Model 4 Unstandardized B | t Value | Statistical Significance |
|-----------------------|-----------------------------|---------|-----------------------------|
| (Constant) | | 3.821 | .001 |
| Refpop | -4.476E-6 | -1.503 | .146 |

a. Dependent Variable: (violence/population)*10000

What the data seemingly indicate is that even a variable measured per ten thousand people suffers from relative population distribution within Europe. The data also displays countries as outliers that skew the data to the extremes. Former Yugoslavian countries such as Montenegro and Bosnia, who have decidedly higher reported cases of violence against ethnic minorities per ten thousand, have a relatively low refugee population. In the cases of France, Germany and the United Kingdom, however, there is relatively low violence, but a high refugee population.

CHAPTER XII

CATHOLIC PEACE THEORY?

With the literature's focus on Catholic countries pushing center right candidates across Europe, thereby insinuating less reported cases of violence against ethnic minorities in countries with Catholicism as the dominant religion, it's not surprising the results seem to indicate the accuracy of this theoretical foundation. The data indicates that as Catholic Populations go up, reported cases of violence against ethnic minorities go down. Although this data is not statistically significant, it does seem to concur with the existing literature in the Catholic Church's ability to curtail violence by pushing moderate candidates. In recent years, the papal election of a religious leader such as Pope Francis has moved the church to look beyond traditional issues (Laruelle, 2015). The Pope's platform of improved treatment of refugees and the displaced has had a tangible effect on European countries with high Catholic populations. To better view this effect on the dependent variable, it is prudent, due to Europe's population disparity, to measure it against reported cases of violence against ethnic minorities per ten thousand. In doing so, a more thorough understanding of the violence rates in countries with Catholic populations can be understood.

Table 5. Catholicism Lowering Violence?

| Independent Variables | Model 5 Beta (Standard Error) | t Value | Statistical Significance |
|-----------------------|----------------------------------|---------|-----------------------------|
| (Constant) | | 3.821 | .004 |
| CathPop | -.007 | -1.185 | .248 |

a. Dependent Variable: (violence/population)*10000




Figure 2. Religious Impace by Population

A visible representation, in this case, is more advantageous to see the correlation suggested in the table. As in other results, there appear to be regional variances that are, perhaps, skewing the data. What this chart also indicates is that where the Catholic Church has been successful pushing middle right candidates (Spain, Italy, Portugal, and Poland) violence has been reduced significantly, and represent the lowest reported cases of violence on the continent (Benestad, 2015). The low statistical significance, however, could also indicate that a better variable exists to measure the relationship. A variable that measures religiosity within parishioners could speak to the level in which Catholicism is preventing violence on the continent. Given the recent success of extreme right parties on the continent, the coming elections will provide no shortage of examples indicating how center-right candidates are performing in such sociopolitical atmospheres. And if the church's message of moderate behavior is effective in curtailing violence.

CHAPTER XIII
ELECTORAL SUPPORT

In the case of electoral support for extreme right parties (ExtRigPar) and the electoral support (ElecSup) they receive in each country, the data does not reject the null hypothesis. The findings, however, are not statistically significant. With t values of .760, and 1.044, there is a trend between the mean reported cases of violence and extreme right political presence. The data indicates that there are more reported cases of violence against minorities in countries with high extreme right support, but only marginally. Similar to the unemployment findings, a trend developed with countries with high populations displaying a higher number of reported cases of violence against ethnic minorities. Because these numbers could be skewed by a higher population, meaning it could be conducive to low explanatory power. Therefore, a controlled test with violence per ten thousand could be more revealing.

Table 6. Electoral Support for Extreme Right Parties

| Independent Variables | Model 6 Unstandardized B | t Value | Statistical Significance |
|-----------------------|-----------------------------|---------|-----------------------------|
| (Constant) | | .576 | .570 |
| ElecSup | .019 | 1.095 | .284 |

a. Dependent Variable: (violence/population)*10000

In the findings for violence per ten thousand, the findings suggest a relationship between the two variables, but not a particularly strong one. With every percentage point of electoral support, there are an additional .02 reported cases of violence against ethnic minorities on average. What the findings also demonstrate, is that in countries where electoral support is high, and the population is low, reported cases of violence increase. As is also indicated similarly in the unemployment findings, there is again, a trend that demonstrates several Eastern European countries have both high extreme right wing support and high reported cases of violence per ten thousand during this period. This perhaps suggests a geographical influence upon these variables.

