

SYRIAN MIGRATION UNDER THE UMBRELLA OF TERRORISM: INFLUENCING
FACTORS OF IMMIGRATION ATTITUDES WITHIN THE EUROPEAN UNION

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ABSTRACT

SYRIAN MIGRATION UNDER THE UMBRELLA OF TERRORISM: INFLUENCING FACTORS OF IMMIGRATION ATTITUDES WITHIN THE EU

by Austin Bowman

The goal of this thesis is to better understand the relationship between acts of terrorism and immigration attitudes within the European Union. Past research carried out within the EU suggests that the occurrence of terrorist attacks is directly related to the heightening of negative public attitude towards immigration. Building onto this theoretical framework, it is posited that this association extends itself to the case of Syrian refugees following the November 13, 2015, Paris Attacks. More Specifically, it is expected that following the Paris Attacks, there occurred a negative shift in attitudes towards both Syrian refugees and immigration as a whole within the EU. Using survey questions drawn from the European Commission's Eurobarometer 84.3, this research measures the dependent variable as attitudes towards Syrian refugees before and after the attacks. This research finds that the Paris Attacks are strongly correlated with increasing hostility towards Syrian refugees. Further analysis reveals the significance of racial affinity in determining those migrant groups most affected by the above influences and the important role of economic security, education, and European identity in mitigating this relationship. These findings make clear that future European terror attacks can be expected to foster hostility towards Syrian refugees. For those EU member states in the process of admitting Syrian refugees or with the intention to do so, these findings also suggest the prudence of public policies promoting economic security, educational attainment, and European identity as opposed to nationalism.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Entering the seventh year of a civil war that began in 2011, the inhabitants of Syria have endured mass devastation and displacement suffering roughly 450,000 casualties to date, 50,000 of whom were children.¹ Serving as a living reminder of this horror to the global community are the 4 million plus who have fled since the outbreak of war and the countless others who will certainly follow.² It is currently estimated that there are 8.7 million internally displaced within Syria, a number that suggests what has been termed the “Syrian Migration Crisis” is far from over.³ Among those enduring the status of a refugee in exchange for a future that otherwise seems bleak, are 1.3 million Syrians who have traveled to Europe.⁴ For a vast number of these refugees, the journey to Europe was incredibly perilous; entailing the recruitment of smugglers, fear of human trafficking, overcrowded boats, undersupplied refugee camps, hostile borders, and the loss of legal status and rights.⁵ Perhaps most frightful of all, is the rather arduous and abstract process by which refugees eventually must integrate and find social and legal acceptance within the European countries in which they settle.

Despite the horror that is the Syrian Civil War, contemporary politics in the European Union have become increasingly detached from questions regarding how incorporation of Syrian refugees might be streamlined in favor of a fixation on the possible danger these individuals pose to the cultural unity and integral security of Europe. This point is best illustrated through the case

¹ "Syrian Refugee Crisis." I Am Syria. <http://www.iamsyria.org/syrian-refugee-crisis.html>.

² "Syria Emergency." UNHCR The UN Refugee Agency. <http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/syria-emergency.html>.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Connor, Phillip. "Number of Refugees to Europe Surges to Record 1.3 Million in 2015." Pew Research Center. August 02, 2016. <http://www.pewglobal.org/2016/08/02/number-of-refugees-to-europe-surges-to-record-1-3-million-in-2015/>.

⁵ "UNICEF Refugee and Migrant Crisis: Child Alert." Unicef. June 2016. https://www.unicef.org/emergencies/childrenonthemove/files/Child_Alert_Final_PDF.pdf.

example of Alan Kurdi, a three-year old Syrian Refugee who in the process of crossing from Turkey to Greece drowned alongside his brother and mother when their overcrowded rubber raft capsized in high waves.⁶ Alan's body was washed away as his father struggled in vain to save his brother and mother and was later discovered and photographed lying lifeless on the shore of Turkey. While this photograph quickly rose in prominence, conveying a glimpse of the innumerable tragedies that have been and will be suffered by such refugees, a counter-message was not long in forming. The controversial French satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo responded to this tragedy by publishing a cartoon depicting a man chasing after and groping at a frightened woman, which was titled, "Migrants" and read, "What would little Alan have grown up to be? A groper in Germany."⁷ This publication while highly controversial and by no means representative of the sentiment of Europe or even France as a whole sheds light on the divisive nature of Syrian migration and begs the question, what factors might make certain individuals prone to sympathetic sentiment towards refugees while others are constrained by fear?

Contrasting humanitarian and security-oriented perspectives regarding the Syrian Migration Crisis cannot be reduced to a difference of facts, instead this research poses that such variation is the sum product of a multidimensional relationship between subjective values, personal identity, and socio-economic positioning. Of these rather broad categories, subjective values are the most abstract and consequently highly prone to change. It is argued that while understanding the importance of subjective values is a critical component of advancing the theoretical body of knowledge surrounding the formation of immigration attitudes, it is also

⁶ Barnard, Anne, and Karam Shoumali. "Image of Drowned Syrian, Aylan Kurdi, 3, Brings Migrant Crisis Into Focus." *The New York Times*. September 3, 2015. <http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/04/world/europe/syria-boy-drowning.html>.

⁷ Hume, Tim. "Outrage over Charlie Hebdo cartoon of dead toddler Alan Kurdi as sex attacker." *CNN*. Accessed January 14, 2016. <http://www.cnn.com/2016/01/14/europe/france-charlie-hebdo-aylan-kurdi/>.

important to acknowledge the shifting nature of these values and those events, which might prompt their change. Specifically, this research is concerned with security-laden values, which might lead an individual to view Syrian refugees not as any other citizens, but instead as a separate class of social deviants. It is put forward that a largely ignored component of this relationship is the occurrence of major terrorist attacks in Europe, which not only encourage citizens to question their own safety but also to identify a source upon which to heap blame for such tragedy.

Problem Statement

This thesis is intended to provide a better understanding of the relationship between acts of terrorism and immigration attitudes within the European Union. Past research carried out within the EU suggests that the occurrence of terrorist attacks is directly related to the heightening of negative public attitude towards immigration.⁸ Building onto this theoretical framework, it is posited that this association extends itself to the case of Syrian refugees following the November 13, 2015, Paris Attacks. More specifically, it is expected that following the Paris Attacks, there occurred a negative shift in attitudes towards both Syrian refugees and non-EU immigrants as a whole within the EU. Using Survey questions to measure the dependent variable, attitudes towards Syrian refugees, in conjunction with the independent variable, the occurrence of the Paris Attacks, this research will be able to gauge the impact that these attacks

⁸ Legewie, Joscha. "Terrorist Events and Attitudes toward Immigrants: A Natural Experiment." *American Journal of Sociology* 118, no. 5 (2013): 1199-245.; Schuller, Simone. "The Effects of 9/11 on Attitudes Toward Immigration and the Moderating Role of Education." *SOEP* no. 54 (2013).; Hitlan, Robert; Carillo, Kimberly; Zarate, Michaela, and Shelleyn Aikman. "Attitudes Toward Immigrant Groups and the September 11 Terrorist Attacks." *Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology* 13, no. 2 (2007): 135-152.; Economou, Athina; Iacovos, Psarianos, and Christos Kallias. "Terrorism and Attitudes Towards Immigration in Europe." *Discussion Paper Series* 14, no. 1 (2014).

had on public attitudes towards Syrian refugees. Furthermore, inclusion of traditional explanatory measures for immigration attitudes will help ensure that any attitudinal variance recorded is not falsely identified as being the result of terrorism. Such measures are of further value, allowing this research to identify those individual and country level influences that most greatly mitigate the supposed influence of terrorist attacks.

Findings from this research will help answer the overriding question; do acts of terrorism negatively impact popular support for Syrian refugees? Alongside answering the primary question of interest, this research model is also designed to account for cross-national support for EU and Non-EU migration prior to and following the Paris Attacks. It is expected that those migrants sharing an actual or perceived cultural affinity with the perpetrators of the Paris Attacks, Arabs at large, will experience the least popular support for migration amongst potential EU host nations. On this premise it is hypothesized that public opinion regarding Syrian refugees underwent a more dramatic negative shift than that towards immigration as a whole, which is not inclusive to individuals that might be commonly associated with those who carried out the Paris Attacks, as is the case of Syrian refugees.⁹ Accompanying analysis of the relationship between terrorism and public attitude towards Syrian refugees and immigrants, this research accounts for related literature offering validated and contested explanations regarding the formation of immigration attitudes. Lastly, inclusion of country-level dummy variables with France acting as a reference country will allow this research to account for the fact that despite being treated as a singular sample group, individuals included in this research are clustered according to those influences unique to their native country. While incapable of identifying those cultural, historic,

⁹ "Paris attacks: Who were the attackers?" BBC News. April 27, 2016. <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34832512>.

and other various factors that occur at the country level and mold natives' values, dummy variables offer a means by which to measure the cumulative effect of these variables. Such knowledge allows this research to highlight those countries that merit further analysis, paving the way for future research and theory building.

CHAPTER II

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

Prior to a discussion of the existing theoretical and methodological framework underpinning the relationship between terrorism and immigration attitudes, it is first important to establish a base understanding of those factors that have previously been identified as being influential. This research acknowledges that while acts of terrorism are hypothesized to promote negative immigration attitudes, the supposed influence of terrorism is not linear in nature; instead it acts within the bounds set by other variables. Therefore, it is crucial to first identify those variables, which might play an active role in mitigating or exacerbating the hypothesized effects of terrorism. Prominent amongst related literature are economic based theories, which suggest that measures of employment, salary, economic satisfaction, occupation, and job competition are causally related to immigration attitudes.¹⁰ These theories take root in the base premise that immigration whether a real or imagined source of job competition for natives, can be expected to be perceived as such by those who are the most economically vulnerable. However, there exists a large field of scholarship that refutes the notion that economic wellbeing and security primarily determines immigration attitudes.¹¹ Instead the mentioned body of scholarship points to the role

¹⁰ Mayda, Anna. "Who is Against Immigration? A Cross-Country Investigation of Individual Attitudes Toward Immigrants." *The Review of Economics and Statistics* 88, no. 3 (2006): 510-30.; Malchow-Moller, Nikolaj; Jakob, Munch; Sanne, Schroll, and Jan Skaksen. "Attitudes towards Immigration—Perceived Consequences and Economic Self-interest." *Economic Letters* 100, no. 2 (2008): 254-57.; Borjas, George. "The Labor Demand Curve Is Downward Sloping: Reexamining the Impact of Immigration on the Labor Market." *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 118, no. 4 (November 2003): 1335-374.; Rivera-Batiz, Francisco, Ira Gang, and Myeong-Su Yun. "Economic Strain, Ethnic Concentration and Attitudes Towards Foreigners in the European Union." IDEAS Working Paper Series, 2002.

¹¹ Hainmueller, Jens, and Michael Hiscox. "Educated Preferences: Explaining Attitudes Toward Immigration in Europe." *International Organization* 61, no. 2 (2007): 399-442.; Rivera-Batiz, Francisco, Ira Gang, and Myeong-Su Yun. "Economic Strain, Education and Attitudes towards Foreigners in the European Union." *Review of International Economics* 21, no. 2 (April 15, 2013): 177-90.; Schuller, Simone. "The Effects of 9/11 on Attitudes Toward Immigration and the Moderating Role of Education." *SOEPpaper* no. 54 (2013).

of subjective values such as nationalism or globalism and the role of educational attainment in determining these outlooks. Once a substantive account of the varying theoretical explanations of the formation of immigration attitudes has been concluded, discussion of that literature specifically related to terrorism might be better interpreted and evaluated on its merit within the body of knowledge surrounding this topic.

Socio-Economic Theories

Employment and Economic Satisfaction

The longevity and general applicability of labor-market competition theory in predicting individual social attitudes, suggests the importance of its inclusion in any research model that seeks to account for those factors that mostly greatly mold immigration attitudes. Applied to the case of this research, labor-market competition theory suggests that those who either compete or view themselves as potential competition for immigrants are most likely to oppose their integration into the national body. Basing their research on the above premise, the 2002 work of Gang, Rivera-Batiz, and Yun finds strong support in favor of the proposed relationship.¹² Their work employs Eurobarometer data spanning the EU to study those variables that act as detriments to immigration attitudes. Interestingly it is found that simply being within the labor-market, whether employed or unemployed and seeking employment, makes an individual more likely to hold negative attitudes regarding immigration. It is further found that increasing migration concentrations within a country are correlated with opposition to further migration amongst natives. As a caveat it is suggested that education is strongly correlated with decreasing

¹² Rivera-Batiz, Francisco, Ira Gang, and Myeong-Su Yun. "Economic Strain, Ethnic Concentration and Attitudes Towards Foreigners in the European Union." IDEAS Working Paper Series, 2002.

labor-market considerations and general racism, which is found to be strongly predictive of immigration attitudes.

