

THE DEAD AUTHOR SPEAKS:
RECONSTRUCTING THE FICTION OF THE POSTHUMOUS

Melissa Klamer

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts

Department of English Language & Literature

Central Michigan University
Mount Pleasant, Michigan
March, 2012

Accepted by the Faculty of the College of Graduate Studies,
Central Michigan University, in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the master's degree

Thesis Committee:

Ronald Primeau, Ph.D.	Committee Chair
Anne Hiebert Alton, Ph.D.	Faculty Member
John Pfeiffer, Ph.D.	Faculty Member
February 28, 2012	Date of Defense
Roger Coles, Ed.D.	Dean College of Graduate Studies
May 7, 2012	Approved by the College of Graduate Studies

Copyright by
Melissa J. Klammer
2012

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I wish to thank Dr. Ronald Primeau for his endless patience, encouragement, thoughtful suggestions and guidance throughout this project. I also wish to thank Dr. Anne Alton and Dr. John Pfeiffer for their contributions, expertise and support in this project. Finally, I also wish to thank my family: my husband Lance, and my daughter, Lydia, without whose encouragement this project would not have seen completion.

ABSTRACT

THE DEAD AUTHOR SPEAKS: RECONSTRUCTING THE FICTION OF THE POSTHUMOUS

by Melissa Klamer

Roland Barthes made a significant impact on textual interpretation when he argued for the metaphorical “Death of the Author”. Although used to justify an authorless interpretive method, Barthes’ title also raises questions in consideration of the text left behind at the physical death of the author. In attempting to situate the position of the specifically posthumous author in the interpretation of texts, this thesis first traces the development of the author from its origins in 18th century Britain commensurate with the establishment of literary texts as a commodity, through the critical discourse surrounding the roles of author, reader and text in interpretation. The thesis then considers the particular issues encountered in posthumous textual interpretation and scholarship, where analysis is complicated by a destabilization of both text and author through questions of textual authenticity and the involvement of editors and executors. The particular challenge of the posthumous, at least with regard to the author’s role, is that authors become fictive characters—real individuals, no longer able to participate in the reality of interpretation or dissemination of their works. Posthumous authors inevitably become fictionalized, as correlative with others’ representations of them. This fictionalization of the posthumous author opens the field of inquiry for further research through calling attention to the value for literary study of the posthumous text itself. As a representation, the posthumous spans the boundaries between scholarship and art. The question remains: to what extent is fictionalization acceptable in the posthumous, and what is the true value of posthumous texts in critical literary study?

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION.....	1
II. FROM AUTHOR TO READER	
Chapter 1: The Birth of the Author.....	9
Chapter 2: Defining the Roles of Author and Reader: Critical Responses.....	32
Chapter 3: Defining the “Work”.....	52
III. RECONSTRUCTING THE AUTHOR: ARGUING THE POSTHUMOUS	
Chapter 4: Intention and Reputation.....	60
Chapter 5: Finding the “Best Text”: Issues of Scholarship.....	79
Chapter 6: Editor and Executor: Too Many Cooks.....	97
IV. THE DEAD AUTHOR SPEAKS: CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER QUESTIONS.....	111
WORKS CITED.....	117
WORKS CONSULTED.....	122

I. INTRODUCTION

“Words are grown so false, I am loathe to prove reason with them.” - Feste, Shakespeare’s *Twelfth Night*

Although the words above are spoken by a “fool”, Shakespeare’s character—and perhaps through him, Shakespeare himself—expresses the problem at the core of language. Throughout *Twelfth Night*, and indeed, throughout much of Shakespeare, the audience is presented with witty reminders about the ability of language to be simultaneously powerful, equivocal, and unavoidably inadequate. Here, Feste’s comment—a brief segment from a witty repartee with Viola—is rather ironic, because even as he struggles to accept the inadequacy of language, he is forced to express his distaste for it in words. Feste struggles with the problem of language: it is not fully adequate, yet it is the only option which humanity has for communication.

This is a perennial problem for the written word as well. Thoughts must be expressed in words, although their “falseness” can make it challenging to “prove reason.” Intended meaning and received meaning are rarely perfectly aligned. The dichotomy lends itself to problems of interpretation: author and reader, as subjective entities, may interpret the meaning of written texts in different ways. This is demonstrated in the disparity between critical perspectives as to the interpretation of texts; some critics support intention, others, reader response, still others, a combination of the two, and in spite of the challenges of language, these critics are forced to perpetuate the difficulty by expressing their varying opinions on the subject of interpretation in writing itself.

One of the best-known essays in favor of the reader’s response as an interpretive medium for the written text is Roland Barthes’ “Death of the Author,” in which he argues that interpretation of the text becomes the province of the reader immediately following the moment

of writing. Authors, although the source of the text, can no longer have any voice in its interpretation, because it is given to the public; authors, for all practical interpretive purposes, are dead. Their texts take on lives of their own apart from them.

Many of the authors readers encounter are, in fact, dead. Dead authors have a long and staid tradition as figureheads in literary study, where they have been ensconced through canonization and anthologies. A deliberate challenge to the supremacy of “the classics” with new categorizations and demarcations of literary boundaries is making progress, but slowly. Emerging are the days of the Black authors, the Postcolonial authors, the Female authors, the Multicultural authors. Still the dead authors are everywhere. We meet them through their works, the remnants of their imaginations, passed down on paper, or perhaps in the recent age, on a screen, preserved through language for posterity. Their continued prevalence in the contemporary literary world creates a paradox: in the power of their language and their posthumous presence, these dead authors are anything but dead.

My first encounter with this decisive “death” of an author involved the life and works of Theodore Roethke, the Pulitzer Prize-winning poet from Saginaw, whose childhood home lies about two blocks from my grandmother’s current house. I suspect, in fact, that her home was built upon what was once Roethke family property, the location of the expansive greenhouses that influenced his poetry. Perhaps that is why Grandma’s roses bloom so well year after year. Yet, in spite of our physical proximity, I met Roethke in Nebraska. There has been a concentrated effort in recent years to remind Saginaw about the literary treasure they have in Roethke and his work, but when I began college in 2001, I still hadn’t heard of him. I found his poems, preserved after his death in an undergraduate literature anthology my first year. I read his poem, found it amusing but not terribly impressive, and thought little of him for several years.

A few years later, I discovered Roethke again, as my eyes wandered over the poetry section of the bookstore hoping to obtain a volume that would expand my literary horizons, having always rather neglected poetry. I chanced upon David Wagoner's *Straw for the Fire*, a posthumous collection of Roethke's fragments. I was struck, not only by the witty, pithy phrases in the text, but also by the words in the introduction, which explained that the poetry was posthumous, pulled together by an editor after Roethke's death. I had at this point read Barthes' essay as well, and I began to wonder: can an author really be dead?

Many scholars have recognized the phenomenal outpouring of interest that seems to follow close upon the heels of an author's physical death. The majority of writing about Roethke has appeared since his death, and the case is not unique. I reasoned, given the wealth of information about dead authors, from criticism and biography to numerous posthumous collections or so-called "unpublished" works, that Roethke the author was anything but dead. The reader couldn't have superseded him—readers seemed instead to be stalking him, chasing wildly after every word he had ever thought or written in a Hollywood-esque paparazzi fashion. The question, for me, became this: if the physically dead Roethke could still be the source of all this discussion and conjecture, yet had no say in it, who was the Roethke they were writing about?

The posthumous author is cloaked in fabrication, as if death draws a veil between this life and the literary reputation and work that live on after the author. My struggles to discover Roethke through a largely posthumous—and therefore limited—oeuvre made him seem less like a living, breathing poet and more like an actor—a figure in a mask that I was trying to see behind. I found an effective metaphor for my image of Roethke in the work of Shakespeare. In *Twelfth Night*, he extends the communication metaphor, the "falseness" of words for proving

reason, to the larger reality of life, when he gives the minor character Fabian the following line: “If this were played upon a stage now, I could condemn it as an improbable fiction” (3.4.135).

The irony, clearly, is that the scene Fabian is commenting on *is* a fiction, yet he speaks as though real life has become temporarily so improbable as to seem unreal—Fabian’s reality appears to him as a fiction. Yet the audience recognizes that Fabian’s reality *is* a fiction, and this fiction is also based in writing: a very real text, played out as a very fictive reality.

This is what happens in the posthumous: a blurring of reality and fiction. Wagoner and other editors of other poets in similar situations attempt in their work to remain true to the real author, the Roethke who lived in Saginaw, whose childhood home is still there. Yet the “poems” in the book I found on the shelf were not ‘written’ in the traditional sense by Roethke himself. The words were his, the organization was Wagoner’s. Who then, is the author of *Straw for the Fire*? The Roethke of the posthumous text is, like Shakespeare’s Fabian, a combination of the real and the fictive: Wagoner attempting to channel Roethke, the actor trying to convey an embittered servant jocosely triumphing in the humiliation of the haughty steward. The posthumous author, like Fabian, becomes caught in the middle. Who is Fabian, after all? Is he the embodiment of Shakespeare’s voice? The character himself? The actor on the stage? A construction of the audience’s experience? These questions illustrate the problems that constantly surround the posthumous author.

Perhaps the greatest barrier to understanding in written communication is the identification of the individuals involved: the “author” and the “reader.” These roles are very clearly defined in some texts, as they are, for example, in letters. There is in most cases an absolute delineation of the two parties involved, for even when the author of a letter is intending multiple people for an audience, he or she must still include them in the address, and then must

also identify him or herself in the signature. The roles of author and reader may be slightly complicated in published texts of greater complexity, in particular poetry or novels. The author is occasionally confused with the character—we are tempted to read Jane Eyre’s sufferings at Lowood School as a transcription of Charlotte Brontë’s own childhood experiences. As with the nuances of voice, the audience too may be somewhat vague. While Brontë’s novels contain the straightforward address, “Reader, I married him,” not all published works are so clear. One might argue that Eliot’s *The Waste Land* was intended for a particularly astute audience due to the prevalence of allusions and foreign languages in the text though Eliot makes no such claim. Yet, the fact remains that these published works, while they may leave room for speculation about the meanings implied or inferred by these parties, do give definitive names to the persons involved in their creation. *The Waste Land* is published with Eliot’s name attached to it, and the act of publication itself implies the desire for an audience, even when, as in the case of Charlotte Brontë, the author uses a pseudonym to prevent her own name from being attached to the work. In general (and admittedly this is a gross oversimplification of the case) authors write, like dramatists, to communicate something to their intended audience—which in the case of published works, is the person called a reader.

Such a simple statement would seem to leave three options for determining the meaning of a text: either it is something created by the author, or something understood, and therefore similarly created through participation, by the reader, or some median position of compromise created between the two. In the case of posthumously published works however, these roles, already unstable, become more convoluted. Authors, while in doubt as to their roles in the interpretation of those texts which are their own creation, now must compete with others who also participate in the creation of the readable text: editor, publisher, transcriber, translator,

executor and the like. Where once there was a single individual laying claim to the determinance of meaning, there are now five or more, all with such varying degrees of participation and authorship that its boundaries range from difficult to utterly impossible for the reader to fully determine. Thus with the posthumous text, before one can decide to allow or censure authors' own interpretations of meaning, one must decide which of the pages and paragraphs together with their subsequent interpretations are rightfully attributed to them, and in the case of multiple valid alternatives, which is the best one, or whether they are all to be taken and treated simultaneously.

It might perhaps be easier, in light of these challenges, to dismiss the author/editor/publisher/source mess entirely and instead to turn to the other end of the spectrum and side with the reader in terms of interpretation. Forget the origins, like Barthes has done—words are dead on the shelf until they are read, and what one understands from them is the crucial point. Such a methodology is tempting, not least of all because of humanity's desire to know for itself, and then to be known by others to have understood. Yet this, too, produces any number of seemingly unresolvable issues; perhaps the most prevalent and immediately problematic of these is the question of what to study in the first place. Every scholarly field has some form of mutual agreement or consensus as its aim, and the individual opinions and interpretations of Shakespeare's millions of readers hardly make an easily digestible or teachable college survey course. There must be some boundaries—so, as with the case of the author quondary, some readers ultimately will become privileged over others. And naturally, the sheer numbers of readers will render even this privileged status untenable, because who is to say which readers are right? Are contemporary scholars the wisest? Or were those of Shakespeare's day who shared a common context with him more likely to have a full understanding?

As mentioned earlier, critics on both sides of the issue have taken up the mantle in essays and longer works through the centuries, all offering perspectives on where the line between author and reader should be drawn, and who should take precedence. It is ironic that the debate surrounding the determination of meaning in writing should take place in writing as well. The critics taking up their pens to defend or to attack the author are themselves, most eminently, authors, and these critics, engaging in the discourse to reconcile their differences of opinion, also interact with each other as readers. Further demonstrating the complexities of the issue is the fact that even those authors who write in the hope of dismissing the authorial role in favor of fixing meaning in the hands of the reader still choose to affix their names to their work. As will be explained later, in spite of theoretical ideals with regard to literary theory, authors are still bound by the economic necessity of pecuniary resources and by their desire for property in their work, rendering the “death of the author” more plausible in theory than in practice.

Before entering on a discussion of the author’s role in determining the meaning of the posthumous text, it will first be necessary to examine how critical understanding of the roles of author and reader has evolved through history. A close reading of these critical viewpoints is crucial to the discussion of the role of the author in any text, but particularly those that are posthumous, because the majority of the issues we confront in dealing with posthumous material have already been discussed, at least in part, in the early years of historical debate surrounding the relationship between authors, their texts, their readers, and society itself. Posthumous texts are affected by every decision and direction that literary criticism has taken in the past: they are subject to copyright law, and hence we must consider how texts came to be seen as the property of authors and/or their executors and what this property implies; they are not published under the author’s guiding eye, and thus we must consider the role of and rules for determining intention

and to what extent it may or should be relied upon; they are not always complete in themselves and thus we must consider the effects of editing, completing, and choices made by editors and publishers; they are formed into collections and thus we must determine standards for choosing which texts merit reading by the public and which are not “literary” in nature; and beyond the texts themselves, the posthumous also can contain entirely new adaptations or conceptions of published works that were never within the author’s imagination, which call into question not only issues of authorial intention, but editing practices, copyright, and the effect upon the author’s reputation. For these reasons, it is best to begin our analysis of the texts under consideration by first looking at the roles of author and reader in history, providing a foundation for bringing these questions to bear when we step onto the more precarious ground of the posthumous. Although the explanations and theoretical background that follow may appear at times weighty and extensive, readers will remember that the consideration of posthumous authors and their roles in textual interpretation requires constant reference to the situation of the author throughout history. The position of the author in the posthumous cannot be understood without a firm grounding in the development of the author as an individual.

In the chapters that follow, this thesis will examine the initial appearance of the individual called an “author” as he/she materialized commensurate with cultural, technological and social developments, and will also revisit the relationships between author, reader, and text as they have been the subject of much critical discourse. The thesis turns, after this initial setting of the stage, to the posthumous text and the complications created in its interpretation by issues such as intention, reputation, scholarship, and the role of the editor, in an attempt to answer the question: who is the posthumous author, and what ought scholars to do with him?

II. FROM AUTHOR TO READER

Chapter 1: The Birth of the Author

All communication begins somewhere. In the case of written work, this means in the mind or beneath the pen of an author. In defining a “work,” Michel Foucault explains the necessity that any work have an author:

What, in short, is this strange unit designated by the term, work? What is necessary to its composition, if a work is not something written by a person called an “author”? If an individual is not an author, what are we to make of those things he has written or said, left among his papers or communicated to others? Is this not properly a work? (1624-5)

While the topic at hand here is not in fact, the work, as it is in the remainder of Foucault’s essay, but the person called the author, it is nevertheless necessary to acknowledge, as Foucault does, the impossibility of disentangling the person of the author from the object that is the text. A text’s existence is entirely dependent upon an author. Indeed, the term “author” has at its root the implication of origin and fatherhood: an author is one who creates, with the connotation of through that creation deserving respect and holding some power or ownership over the object created (OED 797). The term Author has even been applied in history to God himself, comprising in its far-reaching application the roles and attributes of creator, father, source, authority, and supreme ruling entity. Perhaps it is this connotation of authority which has lent energy to the attempt to dismiss the author from any position of sole determination over the meaning of his or her texts. Readers are uncomfortable allowing their interpretation to be guided by someone—human or deity—with such a dictatorial air.

Historically however, authors have not always enjoyed such a position of unbridled authority and respect as they seem to have achieved today. When Barthes, in “The Death of the

Author,” argues in favor of the reader as a determiner of meaning over authors, he claims as a primary reason that authors are a modern construct. He explains that in ancient times, the role of the storyteller was more highly valued than that of the author. In the absence often of written forms, stories were passed down orally, making the individuals who could memorize and bring life to such tales the people to be envied and admired. Homer, the purportedly blind poet who is traditionally credited with the authorship of the Greek epics *The Iliad* and *The Odyssey* was “heir to a long tradition of oral poetry” (Knox 19). It is not known when exactly Homer’s poems were written, but they are praised for their completeness and stylistic merit. The earliest extant copies of *The Odyssey* date from the fourteenth century. The Greek epics were passed down largely through oral tradition; Homer is one of the few authors known—and little is really known about him—from this period. In Barthes’ view, the imposition of the author is of recent origin, and the lack of authorial importance in early texts is a strong argument for the removal of authors from consideration of textual meaning, which in Barthes’ view, liberates the text from author-based interpretations which he sees as too limiting. The author’s death allows the text to stand for itself, calling for close reading and analysis of the language without the baggage imposed by the life or intentions of authors.

Foucault, too, cites the storyteller as an important precursor to authors, but Foucault’s allegory extends beyond the mere existence of a storyteller, to explain, interestingly, that there is “a kinship between writing and death” (1623). This kinship underscores the importance of language, and as its temporal extension, writing, to humanity. Authors—the term is used loosely in this context to mean anyone who expressed language in written terms as the title had not yet reached its current or full meaning in the time of storytellers—originally saw writing, through its ability to transcend their own mortality, as an extension of their ideas beyond the grave, thus

delaying or defeating death. Yet the kinship, Foucault claims, can also have—and does following Barthes’ premise—the opposite effect, as the text came to be viewed as an effacement of authors by existing independently of them and being studied and understood apart from them.

Foucault repeats Barthes’ example of the Greek epics as exemplification of this ‘kinship’, although his focus is on the purpose, and not the retelling: the stories, he explains, were meant to “guarantee the immortality of a hero” (1623). He offers as further evidence of this the Arabic stories such as *Tales of the Arabian Nights*, where storytelling had not only a link to death as a preservation of history, but in a more immediate context, was employed by Scheherazade as a method to delay death. Foucault explains,

This conception of a spoken or written narrative as a protection against death has been transformed by our culture. Writing is now linked to sacrifice and to the sacrifice of life itself; it is a voluntary obliteration of the self that does not require representation in books because it takes place in the everyday existence of the writer. Where a work had the duty of creating immortality, it now attains the right to kill, to become the murderer of its author. (1624)

These observations are particularly interesting in light of the now prolific existence of posthumously published material in the literary marketplace. Just as the Greek heroes sought to preserve their stories through written or spoken narratives (and the use of literature as historical preservation dates much further back even than Greece; the ancient Epic of Gilgamesh concludes with that hero traveling home and writing his own story for the benefit of future generations), authors have always understood that their work, even when produced in the immediate context of procuring financial stability, has the potential to last and to be welcomed or rejected by posterity. The paradox of the ability of the text to either preserve authorial identity as personal legacy or to

perpetually separate texts from their origins creates numerous concerns for authors, including whether to write at all, whether to publish, and how to best control the results of publishing both those works created specifically for the public and those with more private aims, such as letters, diaries, drafts and the like. The kinship between writing and death also illustrates, as we will see in the following chapters, the inability of authors to ever fully escape the fiction that surrounds them.

In addition to the privileging of the storyteller as a diminution of authors' importance, the existence of fairy tales, folk tales and songs speaks to the willingness of readers to accept some stories on little or no authority at all. Foucault comments on this phenomenon,

[T]here was a time when those texts which we now call 'literary' (stories, folk tales, epics, and tragedies) were accepted, circulated, and valorized without any question about the identity of their authors. Their anonymity was ignored because their real or supposed age was a sufficient guarantee of their authenticity. (1628)

This is still true in most cases; most individuals have little concern for who actually wrote or originally imagined the classic story of Cinderella, or for that matter, the tragic love story dramatized in *Romeo and Juliet*. Readers do not always seek a clear source or authority for these tales; it is enough to hear them told, and told well, by those who have written them down later.