CHAPTER XIV

VIOLENCE AGAINST MUSLIMS

In what is perhaps the most telling finding from the data, Muslim Population has a direct relation to the number of reported cases of violence against ethnic minorities on the continent. These are results that correlate high Muslim populations with reported cases of violence against ethnic minorities. When coupled with a statistical significance of .028, there is a clear and reflection of the relationship between these variables. Also notable is that two countries possess substantially higher rates of violence and maintain large Muslim populations (Montenegro, and Bosnia). Findings that continue to develop a trend of geographic similarities in the data have been pertinent in each regression. Because the data is so statistically significant, it's beneficial to check it against a more specified variable. As with the other regressions, we will again run reported cases of violence against ethnic minorities per ten thousand, against the Muslim population in European perspective countries.

Table 7. Muslim Population

| Independent Variables | Model 7 Unstandardized B | t Value | Statistical Significance |
|-----------------------|-----------------------------|---------|-----------------------------|
| (Constant) | | 1.839 | .078 |
| MuslimPop | .070 | 3.754 | .001*** |

When ran against reported cases of violence per ten thousand, the results become even more fascinating. With a B value of .070, a result that was not unexpected, but the statistics could indicate that a large-N would be better for such a measure. What also continues is a trend of the regional variance of violence that sees Eastern Europe with significantly higher relationships between violence and the respective variables. In this case, Bosnia and Montenegro having much higher Muslim populations than other countries included in this study, while experiencing significantly more violence, likely contributes to the high level of significance of this regression. With this in mind, running a regression that does not include Bosnia and Montenegro becomes necessary to understand the phenomenon better.

Table 8. Eastern European Shift

| Independent Variables | Model 8 Unstandardized B | t Value | Statistical Significance |
|-----------------------|-----------------------------|---------|-----------------------------|
| (Constant) | | 2.986 | .007*** |
| MuslimPop | .062 | 3.534 | .002*** |
| NonEastern | -.713 | -.342 | .036*** |

a. Dependent Variable: (violence/population)*10000




Figure 3. Non-Western Trends

The results from this regression are significant in that they display a demonstrably high relationship between NonEastern (.062) European countries, MuslimPop (-.713) and instances of reported cases of violence against ethnic minorities. They are also significant because they relay a larger story with a more region specific concentration of violence. What is also compelling is that even under reports of violence per ten thousand people there's a notable trend that is unique among this region specific concentration.

Because Non-Eastern European data appears to be statistically significant in its relationship to the number of reported cases of violence against ethnic minorities, a further modification of the variable seems to be vindicated. A cursory glance as the scatter plot implies that an easy modification of the variable can be made by limiting the variable to Balkan countries. While it would be an imperfect variable, given that data for the complete list of Balkan countries is not available, the Balkan countries that skew the data provide for an efficient test of the variable. What the results also signify is that this variable can also be broken down into former Yugoslavian countries, given that these countries appear to set the trend

among the regional variances of reported cases of violence. Therefore, a variable measuring countries that designate these two regional areas will add understanding to outcomes that are drastically skewing the data, leading to extreme outliers that may or may not misinterpret what is happening, and what the relationship is. Because the Non-Eastern variable does a poor job of isolating the specific region in question, a Former-Yugoslavian variable is needed.

Given the relative significance of MuslimPop this paper finds it important to look at the data without this variable, to see how it affects the other data if removed. In doing so, it hopes to create a visual representation of the impact higher populations of Muslims per country are having on the continent.

Table 9. Islamic Variable Removed

| Independent Variables | Model 9 Unstandardized B | T Value | Statistical Significance |
|-----------------------|-----------------------------|---------|-----------------------------|
| (Constant) | | 1.531 | .144 |
| ElecSup | -.029 | .435 | .669 |
| CathPop | -.008 | -1.251 | .228 |
| RefPop | 4.609E-6 | 1.220 | .239 |
| ExtRigPar | .029 | 1.443 | .167 |
| Unemploy | .023 | -.084 | .934 |
| GDPPerCap | .1.860E-5 | -1.567 | .136 |
| IncomeIneq | .034 | -.542 | .595 |
| PPP | -.001 | .454 | .656 |
| N | 26 | | |
| R Square | .524 | | |

As the results show, when the MuslimPop variable is removed, its effect on the other variables is considerably tangible. In previous models, economic variables displayed relative degrees of collinearity, however, with MuslimPop removed, there is no relationship for them with the dependent variable. These results are fascinating because they indicate a departure from the existing literature, in that most economic variables may not be the driving factor behind the extreme right violence. Economic factors may only exacerbate the problem, while not being the underlying cause. What is also evident in these results is that it speaks to a changing dynamic in the cultural motivations of violence. From a theoretical perspective, the literature points to economic factors awakening cultural issues that lead to violence. This data seemingly points to an inverse relationship between the two, where cultural concerns trump economic concerns, and are made worse by the use of a grievance model foundational understanding.