Finding that migrant concentration is correlated with negative immigration attitudes suggests that measurements of employment or unemployment and actual salaries might fail to fully operationalize labor-market competition theory. This is due to the fact that neither job status nor economic prosperity is entirely indicative of perceived job competition, which according to Gang, River-Batiz, and Yun can best be operationalized by determining if individuals are part of the labor market and if so, what level of migrant concentration exists in that market.¹³ Further research carried out by Scheve and Slaughter, however, finds that in the case of the U.S. increasing immigration can have dissimilar consequences in terms of perceived job competition in different places, suggesting that it is insufficient to rely solely on migration concentrations to predict feelings of economic competition.¹⁴ Instead it is argued that observation of individuals' skill level might better predict their economic vulnerability. This is based on the general assumption that regardless of the economic or cultural climate in which immigration occurs, those natives possessing the greatest degree of skill or education will experience little job competition while their unskilled or uneducated counterparts might fear outsourcing in favor of cheaper migrant labor. Ultimately, Scheve and Slaughter conclude that both measures of occupation and education prove significant in predicting negative attitudes towards immigration, while also downplaying the relationship between areas of high-immigration and such attitudes. These findings indicate that while migrant concentrations might play a role in encouraging anti-immigration feelings, such a measure fails to account for the uniqueness and resulting variance

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Scheve, Kenneth, and Matthew Slaughter. "Labor Market Competition and Individual Preferences Over Immigration Policy." *The Review of Economics and Statistics* 83, no. 1 (March 13, 2006): 133-45.

of individuals' economic situations, which largely influence migrant attitudes outside the context of migration within a native's country at large.

Later research carried out by Mayda, seems to confirm the work of Scheve and Slaughter, finding that there exists a positive relationship between the skill level of a host nation and native support for migrants entering the national body.¹⁵ Mayda's work is unique, however, in that it adds onto the research model left by Scheve and Slaughter, so as to account not only for native skill level, but also the skill level of the migrants who are expected to compete for native jobs. It is theorized by Mayda that it is crucial to account for both native and migrant skill level, because skilled natives are economically inclined to support immigration when it comes from groups that are less skilled than themselves, as such migration provides a source of cheap labor that benefits the economically advantaged. Conversely, these same high skill natives can be expected to oppose immigration when it consists of high skilled individuals. The relationships proposed by Mayda are confirmed through the use of cross-national surveys, with attitudinal measures being pulled from the International Social Survey Program.

For the purposes of this research, the findings of Mayda confirm that measures of average native skill level should be incorporated into the research model. Given the difficulty associated with directly measuring the skill level of Syrian refugees entering various EU nations included within this research, it is difficult to completely follow Mayda's advice. Yet the refugee status of migrant Syrians entering the EU largely excludes them from access to the full job market enjoyed by native citizens, hence it is argued by this research that these refugees can be considered low-skill migrants and therefore be expected to find acceptance amongst high skill

¹⁵ Mayda, Anna. "Who is Against Immigration? A Cross-Country Investigation of Individual Attitudes Toward Immigrants." *The Review of Economics and Statistics* 88, no. 3 (2006): 510-30.

natives. The work of Borjas, seems to further validate the relationship drawn from Mayda's scholarship relying on data drawn in the U.S. to find that immigration lowers the potential job opportunities and wages enjoyed by native citizens, but adds that the affected group is narrow in scope.¹⁶ As a practical consequence, Borjas argues that beyond being a high skill or low skill native, individual immigration attitudes are influenced by the specific occupation to which a native belongs. Despite this caveat, Borjas maintains that education and work experience remain significant explanatory variables of immigration attitudes.

Separate research carried out by Card, reconfirms the assertions of Borjas, but holds that measures of occupation are best able to predict immigration attitudes when accompanied by consideration of migrant concentration.¹⁷ This suggestion is based on Card's assertion that the existence of asset mobility within a country should allow its economy to adjust for inflows of migrants, making their economic impact negligible except in cases of above-average migration. It is still expected by Card that those natives belonging to an occupation perceived to be under threat by migrants should hold negative attitudes towards immigration; however, this relationship becomes much more pronounced under the presence of high immigration. Keeping with the scholarship of authors such as Scheve and Slaughter, as well as, Mayda this research incorporates measures of economic prosperity, and skill level, while also taking into account non-native migrant population within individual EU member states, so as to account for the negative impact of immigration identified by both Borjas and Card.

¹⁶ Borjas, George. "The Labor Demand Curve Is Downward Sloping: Reexamining the Impact of Immigration on the Labor Market." *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 118, no. 4 (November 2003): 1335-374.

¹⁷ Card, David, Christian Dustmann, and Ian Preston. "Understanding attitudes to immigration: The migration and minority module of the first European Social Survey." *Centre for Research and Analysis of Migration* 3, no. 5 (2005).

Building on the strain of thought that immigration has a perceived negative impact on native job opportunities regardless its real world consequences, the work of Moller, Munch, Schroll, and Skaksen argues that past methods of study regarding immigration attitudes have failed to account for the importance of the manner in which immigration is perceived by natives.¹⁸ The authors claim that measures of economic success, such as education, employment, and occupation while at first sight seem to indicate an individual's economic vulnerability to competition from immigrants are flawed. It is argued that such measures merely indicate how an individual ought to feel about their economic security and status, a point that ignores the fact that commonly held conceptions of economic success do not perfectly align with how individuals truly feel. Therefore, Moller, Munch, Schroll, and Skaksen propose that future research concerned with economic vulnerability and immigration attitudes should not be content to simply observe traditional economic measures, but instead collect attitudinal data regarding how natives feel about their economic standing. In recognition of the disunion between reality and perception in the formation of attitudes, this research includes attitudinal measures of household and national economic wellbeing.

Education and Xenophobia

Breaking away from labor market theory, a significant field of scholarship exists that attempts to build a stronger predictive model of immigration attitudes through inclusion of measures of education and racism. Such literature is largely based on the fact that racial outlooks are strongly correlated with immigration attitudes, suggesting that the perception of economic competition stemming from migrants does not necessarily mold immigration attitudes so much

¹⁸ Malchow-Moller, Nikolaj; Jakob, Munch; Sanne, Schroll, and Jan Skaksen. "Attitudes towards Immigration—Perceived Consequences and Economic Self-interest." *Economic Letters* 100, no. 2 (2008): 254-57.

as it reinforces preexisting racism. Following this line of thought, the work of Gang, Fransico, Rivera-Batiz, and Yun employs Eurobarometer data to test the relationship of both measures of economic wellbeing and education in relation to immigration attitudes.¹⁹ It is found that economic measures have undeniable predictive power, but it is concluded that racism and xenophobia are more strongly correlated with immigration attitudes. As an antidote to the influence of racism, the authors suggest that exposure to the typically egalitarian influences of education mitigates individuals' propensity to racist attitudes and by association their opposition to immigration. Furthering the argument of Fransico, Rivera-Batiz, and Yun, the work of Hainmueller and Hiscox finds that while measures of skill level are statistically significant in predicting immigration attitudes, education proves stronger, as there is a tendency for the highly educated to support immigration regardless of the skill level of migrants and the supposed economic consequences or benefits of their arrival.²⁰ Hainmueller and Hiscox find that this association holds true, even when only observing those individuals competing for jobs, a fact that contradicts labor market theories, which predict that economic vulnerability determines immigration attitudes. While it is beyond the means of this research endeavor to directly gauge the racism of individuals, inclusion of a measurement of educational attainment will help to capture those social influences beyond economic wellbeing that mold individuals' feelings towards immigration and more specifically, Syrian refugees.

Further research reveals that not only racism, but also a general fear of individuals and things outside the national identity leads towards negative immigration sentiment. Linkage of

¹⁹ Rivera-Batiz, Francisco, Ira Gang, and Myeong-Su Yun. "Economic Strain, Education and Attitudes towards Foreigners in the European Union." *Review of International Economics* 21, no. 2 (April 15, 2013): 177-90.

²⁰ Hainmueller, Jens, and Michael Hiscox. "Educated Preferences: Explaining Attitudes Toward Immigration in Europe." *International Organization* 61, no. 2 (2007): 399-442

xenophobic attitudes with anti-immigration attitudes finds theoretical backing in the work of Nunziata.²¹ Employing data from the European Social Survey and Labour Force Survey, Nunziata's work indicates that despite the absence of any causal relationship between immigration and crime, the occurrence of immigration in itself acts as a trigger to rising native fears of crime. Explicating on the above relationship, Nunziata posits that the fear of crime is strongly correlated with negative immigration attitudes and by association, so too is the actual occurrence of immigration. Applying the findings of Fransico, Rivera-Batiz, and Yun this research suggests that the correlation between immigration and rising fears of crime identified by Nunziata will be generally enhanced when immigration stems from groups that are racially and ethnically different from natives of their host country. Inclusion of attitudinal measures regarding EU-migration, non-EU migration, and Syrian refugees will allow this research to test the hypothesis that migrant's cultural affinity with a host nation is positively associated with native immigration attitudes.

Additional work has been dedicated to the relationship between immigration and fears of crime, specifically on the mechanisms through which natives are exposed to the idea that immigration is correlated with increasing crime. One such example is the scholarship of Burscher, Spanje, and Vreese , which spans 11 EU countries, employing content analysis and survey panel data to test the effects of exposure to immigration and crime news.²² It is found that exposure to news media dealing with immigration and crime fosters fear and a sense of concern that leads towards a tendency for individuals to support the national party that most strongly

²¹ Nunziata, Luca. "Immigration and crime: evidence from victimization data." *Journal of Population Economics* 28, no. 3 (March 4, 2015): 697-736.

²² Burscher, Bjorn, Joost Spanje, and Claes Vreese. "Owning the issues of crime and immigration: The relation between immigration and crime news and anti-immigrant voting in 11 countries." *Electoral Studies* 38 (June 2015): 59-69.

dominates this issue. It is noted by the authors that while not absolute, such parties are typically anti-immigrant in orientation. In recognition of the influence that media exposure can have when dealing with immigration and crime, this research suggests that a measure of media usage might offer valuable insight in the case of Syrian refugee attitudes following the Paris Attacks. It is beyond the means of this research design to measure for direct exposure to media coverage of immigration and crime following the Paris Attacks. However, it is argued that the connection with Syria shared between the attackers and Syrian refugees represents a dominant focus of popular news coverage following the attacks, suggesting that natives with high media usage were likely exposed to the predicted influence of media coverage linking refugees with terrorism. Therefore this research model includes a measure of media usage, so as to test the hypothesis that exposure to media, specifically that connecting Syrian refugees with the Paris Attacks, fosters negative immigration attitudes.

Measuring for Worldviews

Political Ideology

Branching away from economic explanations, as well as measures of variables that might mitigate or exacerbate racism, scholars have also attempted to describe immigration attitudes in terms of individuals' worldviews. What is meant by the term worldview is simply the paradigm that results from an individual's collective beliefs regarding their own ethnicity, religion, race, culture, etc. in contrast to that of others. This idea has already been touched upon in this essay, despite not being identified by the above terminology. Indeed, the discussed work of Burscher, Spanje, and Vreese, while concerned with measuring the influence of media use, employs as part of its theoretical framework, a connection between broad outlooks, such as nationalism and

conservatism and the more narrow topic of immigration attitudes.²³ The work of Lahav, builds onto this literature employing surveys and interviews carried out in 2007 with members of the EU parliament to determine the viability of traditional political alignments in predicting immigration attitudes.²⁴ Findings from Lahav's work suggest that the relationship between political orientation and immigration attitudes is significantly correlated, with those identifying as conservative holding more negative attitudes in contrast to their more supportive liberal counterparts. While it is certain that the degree to which an individual is conservative or liberal in political orientation is a rather abstract concept and therefore can only be measured imperfectly, Lahav's work demonstrates that it still remains significantly correlated with immigration attitudes and as a result this research model includes a scaled measure of political ideology. It is expected that despite the multifaceted nature of the measure in question, political orientation will prove a salient predictor of immigration attitudes as such a measure helps to identify the larger set of worldviews that an individual identifies with and in turn is molded by.

Aging

Acknowledging the viability of specific attitudes and demographics in predicting immigration attitudes, the work of Calahorrano relies on survey data drawn from the German Research Foundation to look beyond these traditional explanations and put forward the argument that certain outlooks and resulting attitudes follow age specific trends.²⁵ It is found that while perhaps not certain on a case-by-case basis; general immigration attitudes are more or less

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Lahav, Gallya. "Ideological and Party Constraints on Immigration Attitudes in Europe." *Journal of Common Market Studies* 35, no. 3 (September 1997): 377-406.