Through their observations about storytellers and folk tales, Barthes and Foucault raise important questions about the role of authors in texts, which will be particularly relevant in consideration of texts which are posthumously discovered and/or published. As these concerns demonstrate, authors are something of a paradox. While it is impossible to separate authors from the text, because writing does not spontaneously produce itself without thought, it is not a simple matter to link a text with a single author, or sometimes, with any originator or author at all. The

concept of authorship is not as simple as our history or our library filing systems would have us believe. In fact, although authors are typically thought of today as individuals who are talented with words and have published one or more books or other forms of literature, the term author is more correctly a concept developed through time as the literary industry became established from the time of storytellers to the current climate of digital media and textual proliferation. It was in fact the adoption of printing technology and methods for textual reproduction, together with the development of the book as a marketable commodity, and not the individual's gift for crafting and organizing words, that played a major role in the recognition and popularization of the "Author."

The conception of authorship as it is commonly recognized today, as individuals who are both source and owner of given texts, developed in conjunction with the idea of literature as a commodity, and coincided with other important economic and social advancements, such as the printing press, ideas of "originality" and individuality in authorship, the increasing industrialization of society and the creation of a metropolitan marketplace (Rose 3). While these advancements were in part present before, circumstances were never so favorable for the development of the book as a commodity as in Britain in the eighteenth century, and this is where authors as individuals began to take root. Centuries earlier, as the printing press made it possible for books to be reproduced in great quantities, rather than painstakingly copied by hand to create manuscripts, authors became more permanently attached to their work, through the lessening of mistakes and alterations to a manuscript created by copyists, as well as the more permanent binding practices and the sheer number and wider distribution of the books that were printed. The increasing use of the printing technology also coincided with the "discourse of original genius" which was becoming more popular at the time. According to Mike Rose, while

in 1711 Alexander Pope “could still evoke the idea of the poet as the reproducer of traditional truths,” Samuel Johnson stated only sixty years later, “The highest praise of genius is original invention” (6).

As authorial genius was beginning to be praised, however, the potential of texts to stir up the populace became equally recognized, and the first laws creating rights of literary property were not issued to protect the interests of authors, but rather to provide a means to censor them. While interpretation is not strictly governed, and certainly there would be no clear or easy way to do so, literary works had become a commercial entity, and as such were subject to laws concerning ownership, distribution and also content. Foucault explains that authors’ rights over their work were originally granted not as a form of respect or honor, but to prevent unwanted words from being disseminated among the public, “books were only assigned real authors... when the author became subject to punishment and to the extent that his discourse was considered transgressive.... Discourse was not originally a thing, a product, or a possession, but an action” (1628).

Initially, the laws put in place to govern concerns regarding literary property did little to protect authors, and benefitted rather the printers and publishers who produced their work. The first laws governing printing practices originated in Venice, Italy and were an extension of the “privileges” granted to protect mechanical inventions—a type of early patent. These privileges granted specific persons the right to print exclusively for a number of years. Gradually, as more printers became interested in obtaining privileges, the government attempted to accommodate the growing number of individual printers. This was accomplished by creating a multiplication of privileges commensurate with the number of printers through subtle changes in wording—which meant that where privileges were originally given as exclusive printing rights, they were now

limited to specific types or works of literature. The privileges also came with “imprimeurs” to protect the variant forms of publication from appropriation by other printers—a form of early censorship. When the multiplication of printing privileges became impossible to control, as might be expected, other factors for assigning publication rights became necessary. This was when the concept of originality began to play a more central role—in the 16th century, as a means of controlling the trade, privileges were granted only for “new works” that had not previously been published (Rose 10).

Privileges first appeared in England in 1518, and like their predecessors in Italy, were mostly given to printers, though a few were granted to individual authors for specific texts (Rose 11). In England as well, the earliest form of copyright was held almost exclusively by the Stationer’s Company, a guild of printers who were given the exclusive right to print publications, not as a form of individual property, but rather as a type of governmental regulation of material (Rose 16). It is important to note that while authors had almost no control over or distinguishable right in publication, apart from the initial choice to offer their manuscripts to a publisher (who in the early years of publication thereby acquired full rights and control), the decisions concerning printing privileges no less laid the groundwork for the conception of authorship. The concept of originality, in particular, as a determinant factor in publication rights, contains a subtle suggestion of the author as an important force, by nature of initiating a reference to the source behind a text in an attempt at definition of its character. Likewise, the delineation of separate rights among various printers also echoes the later uncertainty over literary property; when texts became commodities, it also became necessary to assign their ownership, a problem which would also of necessity involve authors in years to come. The

entanglement of the text in questions of authorship also places these same issues of originality and ownership at the root of discussions of posthumous authors and their texts.

While the Stationers, as the original owners of English printing privileges, enjoyed these initial regulatory controls, however, books were becoming more and more a marketable commodity, and booksellers became interested in books as private property for their own benefit. Authors still had little or no right to control their own work; rights were almost always exclusively given to the printer or publisher. Yet, the increasing regulations and lobbying in favor of literary property were laying the foundation for authors to become more prominent members of the literary community. In England, a series of changes in policy regarding publication controls would lead slowly, but inevitably, to a greater position of authority for authors.

The first of these changes occurred in 1641, when “the Court of Star Chamber”, which had been responsible for licensing and for the authority of the Stationer’s Company’s controls and privileges, was abolished, leading to, as had been seen in Italy centuries earlier, a brief period of chaos in which anyone could print anything (Rose 15). In the absence of the Court of Star Chamber, controls were reinstated by other authorities. A parliamentary decree a year later required printers to “neither print nor reprint any thing without the Name and Consent of the Author” (Rose 22), and in 1662 a Licensing Act was passed, which made publication without proper authority illegal (Rose 31). The purpose of the licensing act was, as Foucault wrote, censorship and not protection; the preamble of the act states its purpose as explicitly to prevent “heretical schismatical blasphemous seditious and treasonable Bookes Pamphlets and Papers” (sic) from appearing among the public (Rose 31). Even these controls, however, though ostensibly a hindrance to the author’s freedom, gradually began to give him a foothold in the

literary field. While printers and booksellers still had every intention of claiming the ownership of these texts themselves, and merely purchasing them as they had previously done from authors for inexpensive terms, as they began lobbying Parliament to restore their powers of regulation and control over printed texts, the Stationers also saw the benefits of appealing to Parliament's better nature, and began invoke the needs and interests of authors as well as their own in pursuit of their claims.

In the years leading up to the first actual copyright law in England, the Statute of Anne, which was passed in 1710, authors themselves began to play a more prominent role in the politics of literary property. Author Daniel Defoe, concerned that regulations were needed to control "licentiousness of the press," but also determined (having just been released from imprisonment for a satiric essay) that these regulations fall into the hands of the correct authorities, took action by penning a pamphlet entitled *Essay on the Regulation of the Press*, in which he discouraged the reinstatement of licensing in favor of a parliamentary law (Rose 34). Defoe's essay is an early instance of authorial property being made a point of discussion. He argues here that "'twould be unaccountably severe, to make a Man answerable for the Miscarriages of a thing which he shall not reap the benefit of if well perform'd," in other words, if authors were to be censored for licentious writing—and Defoe did support this type of censorship—they should certainly also be rewarded for quality writing, in this case, through property in books since their names must be printed on them (Rose 35). In response to this essay the Stationers, far from viewing authorial involvement as a threat to their own vested interests and instead recognizing in Defoe's words a powerful appeal to Parliament's sense of the public good, created a new petition forwarding the author's interests together with their own, stating

that the lack of control over printing had caused authors to be discouraged from “writing Matters, that might be of great Use to the Publick, and to the great Damage of the Proprietors” (Rose 36).

Defoe’s voice in favor of authorial rights was quickly joined by that of Joseph Addison, who expanded the argument from merely asserting that authors deserved a reward for the success of their work since they were punished for its failures, toward a more prominent view of authors as noble contributors to the society at large. This inclusion of authors in the conversation surrounding literary property marked a shift in the conception of authorship. As Rose points out, previously the metaphors of author-text relations were of an inspirational model, implying more a gift for language than any sort of ownership over it: “various figures were employed... including the author as singing shepherd, tiller of the soil, vessel of divine inspiration, magician, and monarch” (Rose 38). These types of analogies fit well with the role of storyteller as prominent; speakers are fortunate in their ability to weave a tale, but have no clear position of control over the text, and certainly no manifest ownership. These early opinions of authorship, while couched in metaphor, continue to surface in the later debates surrounding authors’ roles in interpretation. It is vital to an understanding of how the role of the author came about to see these historical precedents and tendencies carried through into current discussions about the role of the author.

With the appearance of arguments by Addison and Defoe in several pamphlets and periodicals in late 1709 and early 1710, the conception of the author makes a subtle shift from tropes of inspiration toward those of control; the metaphors which begin to take precedence in the early 1700s are of paternity and land ownership. Defoe writes expressively of his work as his offspring, “these Children of our Heads are seiz’d, captivated, spirited away, and carry’d into Captivity, and there is none to redeem them” (39). Although the parental metaphor breaks down

in further analysis given the nature of literary relations—Rose points out that parents should in no case, as Swift’s satirical *Modest Proposal* would suggest, think of selling their children as authors did manuscripts—the metaphor of land ownership became the authors’ powerful ally, particularly as it had in its favor a cousinly precedent in the discourse surrounding patents for mechanical inventions. Inventors’ ownership of their patents was routinely compared to land ownership, and an obvious first step in the discussions of literary property was to appropriate this linguistic precedent, and employ the ideas of patent ownership in situating the new literary property debate. Indeed, when the Statute of Anne was passed in the spring of 1710, the limited term for copyrights came directly from the Statute of Monopolies, which governed patents for mechanical inventions: new books were protected for fourteen years, as new inventions had been, and previously published books, like previous inventions, for twenty-one years (Rose 45).

This limited term was, it has been suggested, an attempt by Parliament to limit the monopoly the Stationer’s Company held over publication, and it has further been implied that the final wording of the Statute of Anne, “A Bill for the Encouragement of Learning by Vesting the Copies of Printed Books in the Authors, or Purchasers, of such Copies, during the Times therein Mentioned,” was also an attempt to break this monopoly; the original terms of the Statute had only mentioned printers, and not authors (46). It is ironic, therefore, that the discourse surrounding the first copyright law in England involved authors on both sides, not to protect them, but rather as pawns in the interests of both the government, which sought regulation, and the Stationer’s Company, which sought control. Nevertheless, authors were now protected by Copyright, and that right, together with the increasing importance of originality in thought and the use of text to promote authors themselves, would gradually lead authors to a role of greater prominence.

The subtle appearance of authors within the dialogue concerning literary property echoes the larger concerns at the heart of their roles in posthumous interpretation, particularly in the duality between reality and representation. The authors who appear in the tracts, documents and other linguistic apparatus of the literary property debates are no less subject to fictionalization than authors of the published work or the posthumously discovered fragment or grocery list. We see here “real” authors entering the debate: Defoe, Addison and others after them representing their own interests in written form, first to the public at large in journals and magazines, and later, as we will see, in letters directed at the legislative and judiciary players in the action. There is also present the more “representational” form of authors, as invoked by the writers of the Stationers’ guild, who claimed to speak for authors’ best interests.

The choices surrounding literary property are, in fact, a sort of dress rehearsal for the conversation surrounding the posthumous reconstruction of the fictionalized author: in the years that followed, court cases to determine and govern questions of literary property became more and more frequent. Throughout most of the debates and court cases, authors had a limited voice. While an author was occasionally called on to testify, many of the cases were legislated posthumously. In these cases, the arguments heard by the court came from publishers, booksellers, descendants, and the lawyers who all gave their own representations of the rights and wishes of authors. These representations were based on their own beliefs in the roles of authors themselves: some represented them, as the stationers did, as noble contributors to the overall knowledge and well-being of society; some as gentleman owners with as much a right to their texts as any landowner to his property; some as desperate parents, deprived of their own offspring. On the other hand, authors were also alternately viewed as a money-grubbing beggars, peddling worthless prose and only seeking the legal protection to gain financially from such; as

dangerous sources of libel or treasonous thought that needed to be kept in check, or as selfish blights on society, unwilling to use their own gifts for the common good without personal remuneration.

Thus, just as the dead authors whose posthumous works are offered to the reading public by editors and publishers are a product of others' representations of them, the newly-emerging character of authors in the Eighteenth Century was predominantly a product of the culture, of the ideas of authorship attributed to them by the many participants in the conversation. Before they ever took the stage as "real" individuals with clearly recognized rights and property in their own ideas, authors were already becoming a fiction.

In the years following the Statute of Anne, debates and cases in the courts about the definition of copyright and literary property continued to occur, and with them, the concept of authorship gradually developed. These cases typically involved booksellers, who were anxious to retain their profits and saw other editions of the same texts as encroaching on their right of property. The discussion of authors' rights resulting from questions broached by the Statute of Anne culminated in one primary question which the Statute had failed to decide: did authors have a common law, or natural, right to property in their work? This question invariably led to others that were intricately connected with it. If authors possessed a common law property in their work, did that right extend beyond publication, either merely the fourteen or twenty-one years provided by the statute, or for a longer term, possibly even perpetually, as was originally sought by the Stationers after the lapse of the licensing act? Another important question that arose dealt with whether a text, as an intangible entity, could be property, or whether the act of publication made a work "common" to everyone.

Interestingly, this question of publication rendering a text no longer the property of its author closely echoes the later debates over the role of authors in interpretation; the immateriality of the text lends itself to a lack of consensus about its ownership and control in all aspects. By extension, the immateriality of the text also casts authors in a fictional light—after publication, they become less the physical pen that traced the strokes of the manuscript and breathed life into it, and instead take on the less “real” characteristics subject to a reader’s perception—authors are made not of flesh and blood, but are an image conjured equally by the name printed on the cover, the language on the page and the voice the reader hears in the text. Here again, the duality of the real and the representation comes to the forefront. The question of literary property hinged on the materiality of the text: did authors own merely their manuscripts, which became the property of publishers after publication, or could the text itself be seen as somehow separate from the paper in which it was bound? Who were the owners of books as physical objects, and ought the author to have any say in their control after initial publication, perhaps as long as fifty years after? The issue of common law right is an important precursor to decisions surrounding the posthumous, because in the absence of publication and following authors’ deaths, questions of ownership and proper use of the posthumous must take as a precedent the questions surrounding literary property rights decided by copyright law as early as the eighteenth century, when authors were only beginning to be recognized as such.

The issue of authors’ common law rights came to a head in a decision heard by the Court of King’s Bench in 1769: *Millar v. Taylor*. The Chief Justice who issued the final decision in the case was William Murray, Lord Mansfield, who throughout the Eighteenth century played an important role in decisions of literary property, first as a counselor, and finally as a judge and a peer of the House of Lords. The decision in *Millar v. Taylor* upheld the existence of authors’

common law right and the idea of perpetual copyright (Rose 78). Mansfield explained “that, by the common law, an author is intitled to the copy of his own work until it has been once printed and published by his authority” (Rose 79). It is interesting to note here that Mansfield’s wording of his understanding of authors’ common law right: “until it has been once printed,” initially seems to extend that right only so far as publication, and such an understanding foreshadows the opinion of Barthes and other critics that authors’ control over their texts ends at publication. Although Mansfield’s support of the author’s common law right is well documented, the potential for ambiguous construction in his statement is telling with regard to the precarious position of the author in literary scholarship. Questions concerning the relationship between author and text are at once extremely complex and intricately connected; explication of the nuances requires very careful negotiation of language, and this necessity lends itself to differences of opinion and a lack of consensus, as will be seen in chapter 2. One other aspect of Mansfield’s conclusion—he suggested that this common law right had been understood throughout the history of copyright—also illustrates the difficulty in linguistic negotiation of copyright terminology, in that it was perhaps less supported than it was stated to be. Copyright was not so old that the common right was of long standing, and there were few cases to back up the claim. Mansfield however, supported his claim through value statements which again invoked the author. He explained that the prepublication right came from the principle that:

It is just, that an author should reap the pecuniary profits of his own ingenuity and labour. It is just, that another should not use his name, without his consent. It is fit, that he should judge when to publish, or whether he ever will publish. It is fit he should not only choose the time, but the manner of publication; how many; what volume; what print. It is fit, he should choose to whose care he will trust the accuracy and correctness of the

impression; in whose honesty he will confide, not to foist in additions: with other reasonings of the same effect. (qtd. in Rose 80)

In other words, it was a matter of principle that the author should have a role in the publication of his own work. Was that right, however, extended beyond publication? Was it perpetual?

Although in his initial statement he explains that an author has a right until his work is “once published,” Mansfield later seemed to claim this right was not limited by publication, but was, in fact, perpetual, because if the right did not continue, authors would lose all of these privileges and profit, as well as control over the accuracy of their work as printed, the contents thereof, and the control of their names and reputations as associated with those ideas.

The primary objection to the proposed continuation of the common law right, as expressed by a second judge in *Millar v. Taylor*, Joseph Yates, (the other two judges agreed with Mansfield) was that publication rendered a work common, and no longer the property of its author. Mansfield responded by claiming Yates’ argument was circular, and therefore not valid: “The copy is made common, because the law does not protect it: And the law can not protect it, because it is made common” (Rose 81). Mansfield further argued that the most logical objection to the common law right would have been that it had been taken away by Statute, which was not the case. The Statute rather, although it did not expressly affirm an author’s common-law right, implied it in the wording: “A Bill for the Encouragement of Learning by Vesting the Copies of Printed Books in the Authors” (46). Yates’ opinion being of the minority, *Millar v. Taylor* established the common-law right of authors perpetually. The decision, however, was not long-lived.

Mansfield’s decision was overturned in the case of *Donaldson v. Becket* in 1774, an appeal heard by the House of Lords, which though not a direct appeal from *Millar v. Taylor*,

came from a series of cases of disputes among Scottish and British booksellers following Mansfield's landmark ruling. Though the House of Lords decided cases on a vote of the peers, they first heard opinions of judges on the subject. It is interesting to note that in this case, the judges' opinions were in general favorable toward authors' common law right. They agreed 8-3 that the author did possess a common law right, 7-4 that this right survived publication, and Rose suggests, due to an error in recording, likely also agreed 6-5 that the right was not taken away by the Statute of Anne. These numbers, even allowing for the supposed mistake in recording, are strengthened in favor of the common-law right by the fact that twelve judges, not eleven, heard the case before the House of Lords. The recorded votes do not reflect the whole group: Lord Mansfield refused to offer his opinion, as he had been the one to issue the judgment in *Millar v. Taylor* and it might have appeared as a conflict of interest, yet it was well understood that he favored the common-law right. Despite the judges' opinions, however, the Lords determined that the rights of authors were not perpetual, and would be, as stated in the Statute of Anne, limited in term (Rose 103).

In the years that followed, debates continued about the length of the copyright term, and about what it meant for authors. The arguments paralleled the varying opinions about the nature of authorship that pervaded society at the time. Some, who viewed the author as a contributor to the value of society, argued that to extend the term was only fair and was necessary as a reward to authors. Others were concerned that lengthening the term would encourage authors to write poorly and only for pecuniary interests, and argued instead that the reward for quality writers should be the admiration of posterity, and not immediate financial remuneration. Eventually, the disparity of opinions rendered authors, again, of limited importance in the debate: copyright law began to be viewed not as an absolute question as to authors' common law right or lack thereof,

but as a compromise between the recognized rights of authors and the equally important need of society to prevent monopolies.