CHAPTER XV
GHOSTS OF YUGOSLAVIA

Because of the extreme cases presented by the Former Yugoslavian countries, this paper will conduct a second study that isolates the five countries included in the data set which was part of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia before the Yugoslav Wars. The states, namely Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Slovenia, Croatia, and Montenegro, have had decidedly high rates of violence as well as consistently high rates of each other indicator this study has found statistically significant. Examining an independent test of former Yugoslavian countries may provide more insight into the factors of violence against minorities. Given these circumstances, it is vital to remove data from other regions in Europe, to focus on the formeryugo countries solely. Given their impact as an outlier to the results of this study, separating in results that show the tangible outcomes is essential. Because the formeryugo countries skewed the data most notably within the Unemploy, MuslimPop, and ElecSup, it is essential to run those variables to get a fuller understanding of what are an extremely troubling number of reported cases of violence against ethnic minorities.

Table 10. Former Yugoslavian Countries

| Independent Variables | Model 10 Unstandardized B | T Value | Statistical Significance |
|-----------------------|------------------------------|---------|-----------------------------|
| (Constant) | .514 | 1.461 | .159 |
| FormerYugo | 1.399 | 2.948 | .008 |
| MuslimPop | .064 | 2.559 | .018 |
| ElecSup | .001 | .036 | .972 |
| Unemploy | -.037 | 2.559 | .213 |
| N | | | |

As prior models displayed notable relationships between MuslimPop and Unemploy and reported cases of violence against ethnic minorities, it also showed a significant trend of those relationships concentrated among FormerYugo countries. So when these variables are run against a variable indicating only FormerYugo countries, this paper expected to see similar, if not even more significant relationships. With the statistical significance of MuslimPop remaining high in both t value and statistically, perhaps a greater phenomenon is at play. As the academic community struggles yet still to comprehend the Yugoslavian breakup, its high levels of systemic violence also present increasingly complex

occurrences. As former leaders (Goran Hadžić, and Ratko Mladić) still stand trial in the international courts for war crimes and crimes against humanity against Croats and Muslims, the specter of such violence still haunts the region (Mak, 1995). Under such inauspicious circumstances, such violence would seem to be an expected outcome. Outside of post-WWII tumult across Europe, these FormerYugo countries present sociopolitical circumstances that simply do not exist in other regions throughout Europe. As European countries can claim a shared identity, these five countries continue to forge their perspective cultures, separating from a collective identity forced upon them through conquest and bitter conflict.

What is also unique to the region, is that both Bosnia and Montenegro contain parties that can be labeled as an extreme right that is made up of mostly Muslims. In more modern research, these issues were faced by the realization that there can be political violence that is motivated by identity politics rather than ethnicity (Koopmans, 2014). Therefore, political opponents of a left-wing nature can commit crimes against individuals contained within a party comprised mostly of Muslims, and have it be motivated by purely non-extreme right motivations. Data from the region does not systematically remove this as a possibility, so to improve the validity of violence data from the region, the exact nature of the crimes committed against ethnic minorities must be formulated.

The consequences of forging a new nation with separating cultures are that the specter of violence is ingrained in its societal structuring. With this violence as a culpable factor in the sentiment of extreme right party support, the region's blossoming Muslim population acts as a test to an emerging identity (Theodorou, 2015). With such an inundated history of systemic violence, any drastic changes in the socioeconomic balance would be detrimental to preventing violence. A multitude of tests have shown that these variations of discrimination and violence in these countries can be largely attributed to a person's immigrant status, whether or not they're Muslim, and the specific region from which they hail. A multitude of these tests showcases that their particular status, indicating religion and region, is a large determiner of violence, in all its forms (Dancygier, Laitin, 2014).

The FormerYugo countries appear to break along theoretical foundations. The data would indicate that this is accurate. Due to the elevated significance of the data, however, further extensive research of the expansion of variables is necessary to glean a more thorough understanding of the causes of violence in the region. In the expansion of these variables, later research must take into

account regional variances in violence due to a systemic history of ethnic violence in the area. Under these circumstances, and only these circumstances can the results indicate a true measure of the relationship between the violence and the variables.

CHAPTER XVI

FUTURE RESEARCH/RECOMMENDATIONS

After undertaking a thorough review of the findings, it's evident that a great deal of the existing literature on the causes of violence remain accurate. From an economic perspective, the Unemploy and GDPPERCap variables, as the literature predicted, were statistically significant at .078 and .047 respectively. Economic variables present further research with a strong basis in which to understand violence in Europe, especially in relationship to the grievance model theoretical foundations. An in-depth analysis of a more micro level nature could provide more fruitful results. If an extreme right party is finding an inordinate amount of support in a region of a specific European country, then researching the causes of that support is crucial. A more penetrating look into unemployment and other economic variables into a perspective part of the country would provide results that are perhaps more indicative of relative support and its relationship to reported cases of violence.