²⁵ Calahorrano, Lena. "Population Aging and Individual Attitudes toward Immigration: Disentangling Age, Cohort and Time Effects." *Review of International Economics* 21, no. 2 (April 15, 2013): 342-53.

predetermined when looking at the entirety of a population. These findings fall in line with Calahorrano's theoretical premise that when individuals are young they generally lack dependencies and larger life responsibilities, resulting in open-minded perspectives, however, as they grow older and enter middle age, these same individuals gain dependencies and responsibilities that encourage a desire for greater safety and security. As a caveat, it is found that this relationship is not completely linear in nature, making it appear at first glance that no statistically significant correlation exists. However, Calahorrano notes that the process of aging not only brings about the addition of dependencies and responsibilities, in its later stages it also results in the loss of such dependencies and responsibilities, for instance children growing up and the completion of mortgage payments. Subsequently, as individuals enter these later stages of life and shed certain fears and anxieties it can once-again be expected that they will be at an increased likelihood to hold supportive attitudes towards immigration. Therefore, when observing the entirety of a country's population in relation to age and immigration attitudes, a bell-shaped relationship will be observed with average support for immigration spiking amongst younger and older generations while declining with the middle aged.

Nationalism

Furthering the strain of thought that social-psychological factors play an often overlooked but dominant role in the formation of immigration attitudes, there exists a significant share of scholarship devoted to the relationship between nationalism and immigration attitudes. Prominent amongst this work is the research of Sides and Citrin, which advances a theoretical framework for the association between increasing nationalistic sentiment and anti-immigration

attitudes.²⁶ In sum, the work of Sides and Citrin is underpinned by two theories, symbolic politics theory and social identity theory. The first of the above two theories proposes that individual opinions while influenced by material concerns they are also heavily value laden, suggesting the importance of measuring for those altruistic ideals that hold a prominent place amongst individuals. The second identified theory further builds onto symbolic politics theory by positing that typically in-group favoritism is greatest when the group in question evokes emotional significance. Applied to the case of native populations in regards to immigration attitudes, it can be expected that immigrants, which can be thought of as an out-group will be perceived as threatening to the well-being of the national identity by natives, particularly those holding nationalistic sentiment.

Findings from the work of Sides and Citrin are based on data drawn from the European Social Survey and strongly indicate that there is indeed a negative relationship between nationalism and support for immigration.²⁷ Running as a common thread throughout the majority of the literature thus far discussed, the above authors indicate that the relationship between in-group favoritism and out-group demonization is only further amplified when dealing with members of an out-group that share a cultural affinity dissimilar from that of the in-group. This relationship is confirmed through the research of Green, Sarrasin, Fasel, and Staerke, whose case analysis of Swiss data drawn from the 2003 International Social Survey Program finds that nationalism is strongly correlated with increasing exclusionary immigrant attitudes.²⁸ Unlike the

²⁶ Sides, John, and Jack Citrin. "European Opinion About Immigration: The Role of Identities, Interests and Information." *British Journal of Political Science* 37, no. 3 (July 1, 2007): 477-504.

²⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁸ Green, Eva, Oriane Sarrasin, Nicole Fasel, and Christian Staerke. "Nationalism and patriotism as predictors of immigration attitudes in Switzerland: A municipality-level analysis." *Swiss Political Science Review* 17, no. 4 (October 28, 2011): 369-93.

work of Sides and Citron, however, the above listed authors also find that patriotism, which they describe as, “pride in national democratic institutions,” is related to tolerant attitudes towards immigration.²⁹ Such a relationship suggests the importance of not only measuring for individual feelings of nationalism, but also differentiating between feelings of national superiority and pride in national institutions, which have the opposite effects in regards to molding immigration attitudes.

Moving beyond simply identifying the correlation between nationalism and anti-immigration attitudes, the 2011 work of Ariely, employs data drawn from the International Social Survey Program to help explain cross-national variance in the saliency of nationalism in shaping immigration attitudes.³⁰ Ariely, finds that there exists a stronger correlation between nationalism and xenophobic attitudes in globalized nations. It is argued that this observation is the result of the perceived need to reinforce national identity and character in the face of an increasingly heterogeneous population and those influences that might challenge traditional values or beliefs. These findings are important as they provide theoretical and methodological explanatory power for expected cross-national variance in the correlation between nationalism and immigration attitudes. Further research carried out by Crepaz and Damron relying on data drawn from the World Values Survey, Eurobarometer, and European Social Survey adds to Ariely’s work by identifying a extenuating factor that helps determine in what countries nationalistic sentiment might find popular acceptance.³¹ It is discovered that the more comprehensive the welfare state of a give nation, the more likely its population will hold

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Ariely, Gal. "Globalization, immigration and national identity: How the level of globalization affects the relations between nationalism, constructive patriotism and attitudes toward immigrants?" *Group Processes and Intergroup Relations* 15, no. 4 (2011): 539-57.

³¹ Crepaz, Markus, and Regan Damron. "Constructing Tolerance: How the Welfare State Shapes Attitudes About Immigrants." *Comparative Political Studies* 42, no. 3 (March 2008): 437-63.

welcoming attitudes towards immigrants. This relationship is explained as being the result of the enhanced capacity of nations with more developed social welfare states to integrate immigrants and promote feelings of security amongst natives of the host country. Crepaz and Damron propose that as a natural result of an efficient and capable integration process, citizens come to view immigration as part of the natural character, hence reducing the salience of nationalism in promoting anti-immigration attitudes.

The Influence of Terrorism

Returning to the primary research question, do acts of terrorism negatively impact popular support for Syrian refugees? There exists a vast field of scholarship relating to the formation and detriments of immigration attitudes beyond even what has been discussed thus far, yet this research is unique in that it is interested in a narrow class of migrant. Syrian refugees can arguably be thought of belonging to the broader concept of “immigrants” in relation to existing literature surrounding the topic of terrorism and public attitudes. However, the unique circumstances and extreme vulnerability of Syrian refugees coupled with their cultural affinity to the perpetrators of the Paris Attacks respectively lead toward contrasting conclusions regarding if they will find acceptance amongst natives of EU host countries. First, the humanitarian tragedy surrounding Syrian refugees might sway natives to hold more accepting feelings towards these individuals than they might for immigrants in general. Second, the cultural affinity shared by Syrian refugees with the individuals who carried out the Paris Attacks suggests that natives will associate them with terrorists or more generally as a security risk, hence decreasing support for their inclusion within the national body. The following body of literature on the broader topic of terrorism and immigration attitudes, while not exhaustive, offers valuable insight towards answering the proposed research question. Furthermore, discussion of the theoretical links tying

terrorism to immigration attitudes, the forms that these attitudes take, and the role that cultural affinity plays in this dynamic will better equip this research to examine the influences underlying variance in refugee support between both individuals and nations.

Linking Terrorism to Immigration Attitudes

Perhaps for the purposes of this discussion, the 2013 work of Schuller is an appropriate place to begin, as this research largely parallels the research scope and methodological designs that are observed in this research.³² Indeed, Schuller examines the 9/11 terrorist attacks, which like the Paris Attacks were directed at a Western populace, carried out by radicalized terrorists with Islamic roots, and dominated popular media. Additionally, Shuller’s research is carried out in the EU and is based on survey results drawn shortly before and after the occurrence of the 9/11 attacks, much like the design of the research at hand. In regards to the actual findings of Schuller, it is observed that following the 9/11 attacks there was a significant negative shift in popular opinion towards immigration throughout the EU. These findings help to bolster the body of literature supporting the relationship between acts of terrorism and immigration attitudes while also validating the extenuation of this relationship to the case of Syrian refugees. Beyond identifying the negative association between the 9/11 attacks and immigration attitudes, the above work also finds that educational attainment acts as a buffer to the effects of terrorism. In the case of the EU, education proves more significant than competing economic measures in predicting immigration attitudes, suggesting the decreased importance of economic based concerns in the face of violence and fear.

³² Schuller, Simone. “The Effects of 9/11 on Attitudes Toward Immigration and the Moderating Role of Education.” *SOEPpaper* no. 54 (2013).

Similar research also carried out in 2013 by Legewie, and employing European Social Survey data to construct a naturally occurring experimental design around the 2002 Bali terrorist attacks and 2004 Madrid attacks further confirms the negative relationship between terrorism and immigration attitudes.³³ Legewie's work identifies three primary mitigating factors to the above relationship, positive economic conditions, preexisting immigrant population size, and native contact with immigrants. While the negative influence of terrorism on popular immigration attitudes and the mitigating factors identified do not offer insight beyond what might have been drawn from previously discussed sources of literature, Legewie's attention to theory building offers valuable explanatory power to what otherwise might be described as blind observation.

It is argued by Legewie, that in accordance with group threat theory, acts of terrorism foster negative perceptions of out-groups and direct the national majority's attention towards further sources of potential intergroup conflict, such as economic competition and crime. In essence, this implies that terrorism acts as a trigger to the reinforcement of preexisting biases resulting in the demonization of immigrants. Accompanying Legewie's description of the mechanisms through which terrorism impacts public opinion, is the finding that while terrorism might make natives fear immigrants, exposure to those same immigrants actually increases support for immigration. This observation is described in terms of intergroup contact theory, which quite simply proposes that contact between members of separate groups has the practical effect of reducing prejudice amongst those who are exposed. While at first glance this proposal seems rather airtight, it must be noted that this runs contrary to previously discussed labor-market competition theories, which argue that increased migration and subsequent contact with

³³ Legewie, Joscha. "Terrorist Events and Attitudes toward Immigrants: A Natural Experiment." *American Journal of Sociology* 118, no. 5 (2013): 1199-245.

natives will produce real and perceived economic competition, resulting in anti-immigration sentiment. Perhaps, however, both of the above assumptions might be true, with intergroup contact reducing prejudice while natives lacking intergroup contact but perceiving high-levels of immigration remain hostile to immigration.

Adding theoretical weight to the negative association between terrorism and immigration attitudes, the 2005 work of Card, Dustman, and Preston like that of Sides and Citron cites social identity theory.³⁴ What sets Card, Dustman, and Preston's use of social identity theory apart from their peers is that instead of focusing on individuals' preference for their own in-group, they note the influence that simply belonging to such a group has on these same individuals. It is argued that members of any group are naturally inclined to want people to view them as having a positive social identity, hence leading to comparisons between themselves and out-groups which serve the purpose of reinforcing the perceived superiority of the in-group and assumed shortcomings of the out-group. In the case of natives to the EU and Syrian refugees this implies that not only does there exist a predetermined negative association for refugees falling outside the national identity of various EU member states, but that events such as terrorism will serve to reinforce this association. Card, Dustman, and Preston build onto this assumed relationship, adding the caveat that in the case of countries in which the national identity and character is strongly associated with socially tolerant attitudes, members of the in-group can be expected to hold accepting views of immigration, reinforcing their positive social identity. For the purposes of this research endeavor, the above findings further reinforce the necessity of including cross-

³⁴ Card, David , Christian Dustmann, and Ian Preston. "Understanding attitudes to immigration: The migration and minority module of the first European Social Survey." Centre for Research and Analysis of Migration 3, no. 5 (2005).

national measures of social welfare, so as to capture the national social identity with which individuals might be expected to align.

Egalitarianism in the Security State

Further research reveals that shifting immigration attitudes in the wake of terrorist attacks are part of a more broad policy perspective realignment. Specifically, Davis and Silver's 2004 work with U.S. survey data collected shortly before and after the 9/11 terrorist attacks indicates that such events are powerfully associated with the formation of attitudes that are security oriented and subsequently less concerned with the preservation of civil liberties.³⁵ It is found by Davis and Silver that as native threat perception increases, so too does the willingness of individuals to sacrifice civil liberties for security. As a note to the above thought, the authors add that trust in the national government is interrelated to this relationship, with trust precipitating a willingness to sacrifice liberties. These findings suggest that the proposed relationship between terrorism and Syrian refugees holds weight, yet they also indicate that this research model ought to incorporate a measure of trust in national government. While Davis and Silver find that natives lacking trust in their respective national government are at a decreased likelihood to be influenced by acts of terrorism in regards to supporting the diminishment of civil liberties, it remains uncertain if this relationship extends itself to the case of refugees and immigration at large. Inclusion of a measure of trust in the national government will help this research shed light on the above question, while also helping to test the seemingly contrasting assertion of Sarrasin,

³⁵ Davis, Darren, and Brian Silver. "Civil Liberties vs. Security: Public Opinion in the Context of the Terrorist Attacks on America." *American Journal of Political Science* 48, no. 1 (January 2004): 28-46.

Fasel, and Staerkle that attachment to national institutions increases individual support for immigration.³⁶

Seeking to more comprehensively capture the policy preference changes accompanying acts of terrorism, the 2006 work of Echebarria-Echabe and Fernandez-Guede argues that the presence of public fear encourages the embrace of conservative policies emphasizing security and stability.³⁷ To operationalize this hypothesis, the authors rely on survey data collected prior to and after the Madrid terror attacks, which gauges political orientation, racism, liberalism, and authoritarianism. It is found that a positive relationship exists between the attacks and conservative values, anti-Arab sentiment, authoritarian leanings, and the abandonment of liberalism. Despite not being directly intended to observe the effects of terrorism on immigration attitudes, this work does help to validate the more general concept that terrorism fosters popular feelings of insecurity and fear, which take shape in zero-sum game styled policy preferences, pitting natives against all other out-groups. It is also further confirmed that this relationship can be expected to be strongest when dealing with individuals racially dissimilar from the in-group or sharing a racial affinity with the perceived perpetrators of terrorist attacks.