Authors' involvement in the discussion surrounding their own rights serves as a model for the fictionalization they encounter in the posthumous: even as they gained a foothold with literary property, even as their contributions were beginning to be recognized and valued, authors' importance was already limited by society's understanding of its own economic and cultural needs, and authors were subject—as they had always been—to these powers. In the mid-nineteenth century, authors such as Wordsworth, Southey and Carlyle all wrote letters to Parliament expressing the desire to see the copyright term expanded. Authors' reputations had developed to such a degree that these letters were in fact persuasive, and combined with the efforts of others, resulted in the Copyright Act of 1842, wherein Parliament extended the term to the author's lifetime plus seven years or forty-two years from publication, whichever was longer (Rose 111). The Act stood as such into the twentieth century, and copyright continues to play an important role in the complex relationship between author, text and reader. With the initiation of the Copyright Act, and through its ancestors, the author had been born. Yet even at this auspicious event, the vesting of authors with rights in their literary property, the role of the author made its beginning on rocky ground. The right was not perpetual, and the results of copyright decisions continue to impact the relationships between authors and their texts to this day. Authors have rights in their property, but they have never been exclusive rights; the ability to control texts has always been shared with others. It is hardly surprising, then, that the ability to interpret texts has been equally contested. These issues continue to inform discussion of the posthumous, and are a necessary foundation for them, because no text, however incomplete, exists without an author.

Copyright creates as many problems as it solves. While critics and theorists may argue that the author is dead or ought to be eliminated from interpretation, still the author's position as economic authority is rooted in our legal system and also in our own sense of self. One would assume that even the most liberal authors and poets, those who attest themselves to the life their work takes on apart from their initial ideas, still would not welcome a complete separation, either by lack of financial recompense or by the introduction of anonymity. The text must have an author. Tied up in these discussions of authorship are also many questions beyond even the common law right decision that is so prevalent in discussions of copyright. The existence of the author is also inextricably linked to questions of identity, personality and originality, which try though one might, are incredibly difficult to distance from humanity's sense of self.

Perhaps it is also not so surprising that the concern surrounding the author should have come about in conjunction with the proliferation of printing, for it was, after all, the act of printing that allowed authors to gain a sort of independence from their works. Before printed works were so easily disseminated, orators were held in high esteem, and rhetoric—the art of public speaking—was the focus of literacy. A key difference between rhetoric and writing is, of course, the presence of the speaker. Some critics may attempt analysis of speeches without the intrusion of the author as a factor, but such objective reasoning is difficult to say the least; much like a dramatic performer or a prized musician, the oratory performance is in a large part credited to the speaker. It is equally doubtful that one would attend an inaugural address and say nothing about the President's style or voice, and that one would pay to hear Sir James Galway play "Variations on Carmen" and comment only on the music, and not his execution.

With the inscription of language onto paper, however (or in today's world, a screen) comes a tangible separation between authors and their texts, which places barriers between the

two. Even as early debaters of copyright had to determine whether the ownership of text was limited by the physical book, the reader must now come to an understanding of authors through representation—through the voice on the page and the characters. The separation of authors from their published works began as an issue for copyright, continues as an issue in interpretation, and is intensified in the posthumous, where not only the physical disconnect between text and writer exists, but also the additional one between finished and unfinished work. The posthumous is necessarily incomplete, if in nothing more than the uncertainty about the author's intention for the text in hand. While published work has been given approval by the author, unpublished work has not. The discussions surrounding authors' common law rights would seem to suggest that their intentions should be considered in posthumous publication. Even the decisions following *Millar v. Taylor*, although they limited the term of the common law right, still recognized its existence.

Authors may not be able to control what is said or thought about their works following death, but there are several laws now in place that enable them to control the physical presence of these works. Even before the Copyright Act of 1842 was enacted, authors were well aware of the potential effects of their own mortality on their work and reputations, and were concerned with taking measures to control their posthumously discovered outputs, and the impact of such. While the concerns are common, of course, authors have taken varying actions to accommodate these fears. Some authors, as in the case of Emily Brontë, dealt with the eventuality of the discovery of their unfinished or unpublished works by preventing such an end entirely. Brontë burned several of her poems after the publication (without her approval) of some of her poetry in a collection with that of her sisters. Other authors chose to leave their work in the hands of trusted family or friends, either through a will or by appointing an executor. Theodore Roethke's

wife, Beatrice (now Lushington), has been in charge of his estate since his death in 1963, and has overseen the publication of several collected essays and poems since that time. After her sister Jane's death in 1817, Cassandra Austen inherited many of her letters and manuscripts, which she took upon herself to edit before leaving them to their niece, Fanny. Of the letters we have written by Austen today, several are missing sections that Cassandra removed, and more whole letters are missing entirely. In this case, of course, it was not Austen herself, but her representative who determined which passages were not fit for public consumption. It is precisely this compounding of individuals involved which makes dealing with posthumous material complicated.

The legal ramifications of posthumously discovered material also create complications with regard to the author's role by muddying the decision of who controls publication of posthumous work. In its attempt to satisfy both the interests of authors for rights in their property and the needs of the public for censorship and control, the initiation of copyright allowed for perpetual difficulty in decisions about the posthumous by refusing to confer the right of publication exclusively on a single individual. When Jane Austen died in 1817, her brother Henry Austen had been instrumental in the publication of her already published novels, and he then took it upon himself to publish two more, both finished, but perhaps not in the way Austen herself would have appreciated. At the time of her death, Austen had been revising *Northanger Abbey*, a very early novel, but had been unable to complete her revisions, or give it a title. This Henry Austen did, publishing it posthumously together with her last completed novel, *Persuasion*, in 1818. As one of the principal beneficiaries in Austen's will, Henry also, together with Cassandra, was responsible for selling the Copyrights to five of Austen's novels to Richard Bentley in 1832. They were given 250 pounds and two copies in recompense (Grey).

While Austen's family did have legal rights over her work, it is less certain whether they were the best individuals to edit and prepare these works for future readers. Generations of Austen readers have encountered her work through the hands of Henry and Cassandra, and this complication of her role creates questions for the scholar. Austen may have been fully aware of the challenges inherent in leaving her work in the hands of her family, since she was a contemporary of much of the debate surrounding literary property. Born in 1775, just one year after the reversal decision of *Donaldson v. Becket*, she saw her works published in London, the center of the debates, with the help of Henry, who from 1803 until 1816 was a banker there (Grey). Henry, as a London resident, would have been familiar with the various decisions regarding copyright, particularly the revised statute of 1814 that extended the copyright term before the Copyright Act was enacted, and would also have been familiar with Austen's wishes, having helped her throughout her publication career (Rose 110). It is entirely plausible that Austen died with no regrets about leaving her work in the hands of her siblings, and that she both knew and accepted the possibility of their publishing her unfinished work after she died. The scholar, however, cannot be certain that Austen would have chosen *Northanger Abbey* for the title of her last novel, or that she would not have made different changes to it or *Persuasion* given the opportunity. While *Persuasion* has often been considered a remarkable achievement of a more mature Austen, several among its critics have also found it flawed, less polished than her other work.

This is where issues of copyright complicate the posthumous. Legal protection is actually one of the few concrete connections authors have to their work. Unlike interpretation, copyright—until the author's death—is objective. There is little contestation of authorial rights to their own work, and while authors are alive, they have recourse through the legal system to

defend their claims if they believe their rights are being infringed upon. Yet copyright is not perpetual, and upon the author's death, it involves others in decisions surrounding literary property. The roles of executors and editors will be treated in more detail hereafter, but for the present, it is sufficient to note that although it represents a complex and lengthy step in the development of the author as an individual, knowledge of copyright and its connected questions is imperative to an understanding of the unique position of the author in the posthumous.

Chapter 2: Defining the Roles of Author and Reader: Critical Responses

Just as the public perception of the author has been formed and changed through the centuries, critical responses to the author have shifted and developed. As it proves foundational for this thesis, it is prudent before grounding the roles of author and reader through a discussion of their critical precedents to revisit Barthes' "The Death of the Author," (as a part of which he made the aforementioned comments about the author as a modern construct). As previously stated, in his groundbreaking essay, Barthes took issue with criticism's heavy reliance upon authors and their intention as a medium for interpretation, saying:

The image of literature to be found in ordinary culture is tyrannically centred on the author, his person, his life, his tastes, his passions, while criticism still consists for the most part in saying that Baudelaire's work is the failure of Baudelaire the man, Van Gogh's his madness, Tchaikovsky's his vice. The *explanation* of the work is always sought in the man or the woman who produced it, as if it were always in the end, through the more or less transparent allegory of the fiction, the voice of a single person, the author, "confiding" in us. (1466)

Barthes is responding here to the complication created in interpretation by the act of printing, through the physical separation of author and text. With the author removed, at least materially, Barthes posits that logically, the text should be considered on its own merits, and not viewed as a type of clone of the individual who created it.

Most have agreed with Barthes' perspective, or have at least seen the potential for criticism apart from authors. Barthes himself also drew on the ideas of others in his concern regarding authors; in his essay, he notably references the French poet and critic Stéphane Mallarmé, who wrote in his "Crisis in Verse" as early as 1896:

The pure work implies the disappearance of the poet-speaker who yields the initiative to words animated by the inequality revealed in their collision with one another; they illuminate one another and pass like a trail of fire over precious stones, replacing the audible breathing of earlier lyrical verse or the exalted personality which directed the phrase. (qtd in Burke 51)

Mallarmé was keenly aware of the musical nature of poetry, and viewed this “disappearance of the poet-speaker” as a way of making poetry more expressive of what he called “the supreme language” (Norton 847). According to Mallarmé, languages are imperfect because they are not universal:

[T]he immortal word, the diversity of idioms on earth, prevents anyone from proffering the words which otherwise would be at their disposal, each uniquely minted and in themselves revealing the material truth.... I regret that speech fails to express objects by marks that correspond to them in color and movement, marks that exist in the instrument of the voice, among languages and sometimes in a single language. (847-48)

He seems to also see the author as an interruptive reminder of this limited nature of language; by removing the author “who yields the initiative to the words,” the poem becomes a “pure work” consisting of nothing but language, and can work on the reader in a way reminiscent of a musical composition, with harmonious sounds washing over the audience and combining to create emotions and sensations, all without the benefit of words.

Musicians too, have commented on the ability of music to be a sort of language of its own; Mallarmé’s essay could in some ways function as an explanation for what composers have long tried to accomplish and often tried to name through musical terminology and titles, like the novel “program music” of Hector Berlioz, Wagner’s notion of the “leitmotif” or Schumann’s

aptly and yet curiously titled “Songs Without Words.” For Mallarmé, the words, phrases and “total rhythm of the white spaces” that constitute a poem work better together without the intrusion of the author, functioning instead as pure language, the sounds and rhythms of words flowing together like music:

Certainly I never sit down on the terraces to hear a concert without glimpsing amidst the obscure sublimity some sketch of one or other of humanity’s immanent poems or their original state, all the more comprehensible for not being spoken, and I see that to determine its vast line the composer experienced that easy suspension of even the temptation to express it. (850)

Mallarmé’s objection to the author differs from Barthes’ slightly, in that Barthes was concerned with an invasive focus on intention, which Mallarmé does not distinctly mention, yet both critics aim at a liberation of the text; they view the dismissal of authors as enabling the text itself to come forward and be taken and studied as it is, without the “tyrannical” imposition of the thoughts of the author or the “exalted personality” of the “poet-speaker”.

Barthes and Mallarmé, and critics who espouse similar claims, are grappling with a deeper issue that lies at the heart of literature: the juxtaposition of reality and representation. Barthes’ desire to allow the text to speak for itself and Mallarmé’s concept of a “universal language” both point to the inadequacy of language to speak fully, to equate to the reality it represents perfectly, so that communication is no longer subjective, but complete, whole, and indisputable. If there were a “universal language,” as Mallarmé proposes it, then Barthes’ concerns with the intrusion of authors into the text would be wholly invalid: the text would be thoroughly transparent by nature of the perfect language, and there would be no reason to doubt its meaning or to search for it, either in the person of the author, or reader, or the words

themselves. (One might interject here that the fantasy of such a language calls into question the potential role or necessity of any resultant type of literary criticism.)

Although Barthes and Mallarmé both settle on authors as the source for uncertainty and limitation in the interpretation of texts, the real difficulty is one of language itself. Mallarmé describes—one might wonder in consideration of his object whether he doubted his own ability to express such a thought or felt duplicitous in the attempt—his experience of music as “one or other of humanity’s immanent poems... all the more comprehensible for not being spoken” (850). The focus is on expression without speech. Mallarmé praises composers for effacing themselves as Barthes idealizes the removal of authors; this is evident in Mallarmé’s description of the composer’s experience as “the easy suspension of even the temptation to express” the “immanent poems” he finds beneath the sounds. Yet does it follow that after removing the author, the reader is any more capable of expressing his experience in adequate language? Linguistic representation is necessarily ambiguous, and like the text itself, the reader is not exempt from the uncertainties surrounding description or analysis.

The challenges inherent in determining what role authors play in their texts after the instance of writing are in large part created by the equally necessary presence of a reader. Jean-Paul Sartre explains this necessity:

If the author existed alone he would be able to write as much as he liked; the work as *object* would never see the light of day and he would either have to put down his pen or despair. But the operation of writing implies that of reading as its dialectical correlative and these two connected acts necessitate two distinct agents. It is the joint effort of author and reader which brings upon the scene that concrete and imaginary object which is the work of the mind. (1338)

This interaction between authors and readers is precisely what leads to the problems of interpretation—the “work of the mind” is not reproducible. Thoughts are subjective, and as Mallarmé suggests in his commendation of music, regardless of the skill or style of any author, every nuance of meaning, intention or significance authors have in their grasp at the time of writing cannot be simultaneously transcribed onto the page, nor is that in most cases their aim. The inaccessibility of these extra nuances, however, has been instrumental in the attempt to overthrow authors as the sole determining force of meaning.

In his essay “What is an Author?” Foucault explains, as was mentioned earlier, that an underlying difficulty in enacting the ideal separation of authors and text is that the concept of the ‘author’ is inextricably linked to the text itself, and to the concept of a work: for what is a work, he asks, but “something written by a person called an ‘author’?” (1624). Like Mallarmé, Foucault’s focus does not hinge, as Barthes’ does, on the question of intentionality. Rather, he too sees in the dismissal of authors a new direction for literary criticism, in the shift—though not explicitly stated—of critical thought toward analysis of the role and work of the reader:

It is obviously insufficient to repeat empty slogans: the author has disappeared; God and man died a common death. Rather, we should reexamine the empty space left by the author’s disappearance; we should attentively observe, along its gaps and fault lines, its new demarcations, and the reapportionment of this void; we should await the fluid functions released by this disappearance. (1626)

Thus Foucault argues for an increased focus on the text itself, and for in-depth study of the nature of the work, which includes defining the roles and relationships of the terms author, reader, work and text. The “fluid functions” of the authorless text Foucault alludes to are taken further by individuals like Jean-Paul Sartre and Georges Poulet.

Sartre's essay, "Why Write?" from which the above allusion to the necessary interaction between author and reader is taken, does not so much argue for a deliberate refusal to include authors in criticism, but rather argues that by virtue of having written, authors lose any ability for objective experience of their texts and therefore cannot "read" them as a reader can. Sartre explains the total subjectivity of writers reading their own work: "[he] meets everywhere only *his* knowledge, *his* will, *his* plans, in short, himself. He touches only his own subjectivity; the object he creates is out of reach; he does not create it for himself" (1338). Thus, Sartre moves in his essay toward reader-response criticism—although without thoroughly embracing it, for he never denies the importance of authors in the relation to readers, choosing instead to reiterate the author-reader relationship as dialectic and mutually necessary: "It is the joint effort of author and reader which brings upon the scene that concrete and imaginary object which is the work of the mind. There is no art except for and by others" (1338).

Sartre briefly mentions intentionality in his essay, but unlike Barthes, he does not view it as intrusive, perhaps because again unlike Barthes, he is viewing authors, and their intentions, as an implicit part of the process of reading. Sartre writes

It is [the reader] on the contrary, who allows the significance of each of [the words] to be understood; and the literary object, though realized *through* language, is never given *in* language. On the contrary, it is by nature a silence and an opponent of the word.... And if I am told that it would be more fitting to call this operation a re-invention or a discovery, I shall answer that, first, such a re-invention would be as new and as original an act as the first invention.... For if the silence about which I am speaking is really the goal at which the author is aiming, he has, at least, never been familiar with it; his silence is subjective and anterior to language. (1339)

Thus Sartre again emphasizes the primacy of the text itself, and through it, the prominent role of the reader in creating the text. He explains that just as authors cannot read their texts objectively, any intentions that they had in the act of writing, if not part of the text, are not accessible.

Here Sartre echoes slightly one claim against intentionality made by Wimsatt and Beardsley in their earlier essay *The Intentional Fallacy*: “One must ask how a critic expects to get an answer to the question about intention. How is he to find out what the poet tried to do? If the poet succeeded in doing it, then the poem itself shows what he was trying to do. And if the poet did not succeed, then the poem is not adequate evidence” (1375). Interestingly, although Sartre and Wimsatt & Beardsley attest to the impossibility of finding the intention of authors in the text, they offer differing opinions as to the one responsible for locating it. *The Intentional Fallacy* places the onus for such an interpretation solely on the shoulders of the critic, while Sartre remains focused on the reader. This is a question that Barthes, though he decisively does away with the author, leaves unanswered in his monumental essay. Sean Burke writes, “The empty subject position is then filled by the Reader, though it remains unclear that Barthes’s reader is any less mystifying than the author (s)he (it?) would replace” (69). In fact, it may be observed that the intention of authors is not imposed on the reader so much by the authors themselves, who do no more than send their language into the world with the hope that it will find a sympathetic reader, as by critics who write their assumptions about the intention of authors and likewise foist these onto the public, seeking a response or at least the intangible amelioration of the reading community. Thus the critic emerges as a heretofore silent, but nonetheless present, player also in the struggle to affix meaning to literary texts.

The “mystifying” nature Burke refers to of both author and reader is linked to the impossibility of Mallarmé’s “universal language.” Neither author nor reader, finally, is a perfect

solution to the interpretation question. The author cannot be dismissed, but must be seen as part of the text. Yet the author is not a reproducible medium, due to the nature of subjectivity and the representation of self. Much like language, or the text, authors are changing entities, being “read” and “reread” by the various critics and generations of readers, whose interpretations are in turn subject to their own impressions and ideas. Readers, among whom the critic is the most prominent, are also problematic. The multiplicity of opinions and critical essays related to the author/reader dichotomy speaks for itself; criticism has not been able to come to consensus, and the debate continues.

Georges Poulet’s *Phenomenology of Reading*, while it makes claims similar to those of Sartre, emphasizes not the dismissal of the authors, but rather their complete absorption into the text. The focus is on the reader. Poulet views reading as an experiment in human existence or consciousness; the text is not an end or a designated meaning, but instead becomes a boundless field for experience. He describes reading as “the falling away of the barriers between you and it. You are inside it; it is inside you; there is no longer either outside or inside” (Poulet 1321). Influenced by the arbitrariness and ambiguity Saussure’s linguistics revealed about the nature of language, and through it, communication itself, poststructuralists and other critics began to apply what they had learned about language to the act of reading, eliminating authors as symbolic of fixed meaning which does not exist in language, an invalid and superimposed structure that hindered the nature of reading by limiting the reader’s perspectives. Yet Poulet’s conception of the text that is read almost equates it with the consciousness of the author:

I realize that what I hold in my hands is no longer just an object, or even simply a living thing. I am aware of a rational being, of a consciousness; the consciousness of another, no different from the one I automatically assume in every human being I encounter,

except that in this case the consciousness is open to me, welcomes me, lets me look deep inside itself, and even allows me, with unheard-of license, to think what it thinks and feel what it feels. (1321)

Like Sartre, Poulet focuses on the experience of reading, yet rather than viewing the author's experiences as impossible to reconstruct as Sartre does, Poulet seems to view reading as achieving a sort of kinship of consciousness.