Because the existing literature struggles to keep up with the rising Muslim populations and the subsequent refugee crisis on the continent, a more dedicated concentration to it is essential for future research. With Muslim population being so statistically significant at .028, its relationship to increased violence is evident. As previous models indicated, when the MuslimPop is removed, its impact on the results is tangible, indicating its significance to the reported cases of violence against ethnic minorities to be considerable. Creating variables that provide a more in-depth analysis to the Muslim Populations in individual countries could provide even greater explanatory power. Understanding the populist movements that brought about Brexit and the election of Donald Trump in America are crucial. In this understanding, future research must not strictly adhere to existing literature on violence against ethnic minorities. The data, as this paper demonstrates, indicates the motivations behind these cases of violence are being dictated by ethnicity at rates that precede catastrophic events.

CHAPTER XVII

CONCLUSION

In the beginning, this paper asked a complicated question: is the growing extreme right political movement in Europe responsible for the increased violence against ethnic minorities on the continent? It concludes that the extreme right isn't wholly responsible for the upswing in reported cases of violence against ethnic minorities in Europe. The data in Europe does not correlate extreme right electoral support with the reported cases of violence. As the answers to my hypotheses will prove, however, they have utilized methods to exacerbate socioeconomic issues to their advantage. For my first hypothesis, I hypothesized that European countries with higher levels of extreme right support were more likely to have higher reported cases of violence against ethnic minorities. As I stated in the opening of this conclusion, the data simply doesn't support this. This may indicate that a better variable within the extreme right support variable exists to add further explanatory power. This unexpected outcome speaks to a large degree of the uncertainty revolving around the existing literature on the modern day extreme right.

In my second hypothesis, it was this paper's feeling that countries with higher levels of unemployment would be more likely to have higher reported cases of violence against ethnic minorities. This proved to be accurate and vindicates a great deal of existing literature. When ran against violence per ten thousand people variable, the significance improved dramatically, at .031. Because of Europe's wide range of population disparity, a measure of violence per ten thousand added to the explanatory power of unemployment and showed a significant relationship between the two variables. In my third hypothesis, the question of the relationship between violence and the refugee crisis is raised. This paper hypothesized that because of the refugee crisis, thereby raising the total of the refugee populations across Europe, that countries with the highest population of refugees would be more likely to experience more reported cases of violence. This, too, did not find a correlation in the results, even when measured against violence per ten thousand people. Because of the relative newness of the refugee crisis, refugee populations are rising, and this variables relationship to violence could be significant in the coming years.

In what is perhaps the most important finding of this paper, the relationship between the percentage of the population that is Muslim in a given country and violence displayed great significance. Displaying relevant findings in both measures of violence, Muslim populations effect on violence is

undeniable. Even more telling, was the results of removing the Muslim population variable from the data, and the tangible effect it had on previously significant results, which were now not statistically significant. Muslim population, among variables, displays the highest degree of explanatory significance and is the single greatest determiner of violence against ethnic minorities in Europe according to this paper. Because of the relative population disparity in Europe, Muslim population being equally significant when ran against violence per ten thousand people is the most telling result this paper has produced, and will likely speak to a larger section of future research done on the topic. For this paper's fifth and final hypothesis, it speculated that countries with higher Catholic populations would display a lower level of reported cases of violence against ethnic minorities. Thus correlating with the Church's support of middle right candidates across the continent, and the ideological changes centering around the election of Pope Francis. The results did indicate that countries with higher Catholic populations, on average, experienced fewer reported cases of violence, the results were not statistically significant, and were even less so when measured against violence per ten thousand people.

Extreme right parties in Europe are gaining support and authority across Europe. This coincides with increases in reported cases of violence against ethnic minorities on the continent. While the data does not present a direct relationship, the results brought forth by this paper provide more than ample evidence to support an indirect relationship between the variables. As Muslim populations go up, there is a direct correlation to exponentially more reported cases of violence. Where rates of unemployment are high, and GDP per capita are dropping, reported cases of violence against ethnic minorities are also high. Extreme right parties across the continent are enforcing their respective platforms with these issues and garnering support from groups receptive to their message. In physics, there are certain truths one must abide by to understand the laws of nature. One of these truths is that a pendulum that remains in a negative state continues to store energy for its ultimate transfer back to a positive state. This truth can also be said of Europe. The horrific warfare and crimes against humanity that were witnessed in both WWI and WWII were merely a culmination of centuries-old cultural issues that are compounded by the arrival of ethnic groups for which blame can be placed. As the refugee crisis worsens, and culturally different populations continue to flood into Europe, the pendulum that is the European conflict has started

to build energy yet again. As violence against ethnic minorities continues due to the factors stated in this paper, it is only a matter of time before the pendulum has stored enough energy.

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