Adding to the scholarship surrounding the occurrence of terrorist attacks and the formation of conservative values in the place of liberalism, the 2011 work of Finseraas and Listhaug finds that the Mumbai terror attacks increased the fear of future terrorist attacks.³⁸ What is unique about this finding is that the survey data employed by Finseraas and Listhaug is drawn

³⁶ Green, Eva , Oriane Sarrasin, Nicole Fasel, and Christian Staerkle. "Nationalism and patriotism as predictors of immigration attitudes in Switzerland: A municipality-level analysis."

³⁷ Echebarria-Echabe, Agustin, and Emilia Fernandez-Guede. "Effects of terrorism on attitudes and ideological orientation." *European Journal of Social Psychology* 36, no. 2 (March & april 2006): 259-65.

³⁸ Finseraas, Henning, and Ola Listhaug. "It can happen here: the impact of the Mumbai terror attacks on public opinion in Western Europe." *Public Choice* 156, no. 1 (November 11, 2011): 213-28.

from Western European countries, hence implying that acts of terrorism once reaching an unknown mortality threshold can influence public attitudes on a global scale. Admittedly an association between the 9/11 attacks and shifting European sentiment has been previously identified indicating the global nature of the relationship in question, however, it is felt that the case of Finseraas and Listhaug merits particular attention given the lack of racial and cultural affinity shared between the populace of Mumbai and the member states of the EU. While these findings do not offer further explanatory variables for this research, they do help validate inclusion of all EU member states within the research model, which despite including a terror attack carried out within the borders of a singular nation, can be expected to have a cross-national impact.

Racial Affinity and Terrorism

Underpinning the argument that the Paris Attacks negatively impacted support for Syrian Refugees amongst natives of the EU is the idea that this particular out-group is unlike many other out-groups that might fall within the broader definition of immigrants. It is proposed that the cultural affinity of Syrian refugees parallels that of the perpetrators of the Paris Attacks to a degree that they are associated with the attacks and consequently the recipients of increased hostility. This same type of relationship is identified by the 2007 work of Hitlan, Carrillo, Zarate, and Aikman, which employs surveys administered within the U.S. one month prior to and after the 9/11 attacks to study the correlation between the attacks and attitudes towards Arab and Mexican immigration.³⁹ It is discovered that while support for both Arab and Mexican immigration significantly decreased following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, questions related to

³⁹ Hitlan, Robertt; Carillo, Kimberly; Zarate, Michaela, and Shelleyn Aikman. "Attitudes Toward Immigrant Groups and the September 11 Terrorist Attacks." *Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology* 13, no. 2 (2007): 135-152.

threat perception and fear reveal that Arabs engender these feelings much more than do Mexicans. Hitlan, Carrillo, Zarate, and Aikman also find that measures of what they term, “American identity” are positively related to feelings of hostility towards both Arabs and Mexicans. This research is significant in that it not only identifies the security perspectives that result from terrorist attacks, but also the critical role of race in determining the specific group upon which the fear and animosity generated by terrorist attacks might be directed.

Later scholarship by Economou, Psarianos, and Kollias further confirms the importance of race in mitigating and exacerbating the expected influences of major terrorist attacks.⁴⁰ The above work relies on multiple editions of the European Social Survey data to gauge cross-national attitudinal variance regarding immigration following various major terrorist attacks. Through observation and analysis of attacks involving Western victims it is found that both the number of Western casualties, as well as, the cultural affinity of attackers are directly related to resulting public attitudes towards immigration. More specifically, when attacks involve Western victims a greater negative shift in immigration attitudes can be observed amongst EU natives and the immigrant group to experience the greatest degree of resulting hostility can be expected to share a cultural affinity with the perpetrators of the attack. Falling in line with previous literature discussed, Economou, Psarianos, and Kollias conclude that as a rule of thumb, the more egalitarian a country’s welfare state, the less likely that it’s native population will be significantly impacted by acts of terror in comparison to their more conservative counterparts. This phenomenon is explained as being the natural product of both the capacity of more

⁴⁰ Economou, Athina; Iacovos, Psarianos, and Christos Kallias. "Terrorism and Attitudes Towards Immigration in Europe." *Discussion Paper Series* 14, no. 1 (2014).

advanced welfare states to incorporate immigrants, as well as, the egalitarian social identity that such an institutional framework fosters amongst its respective populace.

CHAPTER III

OPERATIONALIZATION

Data

Data Source and Exclusions

Keeping mindful of past literature and in an effort to best ensure valid measurements of proposed concepts, this research design relies on cross-national Eurobarometer 84.3 attitudinal and demographic survey data collected in the Fall of 2015 on the behalf of the European Commission. This data is of primary utility as it was collected in the days shortly prior to and following the Paris Attacks, hence furthering this research model's ability to capture the proposed influence of the Paris Attacks on support for immigration and refugees.⁴¹ Specifically, surveys were administered on the days of November 7th through the 17th, spanning thirty-four countries including all 28 EU member states. Operationalization of the influence of the Paris Attacks on those public attitudes measured is accomplished through the dichotomous coding of all survey respondents. In practice this means that those individuals having taken the survey prior to the November 13 attacks are coded as '0' while those following the attacks are assigned a value of '1.' It is argued that while difficult to measure for, the influence of moral panic fostered by the Paris Attacks if real, will be observable in the dissimilarity of popular opinions between those listed as '0' and their counterparts who have been exposed to the effects of terrorism.

As a consequence of the naturally occurring experimental design of this research endeavor, as well as the need for variable recoding to ensure valid means of analysis, certain

⁴¹ "Standard & Special EB Study Profiles." Gesis. <http://www.gesis.org/eurobarometer-data-service/survey-series/standard-special-eb/study-profiles/>.

cases from the original Eurobarometer 84.3 data set have been excluded. Perhaps the largest reduction in case size takes place when testing for the influence of the Paris Attacks. Given the uncertainty of when survey respondents heard about or first learned of the Paris Attacks, this research excludes all data drawn from the day of the attacks, November 13, 2015. It is assumed that given the magnitude and high media coverage of the attacks that those individuals who were administered the survey the day following had most likely been exposed to the attacks. Subsequently the pre-attack '0' group contains all data falling between November 7th and 12th, while the post-attack '1' group spans November 14th through the 17th. Another necessary alteration of the original Eurobarometer data set includes the elimination of all surveys administered in seven countries due to their non-EU member state status or because of a lack of relevant data. This change still leaves all EU member states, excluding Cyprus within the available survey pool. In the case of Cyprus, the previously mentioned "lack of relevant data," is the result of the administration of surveys in this country that are vastly dissimilar from those carried out in all other 27 EU member states.

Additional recoding of variables is carried out in an effort to exclude answers that might otherwise lead to faulty measurements; for instance imagine an attitudinal question in which respondent answers are coded on a scale ranging from one to five, with one indicating positive attitudes and five negative, while responses of "I don't know" are coded as a number falling outside the described scale, such as nine. While perhaps of use to other researchers, an answer of "I don't know" is of no use to this research design and has the unwanted effect of skewing measures of mean attitudes and the direction of observed correlations. Through ignoring such answers the measurements of proposed concepts are improved by ensuring that they remain ordered in nature and not simply categorical placements. Given the vast scale of the original data

set in question the described methods of elimination and recoding have not deducted from the potential sample group so as to invalidate its representativeness.

Ensuring Representative Sample Groups

In an effort to ensure that the confidence placed in all findings drawn through the comparison of the pre- and post-Paris Attacks sample groups is not misplaced, this research includes tests of mean variance between these two groups. This method offers ample evidence that despite the dichotomous coding of pre- and post-survey respondents and the reduction of the original 32,822 Eurobarometer survey cases to a slightly smaller but better tailored sample group totaling 23,971 cases, findings can be considered meaningful. While the relatively high number of observations maintained in this research suggests that a representative sample group has been drawn, the creation of a pre- and post-attack group demands the need for statistical comparison to better ensure that significant variations resulting from the time and place in which surveys were carried out are accounted for. To accomplish this, T-tests are relied on to provide a methodological tool through which to test the exact significance in mean attitudinal and demographic differences existing between the pre- and post-Paris Attacks groups. As reflected in table 1, mean measures based on previously discussed explanatory variables including employment status, educational attainment, gender, and locality size reveal that no significant variance exists between the populations of the pre- and post-attack groups. It is, however found that a significant difference in mean age exists between the above groups, with a mean difference of .103. It is suggested that this variance in age is not as worrisome as it might appear at first glance, as the variable employed to measure age is coded to group individual age responses within one of seven individual age brackets ranging from younger to older. The practical result

of this construct is that the real difference in the age of all respondents is exaggerated due to their clustered nature.

Table 1. Pre- and Post-Paris Attacks Demographic Variance

T-test					
	F	Sig.	t	df	Mean Difference
Employment Status	1.221	0.269	-2.634	19415	-0.035
Educational Attainment	3.836	0.05	0.461	22019	0.00485
Gender	0.896	0.344	0.48	23969	0.003
Locality Size	0.122	0.727	3.856	23957	0.04024
Age	24.685	0.00	4.183	15158	0.103

Dependent Variables

Attitudes Towards Syrian Refugees

As discussed at great length, the intent of this research is to answer the question; do acts of terrorism negatively impact popular support for Syrian refugees? To operationalize the somewhat abstract concept of “support for Syrian refugees,” Eurobarometer question qd11_6 which asks, “To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement? Our country should help refugees” is relied on to act as the primary dependent variable of this research. Given the particular significance of the Syrian Refugee Crisis to Europe, this research argues that such a question administered in the midst of this phenomenon can reasonably be expected to primarily evoke thoughts of Syrian refugees. In accordance with the example provided in the *Data Source and Exclusions* section of this research paper, question qd11_6 has been recoded into a four-point scale excluding all answers of “I don’t know.” Codes of ‘1’ indicate that respondents “totally agree,” ‘2’ “tend to agree,” ‘3’ “tend to disagree,” and ‘4’ “totally disagree” with the above question concerning refugees. While the exact wording of the question that this research relies on to conceptualize support for Syrian immigration does not differentiate between support

in terms of humanitarian aid and direct immigration, no specific policy attitude towards refugees has been proposed as resulting from terrorism, instead a decline in general good-will and rise in hostility is predicted.

Support for Immigration

Separate measures of native attitudes towards EU-based immigration, question qb4_1 and Non-EU immigration, question qb4_2 are also included within this research model as alternate dependent variables. Despite not being identical in scope to the above question regarding Syrian refugees, these measures do offer a chance to examine, even if imperfectly, the manner in which racial and cultural affinity play a role in molding the direction in which the negative social influences of terrorism are ultimately directed. Both questions are worded to ask, “Please tell me whether each of the following statements evokes a positive or negative feeling for you; immigration of people from other EU member states” with the exception that question qb4_2 replaces “other EU member states” with the words “outside the EU.” Responses to both questions have been recoded so as to eliminate non-conforming answers, resulting in a four point scale with answers of ‘1’ indicating “very positive,” ‘2’ “fairly positive,” ‘3’ “fairly negative,” and ‘4’ “very negative.”

Hypotheses and Explanatory Variables

Molding Attitudes and Terrorism

Central to the research at hand is the assumed negative relationship between the Paris Attacks and subsequent attitudes towards Syrian refugees. Therefore, it seems fitting that the first proposed hypothesis should be, H₁: The Paris Attacks are negatively associated with public opinion towards Syrian refugees across the EU. As previously discussed, there exists no precise

measure of the influence of terrorism. In practice this requires the construction of a research model that relies on the observation of changes taking place in the days immediately preceding the Paris Attacks. Beyond simply noting the presence of change, however, it must be made as certain as reasonably possible that no other phenomenon might explain those variations, which might otherwise be accredited to the influence of terrorism. With the above two specifications, this research model relies on the dichotomous coding of data in accordance with its being administered either prior to or after the Paris Attacks. In this manner attitudinal changes existing between these two representative sample groups can not only be observed, but through the inclusion of competing explanatory variables it can be better ensured that no change is falsely accredited to the Paris Attacks.

Accompanying this research's primary hypothesis is the caveat that while the Paris Attacks can be expected to raise overall hostility towards Syrian refugees, those individuals most exposed to sources of information regarding the attacks are subsequently less likely to hold negative attitudes. The above relationship offers H₂: Individuals experiencing greater levels of media exposure are less susceptible to the presumed negative influences of the Paris Attacks. To measure the concept of media exposure, this research employs a media use index constructed through Eurobarometer question qe3t, which has been recoded to a four point scale, with answers of '1' indicating "very high," '2' "high," '3' "poor," and '4' "none."