Poulet's debt to Saussure is evident in his essay. Before the above quotation, which expresses what Poulet sees in the object of the book itself, he observes "surging out of [it]... a quantity of significations which my mind grasps" (qtd. Burke 102). The use of 'significations' echoes the words of Saussure (or rather of his students and editors; Saussure's *Linguistics* is a notable example of the powerful role posthumous texts can play in the literary tradition): "The bond between the signifier and the signified is arbitrary. Since I mean by sign the whole that results from the associating of the signifier with the signified, I can simply say: *the linguistic sign is arbitrary*" (964). By appropriating Saussure's own language in his discussion of the book, Poulet imposes Saussure's concepts of the arbitrariness of language upon the act of reading itself. Poulet's conception of the interiority of reading, of the immateriality of language, differentiates between the book as physical object and the language within as a secondary object dependent upon human thought:

[T]he book... was an object among others, residing in the external world... in no need of being thought by my thought; whereas, in this interior world where, like fish in an aquarium, words, images, and ideas disport themselves, these mental entities, in order to exist, need the shelter which I provide; they are dependent on my consciousness. (Burke 103)

This dichotomy of language as physically printed and yet representative of thought, which is in turn the sole possession of consciousness, is reminiscent also of Saussure:

Psychologically our thought—apart from its expression in words—is only a shapeless and indistinct mass.... Without language, thought is a vague, uncharted nebula.... The linguistic fact can therefore be pictured in its totality—i.e. language—as a series of contiguous subdivisions marked off on both the indefinite plane of jumbled ideas and the equally vague plane of sounds. (967)

Saussure's "indistinct mass" is precisely the boundless field of experience that Poulet equates with the act of reading. It is not tangible, and additionally for Poulet, marked by a lack of control. Saussure asserts that "Language is concrete" in that linguistic signs are associations "which bear the stamp of collective approval" and which "are realities that have their seat in the brain" (961).

For Saussure, language obtains its concreteness from the fact that signs are tangible—they can be reduced to written symbols, whereas Poulet suggests that language, as an "experience of interiority" is not. In reading, Poulet claims, "I become the prey of language. There is no escaping this takeover. Language surrounds me with its unreality" (103). Here Poulet does not draw as clear a distinction as Saussure does between thought as a vague plane and language as its concrete representation. The "language" to which Poulet falls prey in reading would perhaps be more adequately termed "ideas" or thought, as he states earlier:

In a certain sense I must recognize that no idea really belongs to me. Ideas belong to no one. They pass from one mind to another as coins pass from hand to hand. Consequently, nothing could be more misleading than the attempt to define a consciousness by the ideas which it utters or entertains. (104)

Yet rather than view the takeover he experiences in reading, either by ideas or language, as hostile, Poulet welcomes it, stating that the world of fiction has greater elasticity than reality, and he delights in the freedom “from my usual sense of incompatibility between my consciousness and its objects” (103).

What image then, do these meditations on the nature of reading and language present of the role and mind of the author? Saussure never explicitly mentions authors, although he comments on the inability of individuals to control language: “[Language] is the social side of speech, outside the individual who can never create nor modify it by himself; it exists only by virtue of a sort of contract signed by the members of a community” (961). Saussure would possibly view authors less as masters than as scientists, manipulators of the rules and associations of a language, individuals who try to discover and use the natural laws that govern the field of linguistic signs.

Poulet’s conception is, if possible, more complex. In spite of the ‘takeover’ of language, he asserts that reading is at the same time a subjective experience in which, although “I am on loan to another, and this other thinks, feels, suffers, and acts within me,” yet “reading does not interrupt my activity as subject” (105). In other words, although Poulet is taken over by the “I” of the text, he is still himself, still vaguely aware of his consciousness being acted upon. He is not so much the puppet of the text as to have his own consciousness obliterated by it during the act of reading. Yet what is the role of authors, if the interiority of the reader is so powerful? According to Poulet,

This *I* who ‘thinks in me’ when I read a book, is the *I* of the one who writes the book. When I read Baudelaire or Racine, it is really Baudelaire or Racine who thinks, feels, allows himself to be read within me. Thus a book is not only a book, it is the means by

which an author actually preserves his ideas, his feelings, his modes of dreaming and living. It is his means of saving his identity from death. (106)

It is ironic that Poulet should choose Baudelaire as an example. His “Baudelaire... who thinks... within me” is diametrically opposed to Barthes’s notion of criticism as ‘tyrannically centred’ on the author, Baudelaire’s work as the failure of Baudelaire the man. While Barthes calls for critics to dispense with Baudelaire the man in order to focus on the text, Poulet views the same text as a distillation of the man’s ideas, feelings and dreams, which are to be experienced almost in a state of self-denial. Yet these two essays were penned only a year apart, Barthes’ in 1968 and Poulet’s a year later in 1969. Likewise, Poulet claims the power of literature as protection for the author against death, while Foucault in the same year calls attention to the author as the “victim of his own writing” (1624). This disparity between prominent critics—themselves engaging in the discussion as both authors and readers—is demonstrative both of the continued lack of consensus on the roles of the principal players in literature, and of the enormity of the issues at hand.

The differences between these critics are illustrative of the deeper issue of the nature of fiction itself—which is equally reality and a representation. The whole of literary history speaks to the complicated nature of fiction as a blending of these two. Writers through the ages have approached the issue of what fiction should be like the swing of a pendulum: at times fiction must be as accurate a representation of reality as possible, whether this is achieved through content, as in the exposition of the evils of industrial England, or through style, by the creation of new types of “real” language—as in stream-of-consciousness or a more fragmented style; at other times, fiction is a representation of life open to interpretation, as championed by the gothic novels, romanticism, or fantasy/science fiction literature. The duality of realism and representation is likewise apparent in the approach taken by critics to the person of the author.

Just as fiction can be both real and unreal as a representation of life, it can be real or unreal in its connection to authors. Some, like Poulet, regard reading as a stepping into authors' lives and feelings; others expect to be completely alienated from them in an entirely new field of experience. In both cases, authors remain a fiction—separated from reality through the act of reading, they are a construct, not just of modernity, as posited by Barthes and Foucault, but of readers themselves.

Despite the great chasms between those desiring the murder of the author and those attempting his resuscitation, however, most critics agree with one aspect of Barthes' complaint: that the author's life history should not be taken too far as the interpretive medium for a work. Biographical criticism has perhaps been attacked more vociferously in literary history than intentionality. In his *Validity and Interpretation*, E.D. Hirsch has explained, while maintaining intention as necessary to any objective interpretation, that the stepping away from the biography as critique that often paired with intention has had its advantages. The death of the author came about during an intellectual movement designed to aim at close reading and more intense exegesis of the text itself. Authors were in effect banished so as to not intrude too heavily on the study of the text (Hirsch 2). Hirsch acknowledges that this movement did in fact improve upon older forms of criticism through its focus on close reading; however, he also argues that the method is fraught with difficulties, principally that without an author, there can be no single norm by which to judge the validity of any textual interpretation.

Poulet also speaks to the issue of biographical criticism. While he views the text as a recreation of its author, yet he cautions against using biography as explication of the text. Although he admits that his view of a book as preserving the ideas and feelings of an author would seem to justify "biographical explication," this is not the case. Rather, Poulet claims, "It is not the

biography which explicates the work, but rather the work which sometimes enables us to understand the biography” (106). In his “Literature and Biography,” Boris Tomaševskij expresses a similar opinion more powerfully, “Diaries as well as curiosity about unpublished documents and biographical ‘findings’ mark an unhealthy sharpening of interest in documentary literary history” (Burke 81). He explains that the hype surrounding authors’ lives is like the concept of the author itself, of recent construction; Tomaševskij links the interest in the creator behind the work again to the Eighteenth century (the same period in England that corresponded to the advent of copyright protections), an epoch which he claims “cultivated subjectivism in the artistic process” (82).

Tomaševskij incorporates likewise the idea of authors not merely as writers, but as public figures, citing the example of Voltaire, and claims that the uninhibited and public nature of such figures was an important factor in the increasing importance of biographical detail. According to Tomaševskij, Voltaire’s life expanded far beyond his literary output, with the result that he the person is almost more remembered than his writings. He was also, as was his contemporary Rousseau, “prolific in many genres, from musical comedies to novels and philosophical treatises, from epigrams and epitaphs to theoretical articles on physics and music” (83). In becoming less an anonymous author, like the virtually invisible Jane Austen whose manuscript her brother bought back from a publisher who had no notion the “lady writer” it originated with had also penned the commercially successful *Pride and Prejudice*, authors as “public figures” became more aware of their own biographies during their lifetimes, and began to take this into consideration, much as they also began considering their power over their posthumous outputs. Where the personal lives of writers had previously only rarely become known to the reader, possibly related to their pecuniary interests in court or as models of academic scholarship,

Tomaševskij draws attention to a movement toward biographical “legends” that began to propagate in this period related to authors—rumors of unrequited loves and troubled childhoods, the persona of the penniless poet, oppressed and struggling to eke out a living in a harsh commercial world. These nascent legends he claims, while adding to the recent interest in biography as criticism, are yet more important to the work of the author than the typical biography-as-curriculum-vitae approach used by some critics. Ultimately, Tomaševskij argues, “what the literary historian really needs is the biographical legend created by the author himself. Only such a legend is a *literary fact*” (89).

It is this authorial legend that comes to the forefront in consideration of the posthumous. In the posthumous, the question posed by Barthes of whether or not to consider authorial intention in interpretation becomes a secondary concern, complicated by a necessity to first define the posthumous author, who is mired more than the living author in Tomaševskij’s authorial legend. The particular challenge of the posthumous, at least with regard to authors’ roles, is that authors themselves become fictive characters—very real, in that they lived and wrote, and yet no longer living and able to give definitive support to others’ opinions or choices regarding their work and its publication, and thus a representation that must be created by others. At their deaths, the literary myth surrounding authors, whether created by themselves or others involved in their reputations, becomes a powerful force in this representation. The literary myth of the author to which a posthumous editor or executor subscribes is in many ways responsible for the posthumous “reality” they will construct.

It is, nevertheless, vital to any consideration of the posthumous to first acknowledge the disparity of opinions as to the roles of author and reader in interpretation. Without first understanding the developing view of authors’ roles in their texts throughout history, it would be

impossible to appreciate the delicate complexity of their roles in the posthumous. The use of intention, for example, first appeared in discussions surrounding literary property. Intention is more complicated in published work than in the posthumous. In the case of published works, for example, scholars have proof copies and letters to editors to support their understandings of authorial intention, as opposed to the posthumous, where no such documents exist and where authors sometimes take the opposite extreme and express a definitive disinclination for publication. The use of biography as interpretation likewise becomes a foundational principle for entering on the discourse of posthumous publication of private texts, such as letters and diaries. Additionally, an understanding of the role of the reader strongly informs consideration of the multiple individuals involved in the reconstruction of any posthumous text, since the reader envisioned by the posthumous editor, as well as the authorial myth, plays a part in controlling the type of publication sought.

Many of these issues make their first appearance in the early years of discourse surrounding the author. Mansfield, for example, in his landmark ruling on literary property, alludes to the importance of the author's intention: "It is fit, that [the author] should judge when to publish, or whether he will ever publish. It is fit he should not only choose the time, but the manner of publication; how many; what volume; what print" (Rose 80). The historical situation of the author-reader debate surrounding literary interpretation also continues to surface in the questions involved in the posthumous. The work of critics such as Barthes, Foucault, Sartre, Poulet, and others builds upon questions of literary property in taking the concerns over ownership of text and book to the level of interpretation. Similarly, these authors' works lay the groundwork for approaching questions of intention, reputation, and scholarship, in which an understanding of the relationships between author, reader and text is crucial.

There is one further reason to ground the discussion of the posthumous in critical perspectives. In spite of the unresolved nature of the author-reader question, all of these theorists are writing toward an ideal form of literary criticism, which while ostensibly centered on the dialectical relationship between author and reader, necessarily implies also a third player in the struggle: the critic. It is demonstrative of the challenges of navigating the role of the critic perhaps more so than his fellow players that the majority of critical literature has focused more heavily on author and reader than on the critic himself (perhaps this might also be taken as evidence of the critic's reluctance to too closely examine his own role in the process). C.S. Lewis offers a succinct portrait of the critic's role in his *An Experiment in Criticism*, "he is, in a word, to have the character which MacDonald attributed to God, and Chesterton, following him, to the critic; that of being 'easy to please, but hard to satisfy' (120). The disparity of critical opinions even among contemporaries such as Barthes, Foucault and Poulet attests to the difficulty of "satisfying" critics. It is doubtful whether an ideal form of literary criticism will ever be determined upon.

In the realm of posthumous publication, however, the critic takes on an even more complicated role than one who is difficult to satisfy with quality literature, in that he may simultaneously appropriate or exist in each of the other roles involved in the creation and reception of texts: the critic may exist not only as himself, but also as reader, writer, publisher, editor, translator, executor, and the like. This multiplicity of voices renders the oversimplified "text as communication between rhetor and audience" of ancient Greece almost laughable. (And although it falls outside the boundaries of consideration of this thesis, the imposition of digital media on the textual realm has the potential to render even the clearest of these distinctions even more unintelligible.)

Critics are an ideal model for the problem of the posthumous, in that they so perfectly address the challenges of role delineation created by these orphaned texts. Posthumous publication is properly the realm of the critic: whether the choices are made by family member, executor, editor, translator or any other interested or participant member of the posthumous community, the individual functions, at least partially, as a critic. They must, based upon their knowledge of both author and reader, determine answers to the questions: what was the author trying to do, what would the author have wanted, what value would readers obtain from the publication of these texts, and what would they expect from them? Yet critics, as author and reader, are no less victims to the inadequacies of language and its inability to reconcile reality and representation, and are perhaps less free from the constraints of the author-reader debate by their simultaneous figuring in both camps.

The specifically posthumous critic often views his or her role as delicately reconciling the interests of both author and reader. Posthumous critics—whether they fulfill the role as family member, executor, editor, etc.—attempt to remain true to authors’ intentions and character. They likewise seek to appease the reader; few posthumous editors have ever written a preface to a collection without the suggestion, however subtle, that the resultant publication will be “valuable” or “of interest” to readers. Yet the critic is simultaneously interpreting both author and reader. In his *An Experiment in Criticism*, C.S. Lewis questions, much as Barthes does the author, a too-weighty reliance upon the works of critics to interpret literature:

I am far from suggesting that a retrospective light on literary experiences we have already had is without value. Being the sort of people we are, we want not only to have but also to analyse, understand, and express, our experiences. And being people at all—being human, that is social, animals—we want to ‘compare notes’, not only as regards

literature, but as regards food, landscape, a game, or an admired common acquaintance.... It is natural and wholly proper that we should especially enjoy hearing how a first-class mind responds to a very great work. That is why we read the great critics with interest... They are very good reading; as a help to the reading of others their value is, I believe, overestimated. (124)

Perhaps Lewis's emphasis on reading literature over criticism sheds a light on the underlying assumption that has led to the abundance of posthumous publication in literature. Although posthumous materials are, as will be demonstrated in the following chapters, fraught with interpretive difficulties due to the multiplicity of voices brought to bear upon their reconstruction, there is a general consensus that they are valuable. It is as if these posthumous collaborators, in spite of the disagreements with regard to interpretation, nevertheless are complicit in a "read it for yourself" attitude that prizes the texts over anything that can be said about them. Yet the decision to publish posthumously might also denote a different ultimate purpose than what is found in the essays quoted above. While Barthes and others may argue about the roles of author and reader in interpretation, posthumous publication, although entered into by critics, is, like most of an author's work, for the reader. Most posthumous editors offer their collections with the hope, not merely that they will be learned from, but that they will be enjoyed. Lewis too, mentions this end: "The truth is not that we need the critics in order to enjoy the authors, but that we need the authors in order to enjoy the critics" (122-123).

It is evident that the choice between author and reader for interpretive prerogative is neither simple nor likely to be soon determined upon. Nevertheless, as both authors and readers play a vital role in decisions surrounding posthumous publication, an understanding of the critical discourse surrounding their relationship is equally vital. The metaphorical "death" of the

author, and human mortality as its correlative, cannot be understood without a firm grounding in what it means for a text to have an author, and to have a reader. The posthumous text is a remnant of communication; therefore we must understand the players in the great conversation.

Chapter 3: Defining the “Work”

Distinguishing between the players involved in the struggle to affix meaning is not the only quandary that affects interpretation of the posthumous, however. While the term “posthumous texts” has been used heretofore in this paper to generally denote any and all of the papers that are left behind after the author’s death, whether published or not following that death by others, or sought after and used by scholars in either of these forms, yet this term is itself arbitrarily chosen and is in need, like the roles of authors and readers, of clearer definition for the tasks that lie ahead.

While the reader and author have received ample critical attention, a vast amount of discussion has also been applied to the definition of the “work” or the “text” itself. While this is certainly an issue in the interpretation of published works, particularly in light of those theories that view the book as object and the words or language themselves as some type of immaterial yet no less concrete textual object, it becomes vitally important to the discussion of the posthumous genre. For here, where the written words left behind by an author have not always been formed into completed works, thorough collections, or even organized chronologically or with any other system, even the distinction of book as physical object is invalid in most cases; the posthumous “text” offers no standards for its own categorization. Before attempting further analysis of these types of texts, it is therefore first necessary to define which of these papers and fragments qualify as text, and what the standards should be for defining from among them the “works,” if that is an acceptable term, that are worth further scholarship and/or potential publication.

Although he offers no consensus for an actual definition of “a work,” Michel Foucault’s “What Is An Author” offers a clear and concise rendering of several of the questions that such a

definition must consider. Foucault explains that the work, again, is closely tied to the (albeit difficult in its own right) concept of the author: “If an individual is not an author, what are we to make of those things he has written or said, left among his papers or communicated to others? Is this not properly a work?” (1624). Since works depend upon the author for their physical existence, it seems relevant to consider the author as a part of the definition—if we attempted to approach the work according to the principles of logic, for example, agreeing that there is a sufficient reason for everything, the work would be explained as follows: paper and ink are the material cause, the reader is the formal cause, and the author is the efficient cause. Neither author, reader, nor the text itself is excluded from consideration.

In his contextualization of the issues that must be dealt with in the development of a clear conceptualization of the work, all of which are relevant to any discourse about the posthumous, Foucault incorporates the author:

Assuming that we are dealing with an author, is everything he wrote and said, everything he left behind, to be included in his work? This problem is both theoretical and practical. If we wish to publish the complete works of Nietzsche, for example, where do we draw the line? Certainly, everything must be published, but can we agree on what ‘everything’ means? We will, of course, include everything that Nietzsche himself published, along with the drafts of his works, his plans for aphorisms, his marginal notations and corrections. But what if, in a notebook filled with aphorisms, we find a reference, a reminder of an appointment, an address, or a laundry bill, should this be included in his works? (1625)

Thus here, while the difficulty lies in determining which of the texts written by an author are worthy of inclusion in his “collected” works, the assumption of a work as something penned by an author remains given.

Barthes and his devotees would likely consider this definition of the work—particularly in its link to the author—too limiting. In his “From Work to Text,” Barthes draws distinctions between the work and the text itself—although he never claims a complete separation. Barthes explains: “Over against the traditional notion of the *work*... there is now the requirement of a new object, obtained by the sliding or overturning of former categories. That object is the *Text*.” Thus Barthes conceptualizes the work in very objective terms, reserving the more elusive nature of literature for his definition of text. He states, “the work is a fragment of substance, occupying a part of the space of books..., the Text is a methodological field” (1471). In Barthes’ opinion, the text is the real substance of literary discourse, the work, only its physical representation and source. Just as he sought to liberate interpretation from an unhealthy emphasis on the author, the separation of text and work emphasizes the limitless nature of the literary text, apart from not only a creator, but its physical boundaries in paper and ink.

Foucault also recognized the ostensibly limited nature of his discussion of the author as relative to the work, and expressed it as a concern, “I am aware that until now I have kept my subject within unjustifiable limits.... It seems that I have given the term “author” an excessively narrow meaning. I have discussed the author only in the limited sense of a person to whom the production of a text, a book, or a work can be legitimately attributed” (1631). Yet, Foucault, rather than differentiating between the texts of authors and the physical works in which they reside, claims that authors can sometimes reach beyond their texts and become authors of “a theory, for instance, of a tradition or a discipline within which new books and authors can

proliferate,” what he calls a “transdiscursive” position (1632). For Foucault, the definitive cases of authors achieving this transdiscursive potential are Marx and Freud, whose writings, while rooted in the materials of paper and ink like their novelistic (but woefully more limited) “work” counterparts, have “cleared a space for the introduction of elements other than their own, which, nevertheless, remain within the field of discourse they initiated” (1632).

The varying conceptions of the work, therefore, fall along similar lines to the initial camps of interpretation: some align with authors, considering the work as their product and property, some the reader, believing the work takes on a more significant existence only at its consumption, and some attempt a middle-ground position that incorporates some balance between the two. Foucault suggests, in line with the principles of logic, that the work is necessarily the product of an author, claiming “if some have found it convenient to bypass the individuality of the writer or his status as an author to concentrate on a work, they have failed to appreciate the equally problematic nature of the word ‘work’ and the unity it designates” (1625). Yet Foucault does not offer this assertion with any sort of finality—the product of an author’s hand a work may be, but that still does not answer questions of categorization among all of the written output of the individual. It is also important to note that while Foucault includes the author in his definition of the work, the relationship is not mutual. Foucault also asserts through his example of Marx and Freud, that authors have the ability to transcend their work, and to become authors of entire discourses, where the ideas, like Barthes’ conception of the text, take on a life of their own apart from their authors. Barthes, in his clarification of work and text, seems to lean toward—although never explicitly embracing—the role of the reader, describing the work as “caught up in a process of filiation” whereby it is connected to the author as owner and father, and wherein “literary science... teaches *respect* for the manuscript and the author’s

declared intentions” (1473). In opposition to his conception of the work, however, Barthes’ “text” is free from such binding “filiation”; in Barthes’ words “it can be broken” and is liberated from the controls of science and society that are inextricable from the work. This freedom, although Barthes explicitly denies the overtly controlling role of the reader and his “projection” into the work, yet seems to embrace the multiplicity of textual meaning and interpretation free from the author that is often sought by proponents of reader-response criticism.

In his “Interaction between Text and Reader,” Wolfgang Iser provides a classic example of the middle-ground approach, asserting that the work is “virtual in character,” and is created (as suggested by his title) not by either the author’s text or the reader’s act of reading, but exists as a reality only in the interaction between the two. This is reminiscent of Poulet’s earlier phenomenological theory of reading; Iser claims that the work “cannot be reduced to the reality of the text or to the subjectivity of the reader,” and goes on to explain that the immateriality of this interaction renders it far more complex to analyze than what has been done in the previous chapter, in the discussion of text and reader—both of which Iser views as physical objects (1674).

Iser’s theory goes on to explain the results of this continual interaction in terms of the creation of and filling in of “gaps” during the reading process. Iser bases his theory on an understanding of social communication. Due to what he terms the “inexperientability” of others—we can never fully know what someone else is thinking of when we speak to them, nor can they completely understand our own thoughts—social communication consists of blanks, or “gaps” in understanding, which speakers supply themselves. Reading, he continues, is full of these “gaps”, which “function as a kind of pivot on which the whole text-reader relationship revolves” (1676-77). The blanks in reading take on several functions which continue to play

against each other during the act of reading, and are necessary for any reading of a text. Thus, the work is the result of this interaction; it is neither the text, where the gaps lie undiscovered, nor is it specifically the action of the reader, for the reader requires the text to set up and resolve gaps as reading progresses.

It would be interesting to read Iser's theory applied specifically to posthumous publication, where the occurrence of gaps must be assumed to multiply tenfold. Here there are not only the gaps which the author set up in any given piece, through suspense, action, and revelation or the lack thereof, but the gaps between drafts and finished pieces, fragments and notes, the published output of writers and those pieces they, explicitly or unintentionally, never placed before the public eye, and even the more public realm of poetry or fiction with authors' private documents: letters and diaries.

Here again, it is interesting to note the echoes of earlier debates with regard to authors. A key factor in the definition of the work is its materiality, which played an important role centuries earlier in the literary property debates, where the first instances of discussion of the difference between a work and its text came into play in the questions surrounding disputed ownership of manuscript and print copies. Likewise, the work calls into question the roles of author and reader, as discussed in the last chapter. While Foucault defines a work at least partially in its origin with an author, Barthes identifies as an inalienable characteristic of the text its freedom from a controlling entity. Iser, as Sartre before him, views these individuals as dependent upon each other, rather than mutually exclusive. What then, is a posthumous work?

For the purposes of this thesis, we will confine ourselves to the following definition, culled from the critical perspectives available. First, we will agree with Foucault that the posthumous work is, at least initially, a product of its author. There can be no spontaneous text,

although this is not to assume that the interpretive engagement with such texts must begin with and only with the author. This thesis will, in keeping with precedent, also limit discussion of (though not inclusion in) the category of posthumous work to those types of texts which are most frequently represented in available posthumous collections. This is not to deny that other posthumous materials are worthy of inclusion, but merely to acknowledge that the scope of this thesis prevents a full consideration of them. Here, we will confine ourselves to two major categories of the posthumous therefore, which correspond roughly to an author's work and life: "literary" texts, comprised of fragments, drafts, and completed versions of poems, essays, or longer works, and "biographical" texts, comprised of letters and/or diaries.

With regard to the differentiation between work and text, the posthumous again creates problems of definition. Critical perspectives have enabled, in the case of published works, a clearer delineation than is possible in the posthumous. For while Barthes asserts that the work and text are not completely separate entities, the classification of the work as the physical object and the text as methodological field inscribed within it is useful. Barthes' distinction also builds upon historical precedent: during the debates surrounding copyright law, it became necessary to acknowledge the unique characteristics of the literary text when vesting the author with property rights in his or her work. The lack of such a distinction was perhaps part of authors' initial difficulties in obtaining rights to their works; when the text was limited to a single, manuscript copy, the author had no tangible rights after the initial sale to a publisher. With the discussions of literary property, however, authors, publishers, and the society at large began to acknowledge the unique traits of literary property, and the presence of Copyright attests to the assumption that the literary work is not limited by its physical boundaries.

The distinction between work and text is more practical in terms of published texts, however. The posthumous, as previously mentioned, provides no easy form of categorization. The texts of the posthumous are physical objects, but these exist in multiple forms—finished versions, bound, clean copies, scraps of household paper or loose sheets. Likewise, the posthumous lacks grounding in belonging to readers, having never been offered to them through publication (the case of letters is an acknowledged exception, although by being designated for one specific individual, posthumous letters are still a very distinct category from those published during an author’s lifetime, with his consent). For the purposes of this thesis, then, building equally upon Barthes’ description of the text’s ability to “be broken” and the precedent set in the early years of the author in recognizing the transcendent nature of a text to both exist and require control beyond its physical boundaries, we will privilege the term “text” to refer to posthumous materials, keeping in mind that these texts, lacking the strong presence and correlative role of a reader created in publication, are also, like Foucault’s work, still strongly bound to their authors.

III. RECONSTRUCTING THE AUTHOR: ARGUING THE POSTHUMOUS

Chapter 4: Intention and Reputation

“Theodore Roethke, Theodore Roethke,
What do you think this poem will get ye?”

The above fragment of poetry is drawn from “Straw for the Fire,” a posthumous collection of the notebook material of Theodore Roethke edited after his death by former student, colleague and friend David Wagoner, and it is an apt introduction for the consideration of posthumous material that we are about to embark on. This fragment is an authentic example of what may be done with posthumous material, as it was discovered only after Roethke’s death in one of the 277 notebooks he used to draft his poetry from original conception to completed version, which now reside at the library of the University of Washington. Its publication—whether there is evidence to support that Roethke would have eventually sought this end for the two lines or not—was not sanctioned by Roethke during his lifetime, but rather was the nascent wish of the editor, who obtained permission to use the notebooks from Roethke’s executor, his wife Beatrice. We do not, nor can we ever, know with certainty that this is what Roethke wanted.

The fragment is also of interest because of its content; Roethke’s words, however incompletely and briefly stated, and however unintentional our consumption of them, are a succinct expression of the general thrust of this chapter, which will consider the author’s intention and reputation as they are dealt with in the consideration of the posthumous. The question, “What do you think this poem will get ye?” entails both questions of intention and reputation. With regard to intention, the reader/scholar may well ask: What did Roethke intend with these lines, or any others found in his notebooks or other unfinished work? It then remains of course, for the critic also to consider to what extent those intentions, should they be

discovered, ought to be put into practice. The line also calls into question the effect of posthumous material on the author's reputation: what would publication of these materials "get ye?" How are these materials to be used, and to what extent might they alter—for better or worse—an author's posthumous reputation? While concerns of intention and reputation exist in every conversation surrounding the posthumous, the life and work of Theodore Roethke offers a particularly rich context for their analysis. Roethke, therefore, will serve as a foundational example for this chapter, although other authors will also play minor roles.

The first question to be considered, in spite of its rocky theoretical history, is authorial intention in relation to the posthumous. Unpublished materials left behind by an author are, after all, no less subject to intention than published pieces. Kaye Mitchell, in the preface to her book, "Intention and Text" suggests,

[I]t is my contention that intention, in some form or other, has never really gone away and that it merits a consideration outside and beyond the field of literary aesthetics.

Intention has lurked, as suppressed premise or negative 'other', in a variety of theories of meaning (literary and non-literary) in the years since Wimsatt and Beardsley first appeared to send it into critical exile. We might, nevertheless, attempt to make it more at home in the present climate, less socially awkward and shambling and out of place in its old style authorialist garb. (viii)

Intention, in spite of the virulent arguments against it, will continue to exist at least for the author, whether it is given credence by the critic or not. It might be considered a necessary evil. The difference, and perhaps also the difficulty, in the use of intention in unpublished works (as opposed to those published by the author during his/her lifetime) lies in the extent of our ability to judge and/or discover that intention. In a published work, we may reasonably assume that the

product was at one time (however brief—authors have been known to edit or retract portions of their works even after the initial publication, as we will see with the work of Coleridge in the following chapter) a tolerably complete rendering of what the author sought to accomplish. The act of publication contains a finality that is entirely absent in fragmentary or draft materials, thus resulting in the unavoidable yet problematic uncertainty surrounding the posthumous—without the stamp of authorial approval assumed in publication, readers and critics are less certain of authors’ intentions with regard to these unpublished pieces.

One may argue here that the usefulness of intention in interpretation has been quite successfully barraged by critics and that it is both futile and a denial of the reader’s role to insist that intention be considered in the posthumous. The instability of intention as a valid technique in criticism granted, however, it is my belief that the nature of the posthumous renders intention necessary for two primary reasons: first, that by nature of being bound after death to the physical “will” and testament of an author governing his or her final wishes, the posthumous text is no less (and perhaps even more so in that it has never been otherwise) the property of that author than his published works, and accordingly intention must play a role in consideration of these texts if in no more than an economic sense. Second, the argument against intention is largely rooted in the act of publication, particularly in the interaction between text and reader, and therefore, as posthumous materials lack the definitive function of having been presented to the public (and subsequently, a defined reader), the objection to the author in favor of the reader is invalid.

Another, though admittedly less forceful, argument in favor of considering authorial intention when editing and studying posthumous material is the same one that played a major role in the copyright debates: precedent. In spite of the warnings against a too-heavy reliance on

authors' expressed thoughts and/or biographies as a source of meaning in their texts, editors of posthumous collections have repeatedly ascribed to posthumous material the ability to add to our knowledge about just such things. Margaret Drabble in her Introduction to an edition of Jane Austen's unpublished works writes, "Obviously these fragments from a major writer who died young... would have been of interest as literary records and curiosities, even if they had been of little intrinsic value, but as it happens they are all of them of high quality, well worth reading for their own sakes, and for pleasure as well as study" (7). Drabble's calm approbation of the fragments in this quotation is standard of what one will see in the introductory material to most posthumous collections, hardly a surprising coincidence when one considers that the choice to publish the previously unpublished necessitates a belief by someone that these materials are worth reading, or worth studying. Perhaps even those opposed to intentionality would see little wrong with an appeal to the curiosity of the reading public about these incomplete works, so long as they were not the focus of serious criticism. Consideration of the posthumous, however, rarely stops at mere "pleasure" for either the serious devotees of a favorite author or for scholars.

While fragmentary and other unpublished material is frequently recommended merely for its own sake, it often leads to speculations of a more far-reaching nature related to the work of an author. Ralph Mills, Jr. writes of the Roethke essays collected posthumously in *On The Poet and His Craft*, "these essays, lectures, and reviews are worth turning to repeatedly for the help they give us, deepening our insight into the work and adding to our minds from this fine poet's store of wisdom about poetic art" (Mills xv). The phrase "insight into the work" is perhaps the most telling—posthumous and unpublished materials often become a reference point for interpreting the works of authors. R.W. Chapman echoes this sentiment in his introduction to the first edition of Austen's Letters: "It has been assumed that they have little interest except for the few brief

rays with which they illumine the history of the novels, and would hardly be readable if their author were not otherwise famous” (ix). So history has set a strong precedent for the use of the posthumous as a source of this “insight into the work” of authors, in spite of criticism’s campaign against authorial intention.

The second popular use of these materials is to enlighten readers not as to authors’ works, but as to their personalities, identities, or values, either for the sake of curiosity, or for more serious scholarly insights. Wagoner, in his *Straw for the Fire*, writes of Roethke,

If the notebooks show nothing else, their extensiveness and their intensity show the most wholehearted, energetic, even uncanny devotion to poetry I have ever known of, an apparently almost total commitment of time and attention. I hope the forty-three pieces that follow may give some further evidence that Theodore Roethke was one of the truly phenomenal creative sources in American poetry. (7)

Thus Wagoner presents the notebook fragments as evidence of Roethke’s creative genius. Posthumous material thus is taken to show the development of writers, or their particular accomplishments. It is also used to establish authors’ opinions and beliefs, particularly those related to other authors or to the craft of writing itself. Take as an example the words of George Eliot regarding the phenomenon of the posthumous: “Is it not odious that as soon as a man is dead his desk is raked, and every insignificant memorandum which he never meant for the public, is printed for the gossiping amusement of people too idle to re-read his books?” (Haight 436-437). This comment, taken from a letter written by Eliot to her publisher, John Blackwood, is one of many cases where letters or other sources are used to establish authors’ opinions on literary matters. In this case, Eliot expresses—as did Tomaševskij—disapproval of the fascination with authors’ posthumously discovered private documents.

Letters, diaries and the like, as records of the individual's thoughts, have historically been viewed as important sources for this biographical information about authors, but they are also valuable as resources about other figures in the arts, perhaps more so because often these individuals do not leave, as authors do, a wealth of written accounts. And, as with literature, scholars in the arts have also touted the abilities of the posthumous to give insights about individuals' work and character. One such individual is Vincent Van Gogh, whose vast output of letters has not been frequently seen among artists. Van Gogh's editor writes of their initial publication in the early 1900s: "for the serious reader and the art historian, the publication of these letters added a fresh dimension to the understanding of Van Gogh's artistic achievement, an understanding granted us by virtually no other painter" (de Leeuw ix). Musical scholars, too, benefit from these rare written accounts as evidence of intention. Upon its discovery in the 1930s in a home in Frankenmuth, MI, Johann Sebastian Bach's personal Bible became an invaluable resource for the musical community (Leaver 17). Bach's compositions are well known for their overt expression of his faith through musical techniques—one example is Bach's depiction of Christ's incarnation through repeated descending motives. When discovered posthumously, Bach's Calov Bible, with its wealth of annotations and commentary in Bach's own handwriting, became an important resource in that it established Bach's personal spiritual commitment and was illustrative of the debt his music owed to it.

Here the importance of posthumous materials for determining intention is perhaps more evident than it is in literature, given the nature of the art at hand. Whereas Jane Austen's belief in the value of the novel may be drawn from her work itself—there is a fine statement about this in the text of *Northanger Abbey*—the paintings of Van Gogh and the compositions of Bach offer no such easy solutions. Likewise, one may speculate that Beethoven was attempting something new

in his later symphonies, but one cannot prove it, unless there exists a letter, or a diary account, or some other form of language which clearly indicates that he did. In spite of its ambiguous nature, language is still the clearest form of communication we have, making written posthumous accounts valuable for determining the hopes and thoughts of artists when we can no longer ask them their opinions.

Precedent has established the usefulness of posthumous material in illuminating authors' intentions for their works, and also for developing greater understanding of the lives and characters of great figures in both literature and the arts and sciences. Intention, as I have stated, must be considered in the posthumous because of the legal property ramifications and also because in the absence of a reader, the author still holds sway. The use of intention, however, does pose dangers in consideration of the posthumous, in that it has the potential to affect the other focus of this chapter: authors' posthumous reputations. As a demonstrative case, we return to Drabble's introduction to the posthumous Austen pieces. Here she follows a discussion of Austen's *Lady Susan*—an uncharacteristic portrait of an adulterous but deceptively charming woman in her schemes to twist the lives of family and 'friends' to her own ends—by stating that the fragment “raises, inevitably, the question of what Jane Austen's true tone was, and whether she was denying herself in cutting out the freedom, malice and coarseness represented in *Lady Susan*” (13). Here is the question of intention at its most serious, for if the question Drabble poses is taken in the affirmative, in other words, if we do accept the argument that Austen's published work was self-repressive of her “true” ruthlessness and biting, acerbic tongue apparent in the earlier *Lady Susan*, the result could be a poignant reversal of critical conceptions of Austen's work.

Austen, while often acknowledged for her playful and gently critical wit, has not typically been characterized with the bitterness of Lady Susan. Charlotte Brontë wrote (somewhat disparagingly) of Austen as a writer that

Passions are perfectly unknown to her; she rejects even a speaking acquaintance with that stormy Sisterhood.... Her business is not half so much with the human heart as with the human eyes, mouth, hands and feet; what sees keenly, speaks aptly, moves flexibly, it suits her to study, but what the blood rushes through, what is the unseen seat of Life and the sentient target of Death—this Miss Austen ignores. (Brontë 383)

This is representative of much of Austen criticism. Like Brontë, many critics of Austen, even those who express a more laudatory opinion of her powers, frequently concur in this assessment of her work as “trivial”—the “drama of the teacup.” Virginia Woolf said of Austen, “There is no tragedy and no heroism. Yet for some reason the little scene is moving out of all proportion to its surface solemnity” (*Jane* 138). Austen is seen as the perennial chronicler of the trivial. Her stories, though admired, are appreciated more for their achievement in forwarding the novel form and her witty, light comic treatment of the everyday than for the more poignant exploration of the human condition that she, according to Brontë, so studiously avoided. What then, would have Brontë thought had she read *Lady Susan*? Might she have been led by this starkly different Austen text to believe that she, rather than having no business dealing with passion, was instead as feminist critics have suggested, “a frustrated wit, forced by a changing society to admire quietude and virtue against the grain of her own nature”? (Drabble 13) This is a struggle that Brontë herself would have recognized, one that her characters face in her novels, and that would have perhaps bred a higher estimation of Austen’s gifts. Ironically, it is interesting to note that in spite of her apparent support of passion in literature, even Brontë’s own biographer, Elizabeth

Gaskell, downplays this aspect of her life, saying she was not “easily susceptible” to “the passion of love” which is so present in her novels (Sutherland xx).

So this is also where the posthumous, in its lack of finality, lends itself to questions—and potential hazards—of intention. Woolf both acknowledges Brontë’s assessment of Austen: “vice, adventure, passion were left outside” (*Jane* 140) and simultaneously admires her talents: “the balance of her gifts was singularly perfect,” yet Woolf’s even-handed criticism is not immune to speculation, this time brought about by the fragment “The Watsons”: “there can be no doubt that she would have written more, had she lived, and it is tempting to consider whether she would not have written differently (*Jane* 143). If posthumous material has the potential then, to change the perceptions of authors’ work so strongly, the questions become these: ought we to draw boundaries to contain these perceptions, what role does authorial intention play in such boundaries, and to what extent should the posthumous be allowed to interpret either the lives or works of authors?

Obviously, given the publication of so many posthumous collections, most editors or executors make the judgment that the public deserves to read authors’ unfinished pieces. The judgment to publish works that an author did not involves making a call about whether the author would have intended such a publication at all, and for any given text, the answer ranges from very clear to very muddy. In the case of Theodore Roethke, for example, when his wife as his executor made the choice to publish *The Far Field* after his death, she may have been reasonably sure of fulfilling his wishes. Although Roethke did not publish this collection himself, at the time of his death he was “working hard every day getting the body of the *The Far Field* poems ready to submit, changing, polishing, pruning” (Seager 285). Clearly given the extent of his editing, his wife would have surmised, and likely correctly, that he would have wanted them published,

although he might have wished to make a few more minor corrections than he was able to do. Roethke's wife may also have been gratified by her choice to publish, in spite of the slight incompleteness of *The Far Field*, since it subsequently won a National Book Award in 1965, something that Roethke's other writings suggest he would have been proud of. In an essay as an undergraduate at the University of Michigan, Roethke expressed his desire to write, and write well, in his characteristically blunt prose, "I have faith in myself. I'm either going to be a good writer or a poor fool" (*On the Poet* 6).