Socio-Economic Explanations

In accordance with the vast scholarship devoted to socio-economic explanations of immigration attitudes, this research takes into account multiple measures of economic wellbeing as possible influences of Syrian refugee attitudes. The first proposed economic hypothesis H₃, states that: Those individuals that perceive themselves as economically secure within the labor

market are at a decreased likelihood to hold negative attitudes towards Syrian refugees, who represent labor competition for natives. Employment status is measured through the use of question qa1a_3, which has been recoded to record respondents subjective evaluation of their current employment status on a four-point scale ranging from '1' "very good" to '4' "very bad." Moving beyond the possible detriments of individuals' economic position within the job market, this research acknowledges those individuals who might not be part of the job market out of choice, such as students and the retired. Therefore a further hypothesis is put forward, which ignores the narrow scope of employment in favor of a measurement of general financial wellbeing, H₄: Individuals who perceive their financial wellbeing in a positive light are less likely to fear economic competition from Syrian refugees, whom they are subsequently expected to hold positive attitudes towards. The concept in question is measured through Eurobarometer question qa1a_4, which asks respondents to assess their current household finances in accordance with a recoded four point scale ranging from '1' "very good" to '4' "very bad."

One last purely economic individual-level hypothesis is included in this research design to help account for the difference between how individuals feel about their own economic wellbeing and that of their native country as a whole. Put simply, it is possible to feel confident about one's own salary, job security, and household finances, yet still perceive these circumstances to be unrepresentative of the entire nation, hence encouraging negative immigration attitudes in the face of economic prosperity. To better account for the above-suggested complexities, the following hypothesis is advanced by this research, H₅: Individuals possessing a positive outlook regarding employment in their native country are less prone to view Syrian refugees as an economic threat, prompting more tolerant and supportive attitudes towards these refugees. Eurobarometer question qa1a_5, which asks respondents to rate the state

of employment in their country, is employed by this research to operationalize the independent variable in H₅. Responses have been recoded to construct a four point scale ranging from ‘1’ “very good” to ‘4’ “very bad.”

Branching away from measures of economic wellbeing and employment, two additional socio-economic hypotheses are included within this research model. First, H₆ posits that: The egalitarian and economic influences associated with educational attainment are positively related to tolerant refugee attitudes. Operationalization of the proposed relationship is accomplished through Eurobarometer question d8r2, which has been recoded to index respondent answers into four categories including, ‘1’ “post-secondary education,” ‘2’ “high school education,” ‘3’ “middle school education,” and ‘4’ “no education.” The second such hypothesis advanced H₇, builds onto the previous line of thought, proposing that: Individuals perceiving themselves as belonging to a higher social class than their peers are at an increased likelihood to hold positive views regarding Syrian refugees due to their likely economic security and the social desirability attached to egalitarian sentiments. Measurement of the above concept is drawn from Eurobarometer question d63, which asks respondents to provide a self-assessment of the social class to which they belong. Answers have been recoded to form a scaled five point measure that ranges from answers of ‘1’ indicating “higher class” to ‘5’ “working class.” Inclusion of the above two hypothesis provide this research a means by which to account both for economic prosperity and the egalitarian influences which accompany its acquisition.

Placing Immigration Attitudes within Larger Worldviews

Despite the attractiveness of theoretical constructs inclusive to easily observable explanatory variables, as discussed at great length within the review of literature, abstract values and attitudes also play a powerful role in formation of immigration attitudes. For instance, the

work of Calahorrano strongly indicates that individual viewpoints regarding conservative values and by association immigration seem to follow a non-deterministic but observable pattern that is age dependent.⁴² Based on these assertions, this research model proposes H₈: As individuals' age and form dependencies they can be expected to harbor increasingly conservative values and negative attitudes towards Syrian refugees, however, the additional process of further aging and decreasing dependencies fosters decreasing conservatism and resulting positive attitudes towards refugees. To better understand and evaluate the relationship in question, this research recodes Eurobarometer question d11r2, to group respondents according to seven different age brackets, each spanning a period of ten years. It is expected that when compared to Syrian refugee attitudes, those falling within the youngest and oldest brackets will be the most supportive, while individuals within the middle brackets are most likely to be hostile.

Further building on the above relationship, this research model incorporates a direct measure of dependencies. It is reasoned that while a measure of age might share an association with Syrian refugee attitudes, this correlation is improved by instead measuring for dependencies, as it is this factor not the biological process of aging, which is truly predicted to influence such sentiments. Summation of the previous suggestions advances H₉: The conservative values fostered by the formation of dependencies makes their presence negatively associated with Syrian refugee attitudes. Eurobarometer question d7r3, provides a measure of reported dependencies and is recoded by this research to group answers into one of three

⁴² Calahorrano, Lena. "Population Aging and Individual Attitudes toward Immigration: Disentangling Age, Cohort and Time Effects." *Review of International Economics* 21, no. 2 (April 15, 2013): 342-53.

categories with '1' indicating "no relationship or children," '2' "relationship or children," and '3' "relationship and children."

In the same manner that conservative values are correlated with negative Syrian refugee attitudes, previously discussed scholarship also suggests that larger worldviews, such as globalism and nationalism can be expected to significantly influence more specific attitudes, such as those towards immigration. Acknowledging the influence that broad outlooks have on other more narrow attitudes, this research advances two related hypotheses. The first proposed relationship posits that, H_{10} : Individuals regarding themselves as belonging within the broader social construct of the EU, as opposed to a single nation are likely to be less nationalistic and subsequently hold supportive attitudes towards Syrian refugees. The independent variable in question is captured through Eurobarometer question qd3, which asks respondents to place themselves on a four-point scale ranging from '1' "European only," '2' "European and nationality," '3' "nationality and European," and '4' "nationality only." The second hypothesis alluded to accounts for the fact that while nationalism is to expected to predict negative attitudes towards Syrian refugees, trust and investment in national democratic institutions is conversely related to supportive refugee sentiment. Therefore, H_{11} states: Individuals who trust their national government and institutions within largely democratic EU member states are at an increased likelihood of holding positive feelings towards Syrian refugees. The above concept is measured through Eurobarometer question qa8a_8, which asks respondents if they trust their national government and dichotomously codes answers as '0' "tend to trust" or '1' "tend not to trust."

As an additional attempt to capture the suggested influences of conservatism, this research posits H_{12} : Individuals identifying with liberal political ideologies can be expected to hold more positive attitudes towards Syrian refugees than their conservative counterparts. While

this research acknowledges that the concept of conservatism varies in scope and meaning across countries, it is argued that in the case of the EU a consistent enough understanding of liberalism and conservatism exists that a left-right scaled measure of political orientation can be considered meaningful. To operationalize the concept of political orientation, Eurobarometer question d1r2 is relied on. The question asks respondents to describe their political sentiment through a 5-point 'left-right' political scale coded so that '1' corresponds to an answer of "left," '2' "center left," '3' "center," '4' "center right," and '5' "right." As a last worldview based prediction of Syrian refugee attitudes this research model includes H₁₃: The increased exposure to various cultures and egalitarian influences associated with living in a metropolitan environment suggests that individuals from such areas are more likely to hold positive attitudes towards Syrian refugees than those from rural localities. Measurement of the above concept is accomplished through Eurobarometer question d25, which asks respondents if they are from '1' a "large town," '2' "small or middle town," or '3' "rural area or village."

Cross-National Variance

While not exhaustive of the country level variables that influence popular attitudes towards Syrian refugees, this research model advances three hypotheses intended to capture expected economic and social influences unique to individual states. The first such hypothesis is based on previous discussion of the association between economic prosperity and supportive immigration attitudes, H₁₄: Countries experiencing higher levels of economic prosperity are less likely to foster native fears of economic competition from migrants than those lacking wealth, hence suggesting that national prosperity is positively associated with Syrian refugee attitudes. Operationalization of the above concept of national wealth is accomplished through a cross-

national measure of purchasing power parity drawn from The World Bank.⁴³ It is argued that such a measure better conceptualizes the proposed economic security fostered by affluence than simply observing national GDP, which fails to account for the manner in which wealth is distributed.

In the same manner that wealth is expected to negate feelings of economic insecurity this research further poses that H₁₅: The presence of high-levels of immigration is associated with the perception of labor competition and subsequent negative attitudes towards Syrian refugees within the EU. Measurement of immigration is accomplished through data collected by the European Commission, which records migration flows within EU member states.⁴⁴ The last hypothesis put forward by this research model moves beyond the expected influences of immigration accounting for the manner in which the institutional framework under which it occurs shapes its public perception. Specifically, it is argued that, H₁₆: Nations fostering a comprehensive social welfare state can be expected to more efficiently incorporate migrants within the national identity and economic market, hence promoting positive native feelings towards Syrian refugees. The concept of social welfare is operationalized through data from the European Commission, which lists national social welfare as a percentage of total GDP.⁴⁵

⁴³ "GDP per capita, PPP ." The World Bank.

http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.CD?end=2015&locations=XC&start=2015&view=map&year_high_desc=false.

⁴⁴ "Migration and migrant population statistics." Eurostat. May 2016. http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Migration_and_migrant_population_statistics#Further_Eurostat_information.

⁴⁵ "Total general government expenditure on social protection." Eurostat. 2014.

[http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/File:Total_general_government_expenditure_on_social_protection,_2014_\(%25_of_GDP_%25_of_total_expenditure\).png](http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/File:Total_general_government_expenditure_on_social_protection,_2014_(%25_of_GDP_%25_of_total_expenditure).png).

As previously noted, the above cross-national measures are by no means exhaustive of the country-level variance assumed to influence public opinion towards Syrian refugees and immigration at large. While not an equal substitute for direct measures of those historic, cultural, and religious factors unique to the population of any give country, this research model includes country-level dummy variables with France serving as a reference case. Through the creation of dummy variables this research is better able to account for those cumulative national influences beyond the research scope at hand, while also identifying the states in which such influence is greatest. Informed by the presence and degree of country specific factors molding public opinion, it is not only possible to identify that variance which the model at hand fails to account for, but also open doors for future research through identification of those places where said variance remains unaccounted for.

CHAPTER IV

METHODOLOGY

T-Tests

Initial confirmation of the proposed influence of terrorism begins through a T-test of mean attitudinal change occurring between those surveys administered before and after the Paris Attacks. It is proposed by this research that given the short span of time separating the pre- and post-attack groups (the day of the attacks, November 13, 2015) it is unlikely that any significant shift in public attitude towards Syrian refugees during this same time frame can be explained by more subtle socio-economic variance that might be found. Based on the preceding platitudes, it is suggested that the influences of the Paris Attacks stands as the most likely explanation of such a shift in public sentiment. Acknowledging the inherent flaw that would accompany the assumption that no other phenomenon other than the Paris Attacks might explain recorded attitudinal variance, additional explanatory measures are included in this stage of analysis. These variables are drawn from previously discussed hypotheses surrounding the formation of Syrian refugee attitudes and include employment status, educational attainment, gender, and locality size. While not all encompassing, the above research design allows for the base confirmation that an association between the Paris Attacks and Syrian refugee attitudes exists. Furthermore, as a precaution T-tests allow this research to test for the possibility that demographic variance exists between the pre- and post-survey respondents that might otherwise explain a change in refugee attitudes.

Accompanying the above analysis, further T-tests help to reveal the manner in which factors of racial affinity play a role in directing public outrage following acts of terrorism. It is

proposed that observation of mean attitudinal scores regarding not only Syrian refugees, but also EU immigration and non-EU immigration prior to and after the Paris Attacks, will allow this research to determine if the proposed influence of terrorism applies equally to all migration attitudes, or specifically to those concerning migrants associated with acts of terror. It is expected that observed attitudinal variance before and after the Paris Attacks will be greatest for Syrian refugees, followed by non-EU immigration, and finally EU immigration. These predictions are based on the belief that Syrian refugees clearly fall outside the national identity of EU member states and share a cultural affinity with the attackers that will foster further hostility towards them than that directed against non-EU immigration, which is not inclusive to groups falling outside Western culture. It is further expected that attitudes towards EU immigration will experience the smallest negative shift in support following the Paris Attacks, as such a topic concerns migrants falling entirely within the Western world.

Crosstabulations and Somers' d

In an effort to both validate suggested hypotheses and to better determine what explanatory variables might best be incorporated in regression analysis, this research model relies on crosstabulations and a test of Somers' d to analyze the strength and direction of the relationship between Syrian refugee attitudes and proposed explanatory variables excluding terrorism. It is important at this point to note that this phase of testing does not rely on dichotomous pre- and post-Paris Attack groupings, instead data collected between these two groups is recombined in an effort to identify other mitigating and exacerbating factors of hostile refugee attitudes. Those independent variables that prove insignificantly related to Syrian refugee attitudes are excluded from the final regression analysis, while only non-overlapping variables found to be significant are included. In stating that variables might be "overlapping," this

research implies that when included in a regression model that takes into account the cumulative explanatory power of all independent variables, the presence of two or more variables that measure-overlapping concepts might lead to a faulty estimation of explanatory power. To correct for such a possible flaw, this research only advances one variable if overlapping-variables exist. For instance, while multiple measures have been employed to conceptualize the various hypotheses surrounding the issue of economic wellbeing, only the one that proves most strongly associated with Syrian refugee attitudes will be included in regression analysis.

Regression Analysis

While employment of crosstabulations and tests of Somers' d allow this research to identify the correlation between explanatory variables and Syrian refugee attitudes, final employment of regression analysis sheds further light on the cumulative strength of these associations and that country specific variance unaccounted for. As previously discussed, this stage of analysis incorporates country dummy variables to help account for the fact that while treated as a uniform sample group, all cases involved in this research are to some extent influenced by those factors unique to their native country. In an attempt to avoid the pitfalls of including explanatory variables that overlap in conceptual scope, this research advances two separate models of regression analysis, the first including country dummy variables and the second explanatory measures of purchasing power parity, stock of foreign born, and social welfare funding. Both models, however, will be accompanied by individual-level explanatory variables including household finances, educational attainment, liberal political orientation, trust in national government, European self-identity, media use, social class, and locality size. All listed independent variables are drawn from previously discussed hypotheses and are included within regression analysis as a result of their proving significantly related to Syrian refugee

attitudes through a test of Somers' d. Alongside observation of the above described two regression analysis models, the dependent variable of refugee attitudes will be substituted for a measure of EU immigration and non-EU immigration attitudes. Beyond further testing the proposed association between racial affinity with terrorists and immigration attitudes, inclusion of alternate dependent variables allows this research endeavor to observe if different explanatory factors negatively impact immigration attitudes depending on the source of immigration. For instance, when dealing with migrant groups drawn from within the borders of the EU, natives of host countries might be particularly sensitive to economic influences given the higher economic competitiveness of individuals experiencing the full benefits of EU citizenship over their excluded migrant counterparts.

CHAPTER V

FINDINGS

The Social Impact of Terrorism

Completion of the previously described methodological modeling of this research reveals a significant negative relationship between the Paris Attacks and attitudes regarding Syrian refugees within the EU, confirming H₁: The Paris Attacks are negatively associated with public opinion towards Syrian refugees across the EU. Specifically, as demonstrated by table 2, a T-test held to a confidence interval of 0.95 provides confirmation that a significant and negative mean change of -0.234 in public attitude towards refugees occurred shortly after the Paris Attacks. Interestingly, the change in attitudes towards refugees is much stronger than that towards Non-EU immigration (-0.116) and even greater than EU-immigration (-0.046). This seems to add weight to the assumed relationship existing between race and immigration attitudes at large. Previously discussed T-tests (Table 1) have been carried out to help ensure that socio-economic and demographic variations did not occur at the same time as the Paris Attacks, which might lead this research to mistakenly accredit terrorism with observed shifts in attitude. The resulting tests of mean employment status, educational attainment, gender, locality size, and age demonstrate that in regards to these respective areas no significant change can be found between the pre- and post-Paris Attack sample groups. While the absence of significant variation in the above variables is by no means direct evidence for the negative influence of terrorism, it does bolster this research's confidence that the correlation between the Paris Attacks and drastic shifts in public attitude towards Syrian refugees is not simply the result of dissimilar sample groups.

Table 2. Pre- and Post Paris Attacks Refugee and Immigration Attitudes

T-test					
	F	Sig.	t	df	Mean Difference
Help Refugees	267.29	0.00	-16.39	12785.32	-0.234
Non-EU Immigration	20.32	0.00	-9.15	13928.43	-0.116
EU Immigration	14.65	0.00	-3.77	13538.43	-0.046

Additional regression analysis helps to not only further validate the argued detriments of terrorism, but also define the degree of influence that the Paris Attacks had on individuals when competing explanatory variables are accounted for. As illustrated by table 3, the occurrence of the Paris Attacks proves to be a significant prediction of negative attitudes towards Syrian refugees. With a p-value of .000 and a beta weight of .048 the Paris Attacks are a salient factor in the formation of Syrian refugee attitudes, however, this relationship is not deterministic in nature. Instead, the influence of the attacks occurred within the bounds of other mitigating factors of refugee attitudes, as demonstrated by the .000 p-value of all competing explanatory variables included within regression analysis, excluding measures of media exposure.

Table 3. Predicting Refugee Attitudes Through Regression Analysis

	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	Sig
	B	Std. Error	Beta	
Household Finances	0.09	0.01	0.07	0.00
Educational Attainment	0.06	0.01	0.05	0.00
Liberal Orientation	0.08	0.01	0.09	0.00
Trust in National Government	0.22	0.01	0.11	0.00
European Identity	0.24	0.01	0.16	0.00
Media Use Index	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.13
Social Class	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.01
Locality Size	0.04	0.01	0.03	0.00
Paris Attacks	0.10	0.02	0.05	0.00
Belgium	-0.05	0.04	-0.01	0.27
Netherlands	-0.53	0.04	-0.12	0.00
Germany	-0.36	0.04	-0.09	0.00
Italy	0.29	0.05	0.05	0.00
Luxembourg	-0.22	0.06	-0.03	0.00
Denmark	-0.51	0.05	-0.11	0.00
Ireland	-0.45	0.05	-0.09	0.00
Great Britain	-0.38	0.04	-0.09	0.00
Greece	-0.60	0.05	-0.12	0.00
Spain	-0.64	0.05	-0.13	0.00
Portugal	-0.27	0.05	-0.05	0.00
Finland	-0.09	0.05	-0.02	0.05
Sweden	-0.71	0.04	-0.16	0.00
Austria	-0.09	0.05	-0.02	0.07
Czech Republic	0.72	0.05	0.15	0.00
Estonia	0.31	0.05	0.05	0.00
Hungary	0.65	0.05	0.13	0.00
Latvia	0.36	0.05	0.07	0.00
Lithuania	0.14	0.05	0.03	0.00
Malta	-0.08	0.07	-0.01	0.27
Poland	0.08	0.05	0.01	0.13
Slovakia	0.54	0.05	0.11	0.00
Slovenia	-0.02	0.05	0.00	0.66
Bulgaria	0.62	0.05	0.12	0.00
Romania	0.14	0.05	0.02	0.01
Croatia	-0.17	0.05	-0.04	0.00
R-square	0.30			
Sig.	0.00			

Once again drawing attention to table 2, it should be pointed out that a noticeable increase in hostility is observed as the migrant group in question becomes exclusive to a group or groups with a cultural affinity dissimilar from that of Europe. The above claim is based on the observation that while T-tests reveal a significant negative shift in all dependent variables (attitudes towards Syrian refugees, non-EU immigration, and EU immigration) following the Paris Attacks; the change is greatest for refugee attitudes and least for opinions surrounding EU immigration, with non-EU immigration attitudes falling between. Further regression analysis including the same explanatory variables that are in table 3 can be found in table 4 and 5, but with the substitution of the two remaining dependent variables in order to test the proposed link between the racial affinity of migrant groups and native attitudes towards them. When compared to EU immigration attitudes the occurrence of the Paris Attacks does not even prove significant with a p-value of .262, despite remaining significant in predicting non-EU immigration attitudes with a beta weight of .039.⁴⁶ Ultimately the Paris Attacks remain most greatly associated with shifting Syrian refugee attitudes, hence suggesting that their cultural affinity to the perpetrators of the attacks and dissimilarity from European culture made them particularly prone to the negative attitudes fostered by the attacks.

⁴⁶ See Appendix I and II.

Table 4. Predicting Non-EU Immigration Attitudes Through Regression Analysis

	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	Sig
	B	Std. Error	Beta	
Household Finances	0.06	0.01	0.05	0.00
Educational Attainment	0.05	0.01	0.04	0.00
Liberal Orientation	0.10	0.01	0.12	0.00
Trust in National Government	0.23	0.01	0.13	0.00
European Identity	0.20	0.01	0.14	0.00
Media Use Index	0.04	0.01	0.04	0.00
Social Class	0.04	0.01	0.05	0.00
Locality Size	0.04	0.01	0.03	0.00
Paris Attacks	0.08	0.02	0.04	0.00
R-square	0.20			
Sig.	0.00			

Table 5. Predicting EU Immigration Attitudes Through Regression Analysis

	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	Sig
	B	Std. Error	Beta	
Household Finances	0.08	0.01	0.07	0.00
Educational Attainment	0.07	0.01	0.06	0.00
Liberal Orientation	0.06	0.01	0.07	0.00
Trust in National Government	0.18	0.01	0.10	0.00
European Identity	0.23	0.01	0.18	0.00
Media Use Index	0.07	0.01	0.07	0.00
Social Class	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.03
Locality Size	0.04	0.01	0.03	0.00
Paris Attacks	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.26
R-square	0.14			
Sig.	0.00			

The Role of Economic Security and Egalitarian Worldviews

Economic Attitudinal Influences

Of those hypotheses advanced in acknowledgement of past literature both advancing and contesting the importance of socio-economic factors in the formation of immigration attitudes, all demonstrate a positive relationship with Syrian refugee sentiment. As previously discussed, confirmation of all proposed hypotheses excluding those dealing with the Paris Attacks and country-level variance begins through crosstabulation and a test of Somer's d.⁴⁷ Initial crosstabulation analysis and shared Somer's d p-values of .000 confirms hypotheses:

- H₃: Those individuals that perceive themselves as economically secure within the labor market are at a decreased likelihood to hold negative attitudes towards Syrian refugees, whom represent labor competition for natives.
- H₄: Individuals who perceive their financial wellbeing in a positive light are less likely to fear economic competition from Syrian refugees, whom they are subsequently more likely to hold positive attitudes towards
- H₅: Individuals possessing a positive outlook regarding employment in their native country are less prone to view Syrian refugees as an economic threat, prompting more tolerant and supportive attitudes towards these refugees
- H₆: The egalitarian and economic influences associated with educational attainment are positively related to tolerant refugee attitudes
- H₇: Individuals perceiving themselves as belonging to a higher social class than their peers are t an increased likelihood to hold positive views regarding Syrian refugees due to

⁴⁷ See Appendix III, IV, V, VI, and VII.

their likely economic security and the social desirability attached to egalitarian sentiments.

Based on additional information concerning the strength of association uncovered by Somer's d and with the intent to avoid measurement overlap, this research model excludes explanatory variables related to employment status and national employment from regression analysis in favor of a measure of household finances. Both employment status and national employment are positively related to support for Syrian refugees with respective Somer's d associations of .167 and .161, however, these are overshadowed by the .208 positive association held by the variable household finances. Subsequent regression analysis shows that individual household financial situations remain a significant factor in the formation of refugee attitudes, holding a p-value of .000 and beta weight of .068. Accompanying regression analysis measures of educational attainment and social class prove less influential than household finances but nonetheless significant in explaining refugee attitudes.

Molding Worldviews

A process paralleling the above-described validation and confirmation of proposed hypotheses through tests of Somer's d and regression analysis is employed to test the following:

- H₁₀: Individuals regarding themselves as belonging within the broader social construct of the EU, as opposed to a single nation are likely to be less nationalistic and subsequently hold supportive attitudes towards Syrian refugees
- H₁₁: Individuals who generally trust their national government and institutions within largely democratic EU member states are at an increased likelihood of holding positive feelings towards Syrian refugees

- H₁₂: Individuals identifying with liberal political ideologies can be expected to hold more positive attitudes towards Syrian refugees than their conservative counterparts
- H₁₃: The increased exposure to various cultures and egalitarian influences associated with living in a metropolitan environment suggests that individuals from such areas are more likely to hold positive attitudes towards Syrian refugees than those from rural localities.

Observation of Somer's *d* and regression analysis disconfirms all null hypotheses, with both tests yielding uniform p-values of .000 for explanatory measures of European identity, trust in national government, liberal political orientation, and locality size.⁴⁸ While all measures are found to be significant, it is worth noting that an individual's identification with a European heritage as opposed to a national one proves to be the most strongly associated variable with Syrian refugee attitudes identified by this research. The importance of this factor in determining subsequent attitudes towards refugees is reflected through its regression analysis beta weight of .158, the next strongest association being held by a measure of trust in national government at a beta weight of .112. These findings suggest that beyond the influences of economic wellbeing, the manner in which individuals perceive their own cultural identity and trust or distrust their government play an important role in shaping their attitudes towards Syrian refugees and determining the extent to which these attitudes are impacted by acts of terrorism such as the Paris Attacks.

⁴⁸ See Appendix VIII, IX, X, and XI.

Country Level Influences on Public Opinion

Unlike previously discussed hypotheses, the final three explanatory variables are interval as opposed to ordinal in measure and concern country level data. Following are the above-mentioned hypotheses:

- H₁₄: Countries experiencing higher levels of economic prosperity are less likely to foster native fears of economic competition from migrants than those lacking wealth, hence suggesting that national prosperity is positively associated with Syrian refugee attitudes
- H₁₅: The presence of high-levels of immigration is associated with the perception of labor competition and subsequent negative attitudes towards Syrian refugees within the EU
- H₁₆: Nations fostering a comprehensive social welfare state can be expected to more efficiently incorporate migrants within the national identity and economic market, hence promoting positive native feelings towards Syrian refugees.