Roethke's unpublished output is replete with opinions and value statements about his life's work, and allows scholars interested in plumbing the depths a keen insight into the poet's mind not always available or at least not so clear in his poetry. The sheer numbers of such comments, however, could lead would-be editors to very different answers about whether he would have wanted these fragments published. Roethke was very conscious of his own reputation as a poet; he was very clear about valuing that as his most prominent role. He once remarked at a party to a fellow dinner guest, "You're a governor. I'm a poet. We're equals, see? The hell with that professor stuff" (Seager 278). Yet even his repeated conviction of being first a poet might be taken in two ways, as indicative of a dedicated, perfectionistic spirit who would have wished his work to be seen in its finest, completed form as deserving of the highest merit, or as a devoted teacher of poetry who recognized in the process the inherent necessity of editing and careful, thoughtful development, and who would therefore have viewed the sharing of his own fragments and unfinished work as a testament to the world of struggles poets face in the "beautiful disorder of poetry, the eternal virginity of words" (Wagoner 256).

Even as they present two sides of the poet's personality, Roethke's comments on poetry might be taken as evidence of both approval and disappointment with the alacrity with which his

posthumous works have been laid before the public. On one hand, one might make the argument that he would not have minded, and would even have welcomed, the posthumous publication of his unfinished work. In one of his posthumously published essays, Roethke recalls a quotation from Jung, “The truth is that poets are human beings, and that what a poet has to say about his work is far from being the most illuminating word on the subject” (*On the Poet* 42-43). Roethke seems to have applied, periodically, this assessment to his own work—the essays as a whole are full of recollections about “bad” poetry he had written, where “now some of the things in it seem to creak” (16). Apart from his willingness to express dissatisfaction with his own work, there is also a line in the notebook material which states “Much to be learnt from bad poems” (Wagoner 171). This does not of course, mention Roethke’s poetry specifically—he may have had different ideas about the possibility of others learning from *his* less than perfect work. Perhaps the most telling piece of Roethke’s posthumous work in favor of posthumous publication is the note Wagoner chose as the epigraph for the collection of notebook material, which states, “The desire to leave many poems / in a state of partial completeness; / to write nothing but fragments” (no pagination). Whether this was Roethke’s aim for the whole of his poetic life or not (and his intense commitment to revision suggests otherwise), it is certainly true of him; at his death, he left one nearly complete collection and thousands of pages of unpublished fragments. Taken together, these brief phrases and comments, collected from both his published and unpublished work, may suggest to critics that Roethke’s intention might have included the publication of his unfinished work as a testament to posterity about the developmental processes of poetry.

On the other hand, however, as noted even by Wagoner in his introduction to the notebook material, Roethke was deeply committed to the perfection of his poetry, and this commitment presents the strongest argument that, although his wishes can never be fully

understood, it is equally possible that Roethke may have been hesitant about the posthumous publication of poems he considered “incomplete”. This concern for perfection is already present in an early essay which Roethke wrote during his years at the University of Michigan, the same one in which he expressed his desire to become a good poet: “I do wish that we were allowed to keep our stories until we felt that we had worked them into the best possible form” (*On the Poet* 5). This perfectionism may have been a family trait. Seager, Roethke’s biographer, writes that Roethke’s paternal grandmother had a “favorite command, ‘*Macht es tüchtig!*’, meaning, ‘Do it right!’” (10). Later, Roethke’s widow Beatrice also echoed her husband’s preoccupation with perfection; when giving permission for some previously unpublished poems to be put before the public, she made the request that readers be informed that Roethke “might not have considered them good enough to publish—they weren’t mature work” (Walker 638). Thus even Roethke’s wife, who perhaps has the best claim to an understanding of his wishes as partner and as executor, appears uncertain as to his intentions, simultaneously publishing pieces that he did not while attempting to maintain control over their interpretation through a disclaimer.

Beatrice Roethke’s preoccupation with Roethke’s perfectionism, even while publishing his unfinished pieces, is illustrative of a secondary issue at the heart of posthumous publication: concerns with reputation. It has long been noted that authors and artists become more popular and respected after their deaths. It is at this point that the family or supporters become engaged in a quest to preserve, or perhaps to increase recognition of, the author’s name and reputation through various means.

As might be suspected, however, this death of the author also creates complications, by the proliferation of individuals involved. While living, an author controls his own work, and often—as expressed by Tomaševskij, consciously engages in developing his own reputation as

well. At his death, the author's role becomes the property of others, most frequently several others, and with many contributors come many opinions, and many aims. Authors' posthumous reputations, and the usefulness of posthumous material to develop or preserve those reputations, involve questions of property, financial gain, biography, critical acclaim, the forwarding of the authors' own aims as articulated during their lifetimes, and the preferences of or benefits to the reader. Rarely do these concerns exist independently of each other in posthumous publication, in part because they are all of differing importance to the individuals involved.

One illustrative instance of this complexity of purpose in the posthumous was the publication by *Esquire* in 1970 of a section of Hemingway's "Islands in the Stream." According to Michael Hemmingson: "'Bimini' was published with a hope that the appearance of a posthumous Hemingway work would boost the magazine's diminishing sales and stature in the literary community" (140). In the end, the decision was a financial disappointment for the magazine and a personal affront to Mary Hemingway, the author's fourth wife, whose comments are illustrative of the depth of family concerns in posthumous reputation:

Gordon Lish—not dear—I ought to shoot you for at least two quickly noticed reasons, maybe more... You allowed that hideous green with dirty-looking teeth picture on the front of your book... Your shilly-shallying 'Editor's Note' with its chickenshit little presentation to scholarship... With such falsities as 'number of changes which he had been unable to make by the time of his death.' Rot. He simply wasn't thinking, over 9 or 10 years, of making them. (Hemmingson 140-141)

While Lish, the editor, may have been disappointed about the lack of residual income or improved reputation of the magazine from the ill-fated attempt to resuscitate Hemingway, the author's wife was more deeply concerned with the repercussions to her husband's reputation in

several respects. She complains first of the choice of picture, suggesting that the image was less than flattering. Presumably she, like so many individuals today, wished to remember the lost at his best, and wanted the public to be offered an equally complimentary image. More than this, however, Mary Hemingway was frustrated by the scholarship which Lish had applied to the text in an “Editor’s Note.” Mary Hemingway herself had “put considerable time and care into the manuscript, thus she was understandably upset that it was not presented with more reverence,” not solely for her own sake, but particularly for her husband’s (142). Later in the letter, she takes issue with the comment made in the magazine that “there can be no question that *Islands in the Stream* will stand as one of the few completed novels by Ernest Hemingway”, which Mary was likely upset about because it gave the impression that Hemingway had left few completed works, which was far from the case (141). The writer of that phrase likely meant that among the specifically posthumous novels, *Islands* was one of the few completed. Thus, the publication of a single text brings with it issues of authorial appearance, writing practice, and considerations of financial gain by the publisher itself, although all of these concerns are wrapped up finally in issues of reputation: both that of the publisher, and of the author, as has been the case since publication and copyright began.

It is clear from the above examples that posthumous publication, and the resultant reputation of the authors involved, is very much in the hands of others. In spite of the wealth of evidence surrounding Roethke’s intentions for his work, for example, the final decision to publish or not to publish his work rested on his wife, Beatrice. The many posthumous works we have by Roethke are not the result—although it may be argued—of his own wishes, but ultimately of Beatrice’s decision that his works were worth reading, even in their partially complete state. Although these publications are undertaken most often with the expressed desire

to 'remain true' to the wishes, spirit, characteristics or other work of an author, they are always undertaken by those who have only a partial, and subjective, ability to understand.

Issues of intention and reputation are dependent upon the myth of the author: in reconstructing the posthumous, we must first determine who the author was, what he or she wanted, and to what extent it is possible or advisable to be true to the intention of the author. Yet this posthumous author is always, at best, a myth or representation of the real author created by our understandings, either as individuals who knew the author personally, or by close scholarly study of his or her life, writings, and any other observable data. Authors are "knowable" in several ways. The most obvious is through personal experience, as Beatrice Roethke and David Wagoner both knew Roethke, and another has been the focus of this chapter: scholars often seek to gain a clearer understanding of authors through documents and unfinished pieces they have left behind. The most traditional method, however, is to know authors through their work: this is the disputed aspect of the role of the reader, since some critics would claim that the reader's goal is to understand or experience a text, which may or may not have ties to knowing the authors themselves.

The challenge of knowing is not mutually exclusive: authors must also know their readers. After all, this is the purpose of literature, the foundation of criticism, and of many critical perspectives related to authorship: the author writes for a reader. Virginia Woolf explains the vital importance of the duality:

[T]he writer who has been moved by the sight of the first crocus in Kensington Gardens has, before he sets his pen to paper, to choose from a crowd of competitors the particular patron who suits him best. It is futile to say, 'Dismiss them all; think only of your

crocus,' because writing is a method of communication; and the crocus is an imperfect crocus until it has been shared. (*Patron* 207)

Woolf explains that not any “patron” will do—the author must choose wisely. Consideration of audience has been a key part of writing since the time of Aristotle’s rhetoric. “To know whom to write for is to know how to write” (Woolf, *Patron* 208). Yet knowing one’s reader is a complicated process.

In his foundational article, “The Writer’s Audience Is Always a Fiction,” Walter J. Ong explicates the challenges of what he names the “fictionalization” of the reader in terms of history: “history is always a selection and interpretation of those incidents the individual historian believes will account better than other incidents for some explanation of a totality” (17). Although history is typically believed to be “nonfiction,” a representation of factual material, Ong suggests it is still subject to authorial creation, to the “selection and interpretation” of an individual, who may or may not be successful in conveying the truth without a bias. Authors of any text consider how to present their material to the reader in the hopes of obtaining a desired kind of response. In the same way, Woolf writes, the author must choose a patron who “suits him best” and must select and interpret his or her work, as Ong suggests, accordingly. Any given work is a product, therefore, of how authors picture their readers.

This picturing of the reader, Ong argues, is necessarily a fictionalization, brought about by the lack of a “circumambient actuality” (10). Writing, and reading as its correlative, lack the physical presence of speech, wherein the participants are able to use situation and visual observances to contextualize their language. Thus, while a public speaker has an audience—one that is unified by their physical presence and mutual reactions to each other and the speaker—the “audience” implied in writing is a fiction, because the readers are separated in time and space

from the author, and do not form a collective group. Ong offers two points in support of his premise of the audience as a fiction:

First, that the writer must construct in his imagination, clearly or vaguely, an audience cast in some sort of role—entertainment seekers, reflective sharers of experience... inhabitants of a lost and remembered world of prepubertal latency... and so on. Second, we mean that the audience must correspondingly fictionalize itself. A reader has to play the role in which the author has cast him, which seldom coincides with his role in the rest of actual life. (12)

This reader as a fiction is a key problem in the interpretation of texts. As is evident in the extensive critical debate, the interpretation of a text must begin with either the reader or the writer, in some form. Yet these roles are not so clearly defined as they would seem. Ong explains that in written communication, less so than in speech, “the masks within masks defy complete identification” (20). As Woolf also asserted, the understanding of the reader is a challenge to the writer.

In consideration of the challenges of intention and reputation surrounding the reconstruction of the posthumous work of an author, I will appropriate Ong’s discourse and make the correlative claim: the reader’s author is always a fiction. Just as authors are separated from their readers by physical distance and the expanse of time, readers are separated from authors—and this separation is perhaps the more poignant, in that it continues to increase and cannot be recovered. While authors are dealing with an uncertain future, readers face an unrecoverable past. Readers, and in this consideration, readers particularly in the role of posthumous editors or scholars, must take on the role of Ong’s historian, and construct the works and/or lives of authors through “a selection and interpretation” of events in order to explain their

significance or interestingness. Thus posthumous authors, even more than their audiences, must be “fictionalized” by the reader or critic.

The role of the author, no less than literature itself, has always been mired in this duality between representation and reality. The difficulty is enhanced in the posthumous: the reality of authors, although mortality has ended their physical presence, is no less a reality; these “dead” authors did live, did write, and did have thoughts, feelings, intentions for their work and reputations which they strove to uphold or create—authors are historical facts. Yet the posthumous author, like history, can only be reconstructed through representation: the bodily presence is replaced and complicated by documents, memories, observations, and objects, all of which come together to form the “myth” of the author, which is as Tomaševskij has explained, a “literary fact” in and of itself.

Thus authors, although very real during their lifetimes, become necessarily fictionalized in dealing with the posthumous. These dead authors can no longer be known objectively, and all the textual evidence and personal reflections available cannot reclaim them. As Ong explained in his analogy of the work of the historian, no two historians report the same event the same way. Likewise with authors: after death, they become unfixed entities, changing as they are “read” and “reread” by successive generations of scholars. These readings also perpetuate themselves, since the way in which editors represent the authors they attempt to reconstruct will depend heavily on their own readings of the literary myths that surround them.

In order to use the posthumous, then, it becomes necessary to accept this “fictionalization” of authors, much in the same way that the audience in a theater must participate in a suspension of disbelief in order to embrace the action of the play. Drama like oral communication requires the audience to engage in role playing. In Shakespeare’s *Twelfth Night*,

the audience cooperates in the belief that Viola is really the male Cesario, much as Elizabethan audiences agreed to understand that the boy playing Viola was a woman. The audience must be complicit in Fabian's statement that his reality appears "an improbable fiction." Ong's article offers a restatement of Shakespeare's well-known phrase (nonetheless potent for its overuse), "All the world's a stage, and all the men and women merely players," when he claims, "masks are inevitable in all human communication, even oral. Role playing is both different from actuality and an entry into actuality.... From the very beginning, an infant becomes an actual speaker by playing at being a speaker" (Ong 20). The ability to recognize these masks in communication, to engage in the simultaneous existence of reality and representation and allow them to coexist in the mind, requires flexibility. This type of "play" is an equally necessary aspect of reading. It is the "takeover" of language alluded to by Poulet, the "silence... subjective and anterior to language" of Sartre, the "immanent poem" of humanity longed for by Mallarmé. Similarly, it is the way readers must approach the posthumous author: in an unspoken agreement that the author the editor has constructed for us, or the one we construct for ourselves, is, although fictionalized, a type of reality, an "improbable" fiction that upon closer inspection both is and reveals the reality of the human condition itself.

Chapter 5: Finding the “Best Text”: Issues of Scholarship

In addition to intention and reputation, a second important issue related to the author’s posthumous reputation is the question of scholarship. How does one approach the analysis of posthumous materials in a thorough and appropriate manner, given again that their lack of publication leaves them in various states of organization and completion? How does one determine which of these materials, and in what forms, are the most important for scholarly study, and is there or should there be a means for ensuring the continuity of scholarship through a standardization of these materials? Issues of scholarship at work in questions of the posthumous text include whether to choose one “best” or standard text from multiple versions for study, how to employ this choice in the preparation of “collected” or anthologized editions of an author’s work, to what degree contextualization should be involved in such analysis, how to deal with supposed mistakes or “lapses” made by the author, how to prevent or correct those already made by editors, and to what extent should the reader be informed of any changes made between the original authorial text and the one presented to him through posthumous editing and/or evaluation. As in the case of intention and reputation, most often several of these issues are a concern for the work of any given author at the same time. The challenge then, lies in determining what constitutes quality academic work with regard to the posthumous, and whether such standards ought to be developed at all.

Perhaps the most challenging issue at hand in the posthumous is often the choice of material itself: how does one choose from among many copies or versions of a text which one is the most worthy of study? The question is posited quite succinctly by Jack Stillinger:

One of our most deeply ingrained notions about Coleridge’s poetic texts is that there should be—somewhere, whether already existing or yet to be constructed by scholars—a

single, “best” or “most authoritative” text for each of Coleridge’s poems, and that it is the job of the modern textual scholar to determine what that single best or most authoritative text is. (127)

Though Stillinger specifically focuses on the work of Coleridge, the question itself is valid for the work of any author and is often as confusing an issue in the case of published work as in the case of the posthumous. Stillinger reports “each of Coleridge’s best-known poems exists not just in a single text, but in several separate versions, some of which differ drastically from others, and every one of which is independently authoritative in the sense that it was authored by Coleridge himself” (127). The multiple versions of these poems consist of manuscripts, multiple variations in published collections based on revisions made by the poet himself, and even Coleridge’s own copies of his published works with hand-written emendations in the margin, providing even more possible versions that although not seen by the public, were clearly completed by Coleridge and therefore beg the question of authority.

Critical answers to the “best text” question, not surprisingly, fall into several differing camps. One traditional viewpoint relies upon the widespread concurrence with the “last word”—the idea that the most recent version of a text, the last one that an author wrote or had a hand in revising, is the most correct and authoritative. This choice appears sensible, in that writers often assert changing opinions in their work as they age, and given the general consensus among the scholarly community that writers tend to improve and produce higher quality work throughout their lifetimes. The diametrically opposed opinion is that the earliest form of a work is the most reliable, particularly when that work appears in manuscript. This viewpoint also has its benefits: manuscripts (provided they are legible) are not subject to the inconsistencies or errors sometimes occurring in publishing, and also provide a greater immediacy in being the first impulse of the

poet, which some scholars hold as a truer and therefore more valuable text. Both of these views are noticeably dependent on the assumed notion that an authoritative text exists, although they differ as to where it may be discovered.

The third opinion, which is the one adhered to by Stillinger, is “that every individual version of a work is a distinct text in its own right, with unique aesthetic character and unique authorial intentions” (129). The option of multiple versions has distinct benefits and detractions. Perhaps the most obvious benefit is that in several cases, and in almost all instances of the posthumous, this is the way in which authors’ texts are handed down to us—in several versions, most if not all edited by the author, and apparently representative when taken collectively not of a single thought or meaning but of the course of development of ideas and technique throughout a lifetime. The multiple versions approach thus hands the scholar a ready-made means for dealing with a very real problem, whereas the use of a “best text” approach would necessitate long hours of deliberation over which text to study before an in-depth analysis could be begun. Consideration of multiple versions also enables the scholar to not only analyze the text itself, but also its development through time: the influences of historical events, the poet’s own evolving technique and other situational factors on the work of the poet. Yet each of these three approaches to the problem created by a multiplicity of posthumous texts has its own distinct benefits and challenges for scholars of literature, which will be enumerated as we consider the other issues at hand in posthumous scholarship.

The presence of variorum editions of literary texts attests to the long recognized popularity of combining multiple versions for such side-by-side study, although these have traditionally been used not to equate all versions of a text but to aid in determining from among them a more reliable or prevalent version. Yet even in such cases, historically scholars have not

always agreed on a correct interpretation with the result that some major works have been published throughout history with notes indicating the dubious origin of some of their passages. Perhaps the most well-known instance of this is the Christian Bible, where multiple versions abound in contemporary culture. Many Protestant Bibles are printed with an indication in the Gospel of Mark that “Some of the earliest manuscripts do not include 16:9-20” (Bible 1697). The use of a multiple version theory enables the study of such differences without forcing the scholar to choose, yet this example also perpetuates the difficulty: often, even the use of multiple texts still urges the choice of a best one, and the scholar must strive to achieve true objectivity in his avoidance of a “standard.”

One challenge at work in the use of multiple versions is the lack of continuity among scholars when such multiple versions are used. Stillinger explains in the case of Coleridge scholarship,

[T]he best critics working on individual poems... regularly make use of the manuscripts, successive printings, and annotated copies to support their interpretations. Even so, I think that students of Coleridge in general have very little idea of the frequency of variation among the texts, or of the multiplicity of versions of the works they are studying and the complexity of relationships among the versions; and I also think that these same students continue, in large numbers, to regard the so-called “final” texts as the principal versions, slighting or entirely ignoring the earlier authoritative versions. (131)

The use of multiple versions may offer the scholar a wider-ranging and more enlightening view of a poet’s work than reliance on a single, standardized version of a text. Stillinger’s use of the terms “slighting” and “ignoring” highlights his view that such texts have, as is often believed in the case of the posthumous, instructive potential that may prove invaluable in academic textual

study. On the other hand, in the absence of one definitive, authoritative version of a text, scholars may be led to promote widely varying opinions simply by virtue of having used a differing version of a text. The multiple version theory then appears to necessitate as its guiding premise the acceptance of multiple interpretations. For, as Stillinger says, “this multiplicity of versions constitutes a type of textual *instability* that makes interpretation of Coleridge far more difficult than it would be if we had only one version per work” (138). The instability of the text is indicative of a resultant instability of interpretation. There is no means, in this method, of standardizing *which* multiple texts any given scholar chooses to consider, and the choice is itself substantial. As the author of the popular grammar book *Eats, Shoots and Leaves* has indicated, a change as minor as a single mark of punctuation can have significant repercussions to the meaning of a text. The only way to enable unity in interpretation from a multiple version approach however would be to designate a collection or grouping of versions that scholars *should* study—which would undermine the idea of a multiple version approach at all, by subsuming it to the time-tested “best text” model.

The inadequacies of a multiple version approach are best illustrated by the unique challenge faced by editors and publishers in producing collections and editions of a given author’s work, where there is an expectation of one text deemed “authoritative” which becomes the foundation for study. An individual scholar may find the study of multiple versions well worth his time and effort—and such a study would certainly require a considerable amount of time and effort to be adequately thorough—but often the reading public wants to be presented with a less complex choice, requiring the editor to develop a standard for determining which texts to include. The dilemma involved in such a choice was the reasoning behind the publication

of two collections of Emily Dickinson's poetry in 1998 by The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.

When editor R.W. Franklin created his three volume Variorum edition of Dickinson's poetry, which contains "the full text of each of the 2,500 source documents, often giving several versions of the same poem" together with "their particular histories, including the identification of recipients," he simultaneously produced a one volume reader's edition, which includes all of the poems, but only one version of each (Franklin, *Reader* 5). In the creation of the one-volume reader's edition, Franklin was forced to follow the practices of the best text critics, and in his attempt to produce the most authoritative edition, he chose to include both early and late versions of Dickinson's poetry. Franklin defends his decision to primarily rely upon the later texts: "about three fourths of the poems exist in a single source. For the rest, with from two to seven sources, the policy has been to choose the latest version of the entire poem, thereby giving to the poet, rather than the editor, the ownership of change" (*Reader* 6). He did not however, always follow his own policy: "Earlier manuscripts have also become the choice—again, all things being substantively equal—if the manuscript otherwise to be chosen, perhaps roughly made or miswritten, has a lapse in form" (*Reader* 7).

Although the long tradition of canonizing and anthologizing so-called "standard" or "authoritative" versions of authors' texts makes the inclusive interpretation sought in a multiple version approach particularly challenging, not only to the practice but to the mindset of a researcher, Stillinger makes a valid point in his call for more inclusive consideration of Coleridge's work. The use of a standard text in some ways parallels the earlier critical model in its weighty reliance on the author. Although the inclusion of multiple texts, like the opening of interpretation to the wider body of readers, is problematic in reducing the unity of interpretation,

it does, as Foucault has suggested, leave an empty space—and in so doing open a new field for scholars to “await the fluid functions released by this disappearance” (1626). And, as mentioned in the initial explanation of a multiple version approach, Coleridge is not the only author whose writing practices have created uncertainty as to a standard version of a text, rendering such an approach highly desirable for literary critics. Typically, publication indicates a certain presumed level of stability in authorial control. Yet even published authors’ roles may be rendered more or less stable by their level of involvement in their texts. The letters of George Eliot to her publisher John Blackwood are full of corrections to the proofs of her texts, and often involve fairly small details that she feared would alter the sense of her text severely. Yet the reverse is true of T.S. Eliot, whose poem *The Waste Land* is a veritable model, like Coleridge’s poems, of an unstable text.

Eliot’s *The Waste Land* provides a more concentrated form of the multiple version problem than Coleridge’s poetry in that its inconsistencies, rather than the result of repeated revisions, have never been separated from the text, but were there at its creation. Initially, the poem was published in quick succession in four different venues: first in Eliot’s own monthly, *The Criterion*, the next month in the American magazine *The Dial*; one month later it appeared in hardcover by the American press of Boni and Liveright, and subsequently it was published by the Woolfs’ Hogarth Press in London (North xi). Although published closely together, each of these versions contains differences, although one might have expected more unity from the author, who both oversaw proofs of the British edition and was the editor of his own periodical. The differences, Michael North explains in his introduction to a Critical Edition of the poem, “are matters of capitalization, punctuation, or spacing, but even the last of these is not trivial in a poem in which spacing is an important indicator of rhythm and organization” (xi). An even more

significant variation is the appearance only in the Boni and Liveright edition of the infamous “notes” Eliot wrote, ostensibly to explain the poem. *The Waste Land* does not improve in clarity or unity throughout its publication career, in spite of the many versions which Eliot oversaw, either as editor or during his lifetime. One line was added to a version in 1960 but did not make its way into subsequent editions of the poem, and there also exists a proof copy of a collected edition with Eliot’s own corrections that then never appeared in the final version (North xii). One may wonder whether these authors—Coleridge through his near obsession with revision and Eliot with his apparent lackadaisical attitude toward it—were actually intending to develop an instability of text, to create a statement about poetry through leaving their work, as Roethke once wrote, “in a state of partial completeness... nothing but fragments” (Wagoner, no pagination).

The instability of text seen in Eliot and Coleridge, while demonstrative of the benefits of multiple-version study, is not the case for every author, although it does frequently become an issue in the posthumous. (And indeed, when it is an issue for published authors, it is often because of a juxtaposition of published and/or standardized versions with newly discovered unpublished drafts or copies). The work of Emily Dickinson is a paradigm of posthumous scholarship, if an uncommon case, and her literary output provides a rich field for study of textual instability in the posthumous. Only ten of Dickinson’s poems appeared in print during her lifetime, all sent anonymously by her friends “and never seen through the press by the poet” (Franklin, *Reader* 5). Yet at her death, her sister Lavinia discovered a wealth of poems, some in Dickinson’s own hand-bound form of collection (what Lavinia termed fascicles), others on single sheets and household scrap papers. It was years before the immensity of her writing was fully realized and subsequently published. At present count, her editor R.W. Franklin lists 1,789

poems, several of which exist, like the work of Coleridge, in multiple versions, accounting for at least 2,500 sources.

The most obvious difficulty in dealing with Dickinson's poetry is that because it is predominantly posthumous, it lacks the precedent for editing choices typically sought in previous publications by other authors. Franklin observes, "An editor's task therefore is to turn to her manuscripts and against criteria that were never explicitly hers prepare texts for the public" (*Variorum* 27). In the absence of published poetry overseen by Dickinson as a functional precedent, the criteria Franklin finally did use when making single version selections for the reading edition were obtained by his best judgment of Dickinson's own intentions and preferences based upon her manuscript practices. Franklin chose later versions in most cases, perhaps justifying his choice by the observation that during much of her career, Dickinson destroyed earlier drafts of her poems after having copied them in a final or near-final version into a fascicle. Occasionally Dickinson also left alternate readings in her poems, even in fascicle form; whenever possible, Franklin also chose to rely on Dickinson's indications in the manuscript—choosing an underlined version or eliminating a struck word or phrase. The unique situation of Dickinson as a predominantly unpublished poet might lead scholars to prefer the variorum edition of her poetry, wherein one can engage in a thorough, multiple-version study of the texts. Yet Dickinson's popularity also necessitates the single-version reader's edition for those uninterested in studying her work in such depth.

It is not merely the existence of multiple versions Stillinger encountered in the Coleridge works that lend themselves, as we have seen, to an instability of text. Rather, authors themselves can create instability either through extensive revision or retraction, as again exemplified by Coleridge, or through a lack of continuity throughout a lifetime of publishing, as in the case of

Eliot. Additionally, as seen not only in the work of Dickinson, but in the posthumous oeuvre of numerous authors, the existence of drafts and fragments can call into question even the validity of previously indisputed published works of an author—as the reading of *Lady Susan* has occasioned for some feminist Austen critics. The posthumous also destabilizes an author's texts through the lack of regulatory apparatus that are generally associated with publication. In the posthumous, scholars often lack proof copies and letters to editors, and in the larger case of posthumous letters, drafts, diaries and notes themselves, the obvious lack of any attempt to publish or the clear avoidance of any public audience limits any assumed authorial intention as to clarity or meaning by muddying the understanding of the purpose of the texts themselves. Thus, the question of textual instability presents a foundational problem for textual scholarship.

A further concern of scholarship, and one that may seem to lend itself to the multiple version approach, is the desire of a scholar to treat the text with greater contextualization. The use of multiple versions of a text might be viewed as more inclusive and “true” to context, and offers the benefit of allowing scholars to study the evolution of a text together with its historical situation, and to consider influential forces that may lie behind the choices, changes and revisions created by the author. Some critics view the influences of historical events, the author's own evolving technique and other situational factors on the work of the author as critical to the study of the work, hence the production of numerous “critical” editions of texts. Such editions are common currency in high school and even some college classrooms, where a study of the poetry of Shakespeare begins with a reading on the Elizabethan age, explicating the structure of the Globe Theater and the traditions and policies of period drama where boys played female roles, and where a reading of Gilman's *The Yellow Wallpaper* is quickly followed by an explanation of medical practice and “rest cures” during the period. Yet even in these situations,

the students are more likely to be offered background in multiple forms, such as letters, critical opinions and historical documentation, while one single text—the result of one critic’s “best-text” approach—is provided for study.

Stillinger offers as one example of the potential benefit of multiple versions for such “contextualization” an issue of chronology in the case of Coleridge. He explains that were the scholar to read four standardized versions of Coleridge’s poems in the chronological order in which they were first written (1795, 1797, and 1798), the result would be “a text of *The Eolian Harp* that dates either from 1817 or 1828.... a *Lime-Tree Bower* and an *Ancient Mariner* that date not from 1797 and 1798 but again from 1817 or later... and a *Frost At Midnight* that dates not from 1798 but from 1829” (141). The result of the chronological ordering of the standardized “best texts” would thus be to give the reader a false impression of the context, which may change the meaning of the poetry itself. The span of twenty or more years might have influenced the poet in his revisions, and a fifty year old Coleridge would likely have some differing ideas about the purpose of his poetry than the he may have had in the first drafts at twenty. Stillinger explains that by working with solely the early versions of texts, scholars run the risk of missing the additions of Coleridge’s maturity, while by focusing on later versions, “we run the risk of misunderstanding or even being entirely ignorant of Coleridge’s changes of interest and emphasis in subject matter, idea and theme” (142). Through viewing the texts in their collectivity as uniquely expressive of Coleridge’s poetic development throughout his lifetime, however, the scholar is able not only to gain a more thorough understanding of the poetry, but also to place it contextually in the situation in which it was written.

Such “contextualization” is often a foundational principle for the use of posthumous material. The introductions and prefaces to posthumous collections are replete with references to

the ability of these pieces to give greater insight, as has been previously stated, into the works of the authors in question. This also applies to the less common, but still extant, publication of early drafts and fragments in addition to more complete or revised versions. In publishing F. Scott Fitzgerald's *Trimalchio* in its entirety in 2000, editor James L. West III suggests that the early draft is particularly beneficial for contextualization of the author's work:

Reading F. Scott Fitzgerald's *Trimalchio*, an early and complete version of *The Great Gatsby*, is like listening to a well-known musical composition, but played in a different key and with an alternate bridge passage.... Several favorite passages are missing, but new combinations and sequences, recognizably from the hand of the composer, are present. To the knowledgeable listener it is like hearing the same work and yet a different work. (xiii)

The *Trimalchio* example is an interesting materialization of the editorial decision to follow a multiple-version approach, in that it is more common to see manifestly new work in posthumous publications, or fragments that shed new light on older pieces. The comparison of Fitzgerald's early and later drafts to a single musical composition performed in two differing musical keys is intriguing; key changes in performance are occasionally justified for various reasons, for example to accommodate the range of a vocalist, yet the piece would remain the same. The change in pitch would alter the tonality, but only slightly, and it is not likely that even the average musician would notice the full extent of the change. The *Great Gatsby* was a popular, and complete, work in its own right, and the decision to publish a complete draft which is markedly similar and yet differs so greatly from it seems to assert the editor's own multiple-version bias more so than a desire to offer new material to the public. In stating his own purpose

for the book, the editor echoes Stillinger's approbation of multiple versions, the "idea that every individual version of a work is a distinct text in its own right" (129). West states:

Fitzgerald improved the novel in galleys; *The Great Gatsby* is a better book than *Trimalchio*. But *Trimalchio* itself is a remarkable achievement, and different enough from *Gatsby* to deserve publication on its own. It is now put into play, not only for comparison with *The Great Gatsby* but for interpretation as a separate and distinct work of art (xix).

Thus the public is offered *Trimalchio* for two expressed reasons: first, for the contextualization it provides, the opportunity for "comparison with *The Great Gatsby*" which it eventually became, but also for the sake of a multiple-version, thorough approach; *Trimalchio* is, for West, "a separate and distinct work of art."

As mentioned earlier in this chapter, most posthumous collections or works are published with one of two aims in mind: to give insight into either the works or lives of authors. While the publication of *Trimalchio* offers a contextualization of an author's work, the contextualization of authors' lives is a vastly more complicated, and necessarily fictionalized, proposal. Letters, diaries, fragments, and photographs of authors have long been read, consumed and enjoyed by their devotees, but a newer medium for the reconstruction of the dead author is the film. One example of an attempt to contextualize the author on the screen is "Becoming Jane," based upon the research of Jon Spence in his 2003 biography, *Becoming Jane Austen*.

In the introduction to his biography, Jon Spence explains that the events in the film, although based on fact, are also largely speculation:

The scriptwriters of *Becoming Jane* have imagined what might have happened during this time. Although the plot and incidents of film are fictional, the writers have striven to give

us a true picture of Jane Austen's character, personal circumstances and social context.

The 'story' of Jane and Tom's romance may not have played out in the way the writers have imagined, but the film is, I believe, true to the spirit of Jane Austen's character and to the forces that came into play at that time in her life. (Introduction ix)

Spence's biography itself is based heavily on sources; whether or not the romance between Jane Austen and her neighbors' Irish nephew Tom Lefroy really was as significant as it is portrayed in the film is a matter of conjecture, but Spence's text offers extensive evidence marshaled from Austen's letters and numerous other sources in support of his claim that their relationship "was serious and more enduring than the brief flirtation that previous biographers had assumed" (Spence ix). The careful treatment of source material present in the biography, however, becomes the stuff of imagination—of fiction—in the film, where there is little room for citation and references, and where the focus is on telling a story. This is where the boundaries between scholarship and speculation become muddled. As is the case with most editors or collaborators in the posthumous, however, Spence appears to endorse the film as instructive with or without the practiced accuracy that was his goal in his biography. He claims, "The film *Becoming Jane* gives us an image of Jane Austen that liberates our imagination.... Anne Hathaway's skillful portrayal of Jane Austen in *Becoming Jane* shows that art can have as much power to bring us closer to the truth as facts themselves can" (Introduction x).

The film is a good example of the challenges of scholarship in contextualization of the posthumous author. Is there, in fact, a line between "art" and "facts" as Spence presents it? The appearance of the term "art" also echoes West's justification of *Trimalchio* as "a separate and distinct work of art." Can art be equated to good scholarship, or does the fictionalization diminish the value of the work? Do the two Fitzgerald texts, and the biography and the resultant

film, have distinctly different aims that account for and excuse the varying levels of reality they present?

A brief summary of major differences between the biography and film will suffice to lay the foundation for a discussion of the discourse of art and scholarship in the name of “contextualization” here. A caption on the biography cover makes the claim: “The true love story that inspired the classic novels.” The choice of the word “inspired” appears more calculated to the marketing of both text and film than to an accurate representation of Spence’s purported aims. While he does assert that Austen’s romance with Tom Lefroy—well documented in previous biographies but often treated as a brief flirtation—has been underestimated, the biography presents itself as a more complete picture of Austen’s young life, rather than purely as an explanation of the novels. It is true, however, that this serious treatment of the Austen-Lefroy relationship is a prominent part of the novel, and it is certainly the foundation for the film. While both are based in fact, however, here the break between art and scholarship begins: the biography asserts only that the relationship between Austen and Tom Lefroy was more serious than scholars have previously believed, and that it continued beyond January of 1796; the film expands this theme into the great romance of Austen’s life, culminating in Austen actually consenting to an elopement and then changing her mind and returning home, before plumbing the experience as fodder for her novels.

The story is based primarily upon the first two letters by Austen that survive to date, in which she wrote to her sister Cassandra about Tom Lefroy, “I am almost afraid to tell you how my Irish friend and I behaved. Imagine to yourself everything most profligate and shocking in the way of dancing and sitting down together” (*Letters* 1). Austen’s own portrait of the relationship is unclear as to its strength, which is perhaps the reason that it has been taken

alternately by biographers as serious and flirtatious. Tom Lefroy is mentioned again in the second letter that exists, “Tell Mary that I make over . . . all my other Admirers into the bargain wherever she can find them . . . as I mean to confine myself in the future to Mr. Tom Lefroy, for whom I donot care sixpence” (sic) (*Letters* 4). Spence’s assertion of the strength of the relationship may be supported by Deidre Le Faye’s suggestion that due to Jane and Cassandra’s established correspondence habits, one letter is likely missing between these two that may have contained a more detailed account of her feelings. It is well-documented that Cassandra censored her sister’s letters before passing them down to her nieces, often through destroying entire letters (Le Faye, Introduction xv). The second letter also signals an apparent end to the relationship, although its seriousness is still couched in Austen’s playful language, “At length the Day is come on which I am to flirt my last with Tom Lefroy, & when you receive this it will be over—My tears flow as I write, at the melancholy idea” (*Letters* 4).

This is where the relationship typically ends in Austen biographies: a brief flirtation comprised largely of dancing and recorded in only two letters in January of 1796, when Austen was twenty-one. Spence, however, offers as evidence for a more serious connection two further letters. In the third letter, dated August of 1796, Austen writes from a location she designates as “Cork Street,” in London (*Letters* 5). Spence argues, following a suggestion by Le Faye in the endnotes to *Letters*, that it is likely Austen stayed on this visit with Benjamin Langlois, the only individual on the street the family had a connection with. The connection existed through the Lefroys; Langlois was Tom Lefroy’s great-uncle, and Tom was staying with him at the time while he studied law (Spence 98). If this is true, Austen would have seen Lefroy on her visit. The other letter Spence refers to was written two years later, in November 1798, and suggests that Austen was still thinking of Lefroy, although in what respect again is the object of conjecture.

The letter records a visit Jane had with Mrs. Lefroy, Tom's aunt, and Austen does briefly mention him again, "of her nephew she said nothing at all... I was too proud to make any enquiries; but on my father's afterwards asking where he was, I learned that he was gone back to London in his way to Ireland" (*Letters* 19). Spence argues that this expresses Austen's continued feelings for Tom Lefroy.

The usefulness of the details of the relationship for Austen scholarship lies, for Spence, in the contextualization both of Austen and of her work. He suggests that Tom Lefroy's family may have been the inspiration for *Pride and Prejudice*: Tom's parents, before his birth, had five daughters and little money, creating the situation that acts as an impetus for the Bennet family in the novel, and the character of Elizabeth Bennet "might have been Tom's sister, a woman with his charm and liveliness and intelligence transformed into a feminine mode" (102). Spence also cites as a benefit of his retelling the additional contextualization readers and viewers receive in the depiction of Jane Austen, an author usually viewed as a mature spinster writing from home, as a young woman. This is reflected in his initial comments about the film: that it is "true to the spirit of Jane Austen's character" (Spence, Introduction ix).

This becomes often, the question at hand in the posthumous scholarship. Is the posthumous creation actually "true" to the author, and what does it mean to maintain that relationship? The film *Becoming Jane* aims to present a picture of the young author to her readers that may or may not account for some of the detail in the novels. The questions it raises for scholarship are: are such portrayals real, and in either case, are they valuable? All editions of the posthumous, where there is collaboration between the dead author and others (whom he may or may not have authorized to change and/or publish his work), are a combination of the "real" work and the "art" of these other parties. Spence's assertions about the film pose an important

question: ultimately, the posthumous work spans the boundary between fact and fiction, between scholarship and art.