Resulting measures of cross-national purchasing power parity, stock foreign born, and social welfare have been included within a separate regression analysis from that incorporating country dummy variables due to the overlapping nature of these measures. Reference to table 6, reveals that the measure of stock foreign born proves significant with a p-value of .000, however, this research must accept the null hypothesis to H₁₅, as migration is positively correlated with migration attitudes, the exact opposite of what was predicted. Remaining measures of purchasing power parity and social welfare prove significant with identical p-values of .000, confirming H₁₄ and H₁₆. With respective beta weights of -.163 and -.106, both purchasing power parity and social welfare prove to be strongly associated with the formation of attitudes towards refugees. It should be noted that due to the manner in which the dependent variable, refugee attitudes is

coded the above negative beta weights indicate that as purchasing power parity and social welfare increase, so too does overall support for refugees. This suggests that while economic prosperity and security reduce refugee and immigrant hostility, this relationship can be artificially replicated through governmental mechanisms geared towards the promotion of economic and social integration of migrants. Such institutional structures help to increase citizen confidence that immigration does not represent an economic threat and more importantly fosters a social identity that puts greater emphasis on the virtues, as opposed to dangers of immigration.

Table 6. Country-Level Detriments to Refugee Attitudes

	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta	
Household Finances	0.12	0.01	0.09	0.00
Educational Attainment	0.06	0.01	0.04	0.00
Liberal Orientation	0.10	0.01	0.11	0.00
Trust in National Government	0.19	0.02	0.10	0.00
European Identity	0.24	0.01	0.16	0.00
Media Use Index	0.04	0.01	0.04	0.00
Social Class	-0.01	0.01	0.00	0.76
Locality Size	0.03	0.01	0.02	0.00
Paris Attacks	0.14	0.02	0.07	0.00
Purchasing Power Parity	-5.30E-06	0.00	-0.08	0.00
Migration Flow	-0.02	0.00	-0.09	0.00
Social Welfare (%GDP)	-0.03	0.00	-0.13	0.00
R-square	0.17			
Sig.	0.00			

Additional observation of those dummy variables included within the regression analysis model displayed in table 3, make clear the need for future qualitative research aimed at identifying those cultural, historic, and other factors unique to countries with high degrees of unexplained variance from the reference case, France. In-fact, nearly every EU member state dummy variable included within this research proves significant in predicting refugee attitudes,

excluding Belgium, Austria, Malta, Poland, and Slovenia. Of those dummy variables that are significant, Sweden is the most salient with a beta weight of $-.161$, followed by the Czech Republic ($.150$) and Hungary ($.131$). It should be noted that the survey question regarding refugee attitudes is coded so that lower numbers indicate increasing support. Hence, the above negative beta weight of Sweden indicates national level factors exist that promote support for refugees while in the case of the Czech Republic and Hungary there are influences decreasing said support. Looking for broader patterns, it can be observed that on the whole Western European country dummy variables tend to be positively correlated with refugee support and Scandinavian countries are particularly prone to this relationship. Conversely, Eastern European country dummy variables tend to be related with greater hostility towards refugees. As previously stated, there exists a great need for additional scholarship on country specific influences on immigration attitudes, particularly what seems to be the importance of lingering Cold War influences molding Western and Eastern European attitudes.

Beyond adding to this research model's ability to identify that cross-national variance unaccounted for by competing explanatory variables, inclusion of country dummy variables greatly add to the predictive strength of regression analysis. For instance, the dummy variable, Sweden proves to be the most salient explanatory variable, followed by a measure of European identity, the Czech Republic, and Hungary respectively. In comparison to the $.048$ beta weight of the Paris Attacks, it becomes quite clear that while terrorism negatively impacts public opinion towards immigration and refugees, relationship is influenced by the social context of the given country in which it occurs. In sum the cumulative explanatory power of both independent and dummy variables produce a regression p-value of $.000$ and r-square value of $.304$, suggesting the statistical significance of this model.

Failing Explanations and Discussion

Through the means of a test of Somer's d or regression analysis this research accepts four null hypotheses:

- H₈: As individuals' age and form dependencies they can be expected to harbor increasingly conservative values and negative attitudes towards Syrian refugees, however, the additional process of further aging and decreasing dependencies fosters decreasing conservatism and resulting positive attitudes towards refugees
- H₉: The conservative values fostered by the formation of dependencies makes their presence negatively associated with Syrian refugee attitudes
- H₂: Individuals experiencing greater levels of media exposure are less susceptible to the presumed negative influences of the Paris Attacks
- H₁₅: The presence of high-levels of immigration is associated with the perception of labor competition and subsequent negative attitudes towards Syrian refugees within the EU.

While a test of Somers's d indicates that the variable of age is insignificant in predicting Syrian refugee attitudes with a p-value of .285, it is argued that this failing does not mean that age is not correlated with immigration attitudes, but instead that this relationship is not linear in nature.⁴⁹ As can be seen through observation of appendix XII, there exists a noticeable bell-shaped pattern of positive refugee attitudes being held by younger generations, decreasing amongst the middle-aged, and slowly regaining strength with further aging. Despite lacking the clarity of a linear relationship the variable of age does offer insight towards understanding the formation of refugee attitudes and further assists this research by offering an explanation for the

⁴⁹ See Appendix XII.

shortcomings of the explanatory variable of freedom from dependencies. Indeed, it is theorized that the insignificant p-value of .466 revealed by a test of Somer's d is the result of a faulty operationalization of the proposed concept, as it fails to account for the fact that while individuals might have dependencies, their age largely determines the extent to which these dependencies influence their conservative values.⁵⁰ For instance, middle-aged individuals with dependencies are likely engaged in the process of raising their children, hence fostering conservative values. Conversely, the elderly might also have children or dependencies, however they can be expected to be out of the home or direct care of their parents, negating the conservative influences of having dependencies.

The final two failing hypotheses concern the independent variables of media exposure and migration flow. In the case of media exposure a test of Somer's d indicates that this variable is significant and positively associated with Syrian refugee attitudes, however, when included in regression analysis a failing p-value of .718 is produced.⁵¹ This finding suggests that perhaps with a greater span of time separating the post-Paris Attacks sample group from the occurrence of the attacks the proposed influence of media exposure might be confirmed through regression analysis. The above argument is based on the understanding that perhaps the short space of time separating respondents from the attacks coupled with the enormous media coverage of these events within the EU following their occurrence temporarily negated the proposed significance of media exposure. Final acceptance of the null hypothesis to the proposed influence of migration is not based on this measure being insignificant, but instead due to the positive correlation that is observed when instead negative relationship was predicted. This research

⁵⁰ See Appendix XIII.

⁵¹ See Appendix XIV.

posits that the above findings suggest a false relationship. Indeed, perhaps instead of migration fostering positive native attitudes towards immigrants, it is those types of preexisting social values that drive high migration rates.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Implications of this Work

Identifying the negative impact of the Paris Attacks on Syrian refugee and immigration attitudes throughout the EU is valuable because of the implications that such a relationship has on European political behavior and the Syrian refugee crisis at large. As acts of terrorism occur within the bounds of the EU and hostilities within Syria continue to push refugees towards Europe, this research can only posit that increasing European hostility towards refugees and immigration can be expected. Furthermore, the strong correlation between racial identity and migration support observed indicates that migrant groups sharing a racial and cultural similarity to that of Western Europe enjoy higher support amongst natives of host nations than their dissimilar counterparts. Adding on to the above relationship, this research reveals that the negative social influences fostered by acts of terrorism in Europe are channeled towards out-groups, particularly those perceived to share a cultural affinity with the attackers. In the case of Syrian refugees, the controversy surrounding their migration to Europe coupled with their racial and cultural affinity to members of the perpetrators of the Paris Attacks makes them recipients of more intense European hostility than other potential migrant groups.

Despite the negative relationship between terrorism and immigration attitudes this research also identifies significant individual-level mitigating factors to this influence, including trust in the national government, self-identification with a larger European identity, financial security, and educational attainment. In terms of policy making with the specific intent of fostering the inclusion of Syrian refugees within the EU, this research suggests three practical

country-level policy initiatives based on the above listed variables. First, the promotion of national government transparency measures centered around matters related to migrant vetting and placement within the national body. It is expected that such steps will increase the trust that natives of host countries place in their government and its ability to effectively integrate migrants. As a practical result, native willingness to entrust the government with the responsibility of handling immigration will rise and subsequently so too will overall migrant attitudes. Second, the expanse of underdeveloped social welfare states to parallel those prevalently seen in Scandinavian countries can be expected to improve the manner in which migrants are incorporated within the economic market. Through these means native financial security might be better ensured while a national social identity of inclusion and acceptance is fostered. Third, investment in both primary and secondary educational quality and accessibility is anticipated to directly increase national levels of educational attainment. Given the undeniable positive correlation between education and supportive Syrian refugee attitudes it can only be expected that the above policy emphasis will produce those egalitarian and economic influences that promote welcoming attitudes towards immigrants. Furthermore, through increased education it is also expected that nationalistic sentiment will decrease, hence further adding to the viability of education as a long term means through which to counter the negative influences of terrorism.

Avenues of Future Research

While a clear relationship between terrorism and negative refugee attitudes has been identified by this research, related questions requiring further research and theory building still abound. Specifically, it is unknown if the racially based tendencies of negative post-attack attitudes are determined by the sharing of cultural affinity with the perpetrators of attacks or simply through belonging to any out-group significantly dissimilar from a Western European

identity. For instance, had individuals from the U.S. and belonging to a radical evangelical group carried out the Paris Attacks, would attitudes towards U.S. migration experience as great a shift as that seen towards Syrian refugees? Further areas of question surround the respective importance of the relationship between socio-economic factors and threat-perception in explaining immigration attitudes. While traditional sources of research often look towards labor-market competition theories to explain immigration attitudes, the growing prevalence of terrorist acts associated with a large share of Europe's migrant population suggests that measures of threat perception might take a new predominant role over feelings of economic security within this field. Future research is needed to shed light on the conditions determining why and when economic concerns become less important than security perspectives in molding immigration attitudes. Lastly, while this research model is able to provide an understanding of the degree of national-level variance influencing individual immigration attitudes, this is by no means the same as explaining what causes this variance. Observed nation-level variance is particularly acute in Scandinavian and Eastern European states, suggesting the need for future scholarship on those historic, cultural, and religious influences driving such dissimilarity.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX I

PREDICTING EU IMMIGRATION ATTITUDES

	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta	
Household Finances	0.08	0.01	0.07	0.00
Educational Attainment	0.07	0.01	0.06	0.00
Liberal Orientation	0.06	0.01	0.07	0.00
Trust in National Government	0.18	0.01	0.10	0.00
European Identity	0.23	0.01	0.18	0.00
Media Use Index	0.07	0.01	0.07	0.00
Social Class	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.03
Locality Size	0.04	0.01	0.03	0.00
Paris Attacks	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.26
Belgium	-0.02	0.04	0.00	0.73
Netherlands	-0.05	0.04	-0.01	0.22
Germany	-0.05	0.04	-0.02	0.19
Italy	0.08	0.05	0.01	0.13
Luxembourg	-0.21	0.06	-0.04	0.00
Denmark	-0.07	0.04	-0.02	0.13
Ireland	-0.38	0.05	-0.09	0.00
Great Britain	0.02	0.04	0.01	0.57
Greece	-0.06	0.05	-0.01	0.17
Spain	-0.40	0.05	-0.09	0.00
Portugal	-0.33	0.05	-0.07	0.00
Finland	-0.20	0.05	-0.05	0.00
Sweden	-0.31	0.04	-0.08	0.00
Austria	-0.14	0.05	-0.03	0.00
Czech Republic	0.21	0.04	0.05	0.00
Estonia	-0.17	0.05	-0.03	0.00
Hungary	0.02	0.05	0.01	0.65
Latvia	-0.02	0.05	0.00	0.73
Lithuania	-0.27	0.05	-0.06	0.00
Malta	-0.10	0.07	-0.01	0.17
Poland	-0.34	0.05	-0.06	0.00
Slovakia	0.17	0.05	0.04	0.00
Slovenia	-0.19	0.05	-0.04	0.00
Bulgaria	-0.33	0.05	-0.07	0.00
Romania	-0.12	0.05	-0.02	0.02
Croatia	-0.32	0.04	-0.08	0.00
R-square	0.14			
Sig.	0.00			

APPENDIX II

PREDICTING NON-EU IMMIGRATION ATTITUDES

	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	Sig
	B	Std. Error	Beta	
Household Finances	0.06	0.01	0.05	0.00
Educational Attainment	0.05	0.01	0.04	0.00
Liberal Orientation	0.10	0.01	0.12	0.00
Trust in National Government	0.23	0.01	0.13	0.00
European Identity	0.20	0.01	0.14	0.00
Media Use Index	0.04	0.01	0.04	0.00
Social Class	0.04	0.01	0.05	0.00
Locality Size	0.04	0.01	0.03	0.00
Paris Attacks	0.08	0.02	0.04	0.00
Belgium	-0.02	0.04	-0.01	0.63
Netherlands	-0.16	0.04	-0.04	0.00
Germany	-0.02	0.04	-0.01	0.66
Italy	-0.06	0.05	-0.01	0.22
Luxembourg	-0.16	0.06	-0.03	0.01
Denmark	0.14	0.05	0.03	0.00
Ireland	-0.45	0.05	-0.10	0.00
Great Britain	-0.21	0.04	-0.05	0.00
Greece	0.02	0.05	0.00	0.73
Spain	-0.60	0.05	-0.12	0.00
Portugal	-0.52	0.05	-0.10	0.00
Finland	0.07	0.05	0.02	0.15
Sweden	-0.50	0.05	-0.12	0.00
Austria	-0.02	0.05	0.00	0.70
Czech Republic	0.37	0.05	0.08	0.00
Estonia	0.43	0.05	0.08	0.00
Hungary	0.32	0.05	0.07	0.00
Latvia	0.35	0.05	0.08	0.00
Lithuania	0.19	0.05	0.04	0.00
Malta	0.21	0.07	0.02	0.00
Poland	-0.07	0.05	-0.01	0.19
Slovakia	0.45	0.05	0.10	0.00
Slovenia	0.22	0.05	0.04	0.00
Bulgaria	0.14	0.05	0.03	0.01
Romania	-0.17	0.05	-0.03	0.00
Croatia	-0.32	0.05	-0.07	0.00
R-square	0.20			
Sig.	0.00			

APPENDIX III

HOUSEHOLD FINANCES AND REFUGEE ATTITUDES

Help Refugees						
		Totally agree	Tend to agree	Tend to disagree	Totally disagree	Total
Household Finances	Very good	961 (39.8%)	1052 (43.6%)	241 (10.0%)	160 (6.6%)	2414 (100.0%)
	Rather good	2691 (21.6%)	5941 (47.7%)	2221 (17.8%)	1600 (12.8%)	12453 (100.0%)
	Rather bad	805 (14.2%)	2326 (41.1%)	1312 (23.2%)	1222 (21.6%)	5665 (100.0%)
	Very bad	306 (18.8%)	487 (29.8%)	361 (22.1%)	478 (29.3%)	1632 (100.0%)
	Total	4736 (21.5%)	9806 (44.2%)	4135 (18.7%)	34600 (15.6%)	22164 (100.0%)

Somers' d		Value	Standard Error	Sig.
	Help Refugees Dependent	.208	.006	.000

APPENDIX IV

EMPLOYMENT STATUS AND REFUGEE ATTITUDES

Help Refugees						
		Totally agree	Tend to agree	Tend to disagree	Totally disagree	Total
Employment Status	Very good	1160 (35.3%)	1421 (43.2%)	411 (12.5%)	298 (9.1%)	3290 (100.0%)
	Rather good	1907 (20.4%)	4346 (46.6%)	1770 (19.0%)	1306 (14.0%)	9329 (100.0%)
	Rather bad	570 (15.0%)	1581 (41.7%)	891 (23.5%)	752 (19.8%)	3794 (100.0%)
	Very bad	368 (19.2%)	670 (35.0%)	383 (20.0%)	494 (25.8%)	1915 (100.0%)
	Total	4005 (21.9%)	8018 (43.7%)	3455 (18.9%)	2850 (15.5%)	18328 (100.0%)

Somers' d		Value	Standard Error	Sig.
	Help Refugees Dependent	.167	.007	.000

APPENDIX V

NATIONAL EMPLOYMENT AND REFUGEE ATTITUDES

Help Refugees						
		Totally Agree	Tend to agree	Tend to disagree	Totally disagree	Total
Employment in Country	Very good	242 (36.9%)	273 (41.6%)	83 (12.7%)	58 (8.8%)	656 (100.0%)
	Rather good	1743 (29.4%)	2828 (47.7%)	818 (13.8%)	536 (9.0%)	5925 (100.0%)
	Rather bad	1611 (17.3%)	4248 (45.6%)	1993 (21.4%)	1468 (15.8%)	9320 (100.0%)
	Very bad	1088 (18.2%)	2320 (38.8%)	1211 (20.2%)	1362 (22.8%)	5981 (100.0%)
	Total	4684 (21.4%)	9669 (44.2%)	4105 (18.8%)	3424 (15.6%)	21882 (100.0%)

Somers' d		Value	Standard Error	Sig.
	Help Refugees Dependent	.161	.006	.000

APPENDIX VI

EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT AND REFUGEE ATTITUDES

Help Refugees						
		Totally Agree	Tend to Agree	Tend to disagree	Totally disagree	Total
Educational Attainment	Post-secondary	2257 (29.8%)	3378 (44.7%)	1131 (15.0%)	797 (10.5%)	7563 (100.0%)
	High School	1480 (15.4%)	4122 (42.8%)	2081 (21.6%)	1942 (20.2%)	9625 (100.0%)
	Middle School	584 (17.4%)	1609 (48.0%)	650 (19.4%)	511 (15.2%)	3354 (100.0%)
	None	42 (22.2%)	79 (41.8%)	40 (21.2%)	28 (14.8%)	189 (100.0%)
	Total	4363 (21.0%)	9188 (44.3%)	3902 (18.8%)	3278 (15.8%)	20731 (100.0%)

Somers' d		Value	Standard Error	Sig.
	Help Refugees Dependent	.135	.006	.000

APPENDIX VII

SOCIAL CLASS AND REFUGEE ATTITUDES

Help Refugees						
		Totally agree	Tend to agree	Tend to disagree	Totally disagree	Total
Social Class	Higher class	47 (26.3%)	82 (45.8%)	23 (12.8%)	27 (15.1%)	179 (100.0%)
	Upper middle class	531 (34.8%)	667 (43.7%)	185 (12.1%)	143 (9.4%)	1526 (100.0%)
	Middle class	2343 (23.7%)	4501 (45.5%)	1701 (17.2%)	1347 (13.6%)	9892 (100.0%)
	Lower middle class	628 (17.6%)	1562 (43.9%)	796 (22.3%)	576 (16.2%)	3562 (100.0%)
	Working class	1135 (17.2%)	2790 (42.4%)	1371 (20.8%)	1287 (19.6%)	6583 (100.0%)
	Total	4684 (21.5%)	9602 (44.2%)	4076 (18.7%)	3380 (15.5%)	21742 (100.0%)

Somers' d		Value	Standard Error	Sig.
	Help Refugees Dependent	.118	.006	.000

APPENDIX VIII

EUROPEAN IDENTITY AND REFUGEE ATTITUDES

Help Refugees						
		Totally agree	Tend to agree	Tend to disagree	Totally disagree	Total
European Identity	European only	109 (39.1%)	95 (34.1%)	47 (16.8%)	28 (10.0%)	279 (100.0%)
	European and nationality	385 (32.8%)	478 (40.8%)	172 (14.7%)	137 (11.7%)	1172 (100.0%)
	Nationality and European	2956 (25.5%)	5625 (48.5%)	1852 (16.0%)	1164 (10.0%)	11597 (100.0%)
	Nationality only	1273 (14.0%)	3609 (39.7%)	2078 (22.9%)	2133 (23.5%)	9093 (100.0%)
	Total	4723 (21.3%)	9807 (44.3%)	4149 (18.7%)	3462 (15.6%)	22141 (100.0%)

Somers' d		Value	Standard Error	Sig.
	Help Refugees Dependent	.230	.007	.000

APPENDIX IX

TRUST IN NATIONAL GOVERNMENT AND REGUEE ATTITUDES

Help Refugees						
		Totally agree	Tend to agree	Tend to disagree	Totally disagree	Total
Trust in National Government	Tend to trust	2070 (29.0%)	3369 (47.3%)	1005 (14.1%)	682 (9.6%)	7126 (100.0%)
	Tend not to trust	2492 (17.8%)	5897 (42.2%)	2959 (21.2%)	2639 (18.9%)	13987 (100.0%)
	Total	4562 (21.6%)	9266 (43.9%)	3964 (18.8%)	3321 (15.7%)	21113 (100.0%)

Somers' d		Value	Standard Error	Sig.
	Help Refugees Dependent	.208	.008	.000

APPENDIX X

LIBERAL POLITICAL ORIENTATION AND REFUGEE ATTITUDES

Help Refugees						
		Totally agree	Tend to agree	Tend to disagree	Totally disagree	Total
Liberal Orientation	Left	594 (30.7%)	703 (36.3%)	312 (16.1%)	325 (16.8%)	1934 (100.0%)
	Center left	1324 (34.1%)	1632 (42.0%)	549 (14.1%)	380 (9.8%)	3885 (100.0%)
	Center	1514 (19.4%)	3774 (48.2%)	1481 (18.9%)	1054 (13.5%)	7823 (100.0%)
	Center right	572 (17.2%)	1624 (48.8%)	679 (20.4%)	455 (13.7%)	3330 (100.0%)
	Right	239 (16.3%)	531 (36.2%)	327 (22.3%)	371 (25.3%)	1468 (100.0%)
	Total	4243 (23.0%)	8264 (44.8%)	3348 (18.2%)	2585 (14.0%)	18440 (100.0%)

Somers' d		Value	Standard Error	Sig.
	Help Refugees Dependent	.113	.006	.000

APPENDIX XI

LOCALITY SIZE AND REFUGEE ATTITUDES

Help Refugees						
		Totally agree	Tend to agree	Tend to disagree	Totally disagree	Total
Locality Size	Large town	1510 (25.2%)	2527 (42.2%)	1035 (17.3%)	910 (15.2%)	5982 (100.0%)
	Small/middle town	2014 (20.5%)	4338 (44.2%)	1895 (19.3%)	1558 (15.9%)	9805 (100.0%)
	Rural area or village	1294 (19.2%)	3075 (45.6%)	1295 (19.2%)	1077 (16.0%)	6741 (100.0%)
	Total	4818 (21.4%)	9940 (44.1%)	4225 (18.8%)	3545 (15.7%)	22528 (100.0%)

Somers' d		Value	Standard Error	Sig.
	Help Refugees Dependent	.036	.006	.000

APPENDIX XII

AGE AND REFUGEE ATTITUDES

Help Refugees						
		Totally agree	Tend to agree	Tend to disagree	Totally disagree	Total
Age	15-24	459 (23.5%)	824 (42.2%)	365 (18.7%)	303 (15.5%)	1951 (100.0%)
	25-34	624 (22.4%)	1178 (42.3%)	497 (17.8%)	489 (17.5%)	2788 (100.0%)
	35-44	798 (21.8%)	1568 (42.9%)	714 (19.5%)	577 (15.9%)	3657 (100.0%)
	45-54	798 (20.8%)	1642 (42.8%)	774 (20.2%)	624 (16.3%)	3838 (100.0%)
	55-64	853 (21.0%)	1796 (44.3%)	771 (19.0%)	638 (15.7%)	4058 (100.0%)
	65-74	821 (20.8%)	1807 (45.7%)	727 (18.4%)	596 (15.1%)	3951 (100.0%)
	75+	467 (20.4%)	1127 (49.2%)	378 (16.5%)	320 (14.0%)	2292 (100.0%)
	Total	4820 (21.4%)	9942 (44.1%)	4226 (18.8%)	3547 (15.7%)	22535 (100.0%)

Somers' d		Value	Standard Error	Sig.
	Help Refugees Dependent		-.005	.005

APPENDIX XIII

FREEDOM FROM DEPENDENCIES AND REFUGEE ATTITUDES

Help Refugees						
		Totally agree	Tend to agree	Tend to disagree	Totally disagree	Total
Freedom from Dependencies	No relationship or children	1490 (22.1%)	2902 (43.0%)	1257 (18.6%)	1092 (16.2%)	6741 (100.0%)
	Relationship or children	1830 (21.1%)	3915 (45.2%)	1586 (18.3%)	1325 (15.3%)	8656 (100.0%)
	Relationship and children	1468 (21.1%)	3049 (43.8%)	1337 (19.2%)	1102 (15.8%)	6956 (100.0%)
	Total	4788 (21.4%)	9866 (44.1%)	4180 (18.7%)	3519 (15.7%)	22353 (100.0%)

Somers' d		Value	Standard Error	Sig.
	Help Refugees Dependent		.004	.006

APPENDIX XIV

MEDIA EXPOSURE AND REFUGEE ATTITUDES

Help Refugees						
		Totally agree	Tend to agree	Tend to disagree	Totally disagree	Total
Media Use	Very high	2857 (27.0%)	4729 (44.6%)	1769 (16.7%)	1244 (11.7%)	10599 (100.0%)
	High	1374 (17.6%)	3505 (44.9%)	1581 (20.3%)	1339 (17.2%)	7799 (100.0%)
	Poor	472 (13.8%)	1445 (42.4%)	733 (21.5%)	759 (22.3%)	3409 (100.0%)
	None	117 (16.1%)	263 (36.1%)	143 (19.6%)	205 (28.2%)	728 (100.0%)
	Total	4820 (21.4%)	9942 (44.1%)	4226 (18.8%)	3547 (15.7%)	22535 (100.0%)

Somers' d			Value	Standard Error	Sig.
		Help Refugees Dependent		.150	.006

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