Beyond the question of boundaries in the posthumous, a further issue that arises is that of motivation. Spence claims that the film *Becoming Jane*, in spite of its dubious factualness, will “liberate the imagination” of readers about Jane Austen and allow them a more intimate portrait of her in her youth. Yet one might also conjecture that the filmmakers, and perhaps the author himself, had other aims in creating a new film and biography about a highly popular author. Books and other publications, as seen even in the early years of copyright, are not merely profitable for the learning and general improvement of the scholarly public, but they are also financially profitable for the author, and for the publishers. Thus the film, while it does offer a portrait of the author, might have been conceived not merely as an act of artistry, but as a project with a good projection of financial gain. The potential for profit, too, is a consideration in posthumous scholarship, and one that will be treated more fully in the following chapter.

Thus far, the discussion of the posthumous has revolved around issues and choices that necessarily come to the forefront in the interpretation of these texts. Consideration of the posthumous involves questions of intention, reputation and scholarship, yet all of these necessitate also a discussion of the individuals involved in determining the answers. The discussion turns now to ground the discussion of posthumous authors and their texts in an analysis of the roles and choices of the other individuals involved in the process.

Chapter 6: Editor/Executor: Too Many Cooks

The act of criticism itself is complicated exponentially in dealing with the posthumous, as this thesis continues to illustrate. Stillinger names the underlying issue in his study of the published and unpublished revisions of Coleridge: “Practical criticism... has always needed two things: first, a single author of the work that is being read and interpreted, and, second, a single text” (138). Stillinger’s article focuses on the challenge brought to the fore by the lack of a single text, as presented by Coleridge’s work, although as he also observes, the first of his two requirements for practical criticism has been met: “every [version] is independently authoritative in the sense that it was authored by Coleridge himself” (127). Stillinger had a single author, but authors’ posthumous outputs frequently result in the same instability of text he dealt with in the case of Coleridge, as we have seen also in Roethke, Eliot and others. Yet the posthumous adds to the complexity of interpretation through the additional *instability* of the author, brought about simultaneously by the inability of dead authors to participate in the structuring or editing of their works and the attempts by others to engage in such work in their place.

It is at the death of the author, when the blurring of intention fails to offer a clear choice, that other individuals often take over: editors, executors and family members (who often fill one or more of these roles). In the absence of an indisputable or in some cases, legally binding statement by the author, one major difficulty arises: that of determining with whom the authority of decisions with regard to publication and editing resides. Even in cases of a clearly appointed executor, as we have seen with Roethke, many voices still come into play in the posthumous construction of authors and their work. Roethke’s wife relied on multiple people to help her disseminate her husband’s works and to establish his reputation within the literary community: participants in the published works include the biographer Allan Seager, the editor of the

posthumous essays, Ralph J. Mills, the editor of the notebook material, David Wagoner, and Beatrice Roethke herself, who together with her second husband has worked to edit some of Roethke's poems and material. Many others have worked to bring Roethke to the public's notice again, particularly in Michigan, where a group of interested community- and literary-minded individuals led by Ann Ransford are working tirelessly to preserve Roethke's childhood home as a museum. Should these individuals, also, be given a voice in how Roethke is presented to the public? The multiplicity of individuals involved in dealing with authors' posthumous reputations is immense, and a discussion of the implications specifically of issues connected with the relationships and conflicts between these individuals is vital to any understanding of the processes involved in interpretation of posthumous texts. Although the roles do not always exist independently, it will perhaps be more prudent for the sake of clarity with regard to the individual issues created by this instability of authorship, to at least attempt to treat them separately. Initially then, we turn our discussion to a consideration of the role of editor.

When David Wagoner compiled his *Straw for the Fire*, he explained his commitment to publish only words that were, as Stillinger said of Coleridge, "independently authoritative" in being authored only by Roethke himself. Very often, however, posthumous editors are not so careful in bringing the work of a much beloved or respected author before the public. There are several ways in which an editor can contribute to the instability of the author in the posthumous. Some of this interference is ostensibly minor and harmless, as in the case of so-called "silent" corrections or standardizations—the updating of an author's spelling, punctuation, capitalization or other idiosyncrasies. Other corrections are more decisive, as when an editor claims to alter an author's text for greater clarity, or to enable it to make what is perceived as "better" sense to the reader.

One example of the second type of editing is R.W. Franklin's own admission of having found "a lapse in form" in some of Dickinson's texts. This posthumous correction is similar to what occurs in the creation of a single-version text, where the editor is required to make choices among multiple versions. Yet in choosing among versions, the editor remains primarily an editor. Decisions about the accuracy of texts are rarely as simple as choosing between a first version and a final, edited version, particularly if there is any ambiguity about what the author meant, or any perceived difference between what was meant and what was said. In the case of corrections for sense or meaning, the editor complicates and destabilizes the role of the author. This is hardly surprising, given the strong critical support for the reader in interpretation. Editors are also readers, and in spite of their attempts to prioritize the thoughts and/or ideas of the author, they are always subject to their own interpretations; editors are not, nor can they ever be, wholly objective, and just as authors reading back over their work after a period of time frequently see places for emendation or correction, editors are not immune to occasional beliefs in their own clearer vision, which may lead them to alter a text based upon their own ideas of clarity, sense, or meaning. This editorial privilege is a potential challenge for criticism not merely because it can introduce words or phrases not necessarily belonging to the original author, but because editors may also have different practices for determining which of their editing choices deserve clear reporting in a text, and which may be corrected "silently."

Silent corrections are problematic by their very nature: they occur without allowing the reader the chance to make a choice. Readers may have differing opinions about how they expect to consume texts, and some may have no problem with silent editing due to the supposed increased "readability" of the resultant version over the extant author-supervised text. Such corrections often involve minor linguistic differences that are considered by editors to be either

idiosyncrasies on the part of the author or “historical” differences that are worth removing to enable the reader to better relate to the text at hand. Common examples of such perceived “minor” editing strokes include standardizing punctuation and capitalization, correcting or modernizing spelling, and the like. In his *Variorum* edition of the Dickinson texts, Franklin explains that his editorial precursors often engaged in such practices: “they gave titles to poems, which otherwise rarely had them..., adjusted texts to public standards of spelling, capitalization, and punctuation, and altered them in the interests of conventional usage and of clarity in rhyme, rhythm, and meaning” (*Variorum* 3). These changes, while they arguably bring the contemporary reader closer to an understanding of the text, also change authors’ own language, thus destabilizing their interests in their own work. A further problem of silent editing is that the reader becomes complicit in these changes; silent editing, rather than allowing the reader the opportunity to look up changes in an appendix and consider the differences, presents the altered text as a unified whole.

In addition to the instability created by editorial corrections of an author’s words, authors may be destabilized through errors subsequently imposed on their texts through careless or inadequate analysis by an editor. The Dickinson works are a prime example of what might be considered this “poor” scholarship at work in the editing of texts. The early editions of Dickinson’s work are riddled with changes, mistakes, and misunderstandings or misrepresentations brought about by less than thorough analysis and examination on the part of the editors. The first three volumes, edited by Mabel Todd and T.W. Higginson, as stated above, heavily standardized Dickinson’s poems, often adding titles where a poem had none. The next volume to appear was edited by Dickinson’s niece, Martha Bianchi, and was mistakenly titled “The Complete Poems of Emily Dickinson.” Unaware of the extensiveness of the poetry she had

in her possession at that time, Bianchi assumed that the poems she inherited from her mother, together with the three volumes published by Todd and Higginson, created the totality of Dickinson's output. It was later that she discovered the existence of many more poems, leading to two more volumes in 1929 and 1935. The incompleteness of Bianchi's editions of Dickinson was not their only fault, however. While they did begin a return toward the original texts in relinquishing the titles imposed by Todd and Higginson, they are also, in Franklin's words, "marked by maladroit misreading or errors... and numerous alterations in the interests of sense and sensibility" (*Variorum* 5). In the years that followed, Mabel Todd's daughter, Millicent Bingham, published two more books, relying heavily on the documents in her mother's possession—one an explanation of the early editing practices, lawsuits, and other challenges associated with Dickinson scholarship to date, and the other a collection of over 600 more previously unpublished poems that Bianchi may not have known existed.

The work of an editor often changes a text, ostensibly for the better, although in the case of the posthumous, if the goal is to retain and proliferate the work of the author under consideration, these changes may be considered intrusive in that the author's work often becomes altered to the point where it may not totally belong to the author. One illustrative case of this complication of the author in a posthumous text is *A Writer's Diary*, published by Leonard Woolf in 1953.

The *Writer's Diary* consists of excerpts and pieces chosen from Virginia Woolf's diary after her death by her husband, and its construction is a model for the posthumous destabilization of authorship. In his preface, Leonard Woolf explains his own misgivings about publishing the diary at all:

It is, I think, nearly always a mistake to publish extracts from diaries or letters, particularly if the omissions have to be made in order to protect the feelings or reputations of the living. The omissions almost always distort or conceal the true character of the diarist or letter-writer and produce spiritually what an Academy picture does materially, smoothing out the wrinkles, warts, frowns, and asperities. At the best and even unexpurgated, diaries give a distorted or one-sided portrait of the writer, because, as Virginia Woolf herself remarks somewhere in these diaries, one gets into the habit of recording one particular kind of mood. (vii)

These concerns are true of most posthumous publication, but the “distortion” Woolf alludes to here is perhaps more poignant in the diary, because it is a prime example of an editor subscribing to “literary myth” in his reconstruction of an author’s posthumous text. Woolf not only chose representative entries of his wife’s diary to include in the text: he actually themed them to present a very specific picture of her life and writing career:

I... have extracted and now publish in this volume practically everything which referred to her own writing.... The book throws light upon Virginia Woolf’s intentions, objects, and methods as a writer. It gives an unusual psychological picture of artistic production from within. Its value and interest naturally depend to a great extent upon the value and interest of the product of Virginia Woolf’s art. (ix)

Leonard Woolf believed in his wife’s status as an artist and accordingly determined that her thoughts about writing would be interesting and potentially instructive to the reading public. His choice to publish the diary only in segments was partially dictated by his concern for the feelings of those individuals referred to in it who were still living, and partially due undoubtedly to the

great number of entries therein. However justified these choices may have been, they significantly alter the portrait of Virginia Woolf that is offered in the diary.

The preface cites Virginia Woolf's own explanation that a diary is often one-sided, as individuals are perhaps more reflective and likely to write when in a particular type of mood. The *Writer's Diary* is more one-sided even than the larger diary it was drawn from in that Leonard Woolf excised those aspects of a more personal nature, leaving the reader only the professional portion of Virginia Woolf's more reflective meditations. An additional difficulty in the diary is Woolf's use of silent editing. Where some editions of posthumous work clearly mark editorial changes through the inclusion of footnotes or appendices, Leonard Woolf determined against this process:

In editing the diary I was in some doubt whether to indicate omissions. In the end I decided not to do so as a general rule. The omissions and the dots would have been so continual as to worry the reader.... The reader must remember that what is printed in this volume is only a very small portion of the diaries and that the extracts were embedded in a mass of matter unconnected with Virginia Woolf's writing. Unless this is constantly borne in mind, the book will give a very distorted view of her life and her character. (ix)

Very distorted, indeed! Here is the dilemma of posthumous editing at its finest: the reader is offered the diary of a writer, with the hope that it will "show the extraordinary energy, persistence, and concentration with which she devoted herself to the art of writing and the undeviating conscientiousness with which she wrote and rewrote and again rewrote her books" (ix). Yet this portrait of a conscientious writer is quite deliberately wiped clean of any reality. *Writer's Diary* is layered with censorship the way Ong's reader is layered in masks, and perhaps the worst is that due to Woolf's decision to not identify omissions, the product looks deceptively

clean and complete, with none of the markings of Franklin's Variorum edition of Dickinson. The unsuspecting reader might be tempted to take this "distorted view" and equate it with the real author.

To be sure, such editing is common and unavoidable at least in some respect in any posthumous manuscript. The so-called "poems" in Wagoner's *Straw for the Fire* are fragments arranged and ordered by himself, and not Roethke; Franklin admits to making decisions for Dickinson with regard to sense. Woolf's editorial alterations of his wife's diary are perhaps unusually extensive, but as he states, he had a clear object in mind in altering the text, and the words in the diary are all Virginia Woolf's.

The question remains, then—or perhaps, the question returns—what makes an author? During the debates surrounding copyright law, there were examples of rulings in which those who had significantly altered previous texts were given permission to publish, as though they were "new works," suggesting that authorship does not depend on complete originality. T.S. Eliot himself asserted in his "Tradition and the Individual Talent" that if we are able to function without a prejudice toward originality, "we shall often find that not only the best, but the most individual parts of [the poet's] work may be those in which the dead poets, his ancestors, assert their immortality most vigorously" (74). Nevertheless, *A Writer's Diary* raises the issue of editorial involvement as a destabilization of the author. Again, we see that posthumous authors are necessarily a fiction, brought about by the work of both their own hands and those of others.

As we mentioned earlier, the roles of editor, executor and family often coincide in those involved in handling the posthumous. So far our task has been to explicate the role of the editor and its commensurate challenges. Due to the deep-seated interests of family in posthumous issues, we have seen already how these individuals may become involved in the process in all

forms: Mary Hemingway edited her husband's work and expressed her concerns quite forcefully following the posthumous "Bimini" publication attempt; Cassandra Austen excised her sister's letters to eliminate harsh words or other undesirable detail from reaching posterity; Beatrice Roethke published her husband's poems with a disclaimer that they were "not mature work"; and Leonard Woolf, in spite of his own qualms, published a markedly altered version of his wife's diary in the hope that it would be of interest to the public. Family concerns in the posthumous tend to center on reputation, although pecuniary interests may occasionally play a role as well.

The other individual who needs to be considered, then, is the executor. Writers often appoint family members as executors, and executors often also end up becoming posthumous editors, illustrating yet again the instability of posthumous authorship. The role of executor, however, is capable of reasonably clear definition taken apart from these other roles. According to the American Heritage Dictionary, the executor is "A person who is appointed by a testator to execute the testator's will." In other words, an executor carries out the legal end of an author's wishes—or at least, that is the official role. Just like family members and editors, however, executors can occasionally be led by their own wishes, as well as those of an author, and they exercise their own judgment even in the attempt to follow that of the author they represent.

Before his death in 1994, Ralph Ellison appointed John F. Callahan his literary executor. One of the literary works Callahan then had supervision over was Ellison's *The Invisible Man*. Although Ellison had been approached repeatedly during his lifetime about the possibility of turning *The Invisible Man* into a film, he never agreed, and in fact left clear instructions in his will that "there would be no dramatic interpretations whatsoever of his work even while his (second) wife, Fanny McConnell Ellison, was still alive" (Jones). At her death in 2005, however, Callahan was approached by filmmaker Oren Jacoby who wanted to create a dramatic adaptation

of *The Invisible Man*. Callahan liked Jacoby's concept, and as Ellison's representative, having already determined to publish Ellison's second novel posthumously, Callahan accepted Jacoby's proposal, saying he "believed that Ellison didn't want those restrictions to remain after his wife's death" (Jones). In making such a decision, however, Callahan claimed disinterestedness, "I know a lot of estates are interested in money, these days... but my sole concern is Ellison's reputation and the artistic reputation of his work" (Jones).

Motivation is a key issue in the publication of posthumous material, and one that is difficult to ascertain. In most cases, even when an author has expressed a wish not to publish his or her work, the executors still decide to publish. Leonard Woolf published his wife's diary in spite of his own doubts about the "distortion" created by such a procedure. Beatrice Roethke published her husband's poems in spite of their being "not mature work." Here, although Ellison was abundantly clear about his "distaste for adaptations," his executor still chose to allow the endeavor, explaining, as many posthumous collaborators do, his own misgivings:

Ralph is not here anymore... I've long had to wrestle with that demon. All I could say... is that Ralph would have done it better. He would have done it his way. But all I can do is make my best call in these things. I cannot expect to replicate exactly what he would have done. (Jones)

The reading public must trust that the posthumous editors and executors have, in fact, made the "best call" in reconstructing the author's work. Implicit in such a trust is also the belief that, as Callahan claims, the purpose behind posthumous publication is to forward authors' reputations, and those of their work, rather than to feed on the consumeristic fascination with authors themselves for pecuniary gain.

Ultimately, as with issues of intention and reputation, the involvement of others in posthumous publication results, inevitably, in the fictionalization of the posthumous author. Callahan recognizes this: “I cannot expect to replicate exactly what he would have done” (Jones). Yet repeatedly, both in contemporary culture and throughout literary history, editors, executors, family and any others involved in the posthumous lives of authors continue to abide by the decision to publish. The decision is sometimes made with reasonable assumption of authorial approval, and sometimes in the face of clear opposition, but nevertheless, posthumous materials continue to appear in print. Evidently there is, then, some underlying principle or assumption which is collectively held to be true governing the value of posthumous work. The question becomes: what is it? What is it about authors, or about their work, that makes such unpublished pieces valuable? Why does humanity insist on knowing what is, ultimately, beyond their ability to know? These are questions which will perhaps never be answered, but they will, most likely, ensure the continued publication of posthumous material. For where the desire to know is frustrated, humanity will keep searching.

Questions of motivation in posthumous publication are in large part the province of the executor or editor determined to oversee an author’s work. One remaining question, then, is what happens when there are conflicts between these individuals? The work of Emily Dickinson provides a model for posthumous conflicts.

When Lavinia Dickinson discovered her sister’s poems in May of 1886, she decided—again, in spite of her sister’s longstanding and documented doubts about publication—that they should be published. She first sent some poems to Susan Dickinson, her sister-in-law, who began editing them and submitted one in December of that year, which was rejected. Then, according to editor R.W. Franklin, “Growing impatient, Lavinia also turned to Mabel Loomis Todd, who,

though married herself, was intimately involved with Austin Dickinson, Emily's brother and Susan's husband" (*Variorum* 2). The decision to involve multiple editors still impacts Dickinson scholarship today, and one might wonder what Lavinia was thinking to involve not only two different women in the publication of the poems, but to choose two who were involved romantically with the same man.

Although she was not, as Susan was, closely related to Dickinson, Mabel Todd seems to have been in practical respects, the better choice for editor. She sought to publish numerous poems in volumes, whereas Susan only sought individual publication, and her efforts were more successful. Nevertheless, Susan's contributions were valuable—of the transcripts of poems that she made from manuscripts before returning them to Lavinia, forty-nine exist in no other form; Lavinia appears to have lost the originals (*Variorum* 31). Todd also made hundreds of transcripts.

The existence of two editors, however, proved challenging. Franklin explains that the publication of Todd's first volume of Dickinson poems, edited by herself and Dickinson's friend T.W. Higginson, in 1890, "must have come as a bitter surprise, for [Susan] did not learn of it until near the end, not knowing before late September that her husband's mistress was co-editor" (*Variorum* 2). Not surprisingly, Franklin reports that the relationship between Susan and Mabel Todd "turned hostile," although he does not specifically list whether this was a result of conflicts over poetry or over Austin Dickinson (*Variorum* 2). As the editors were divided, however, Dickinson's posthumous documents, and their publication, also remained fragmented. Franklin reports that Todd and Lavinia argued over a piece of land in 1895; Todd lost the case, and subsequently stopped working on the manuscripts in her possession. The manuscripts remained divided. After their deaths, those belonging to both Susan and those still in Lavinia's possession

passed to Susan's daughter, Martha Dickinson Bianchi; Mabel Todd left the poems in her possession to her daughter, Millicent Todd Bingham (Franklin, *Variorum* 4). Both women subsequently published more editions of Dickinson's work, including Martha Dickinson's ill-titled *The Complete Poems of Emily Dickinson* in 1914, which actually only included the poems in Susan's possession added to those already published by Todd in the late 1890s.

The two most obvious results of this editorial conflict have affected Dickinson scholarship significantly. First, because the manuscripts were in so many hands, a truly complete collection was not published until 1955, by Thomas Johnson, who also improved previous editorial practice through elimination of titles, standardizations and alterations, allowing Dickinson's work to stand on its own. Previously, no single editor of Dickinson had been aware of the full extent of her texts in other hands, nor sometimes of the number of unpublished texts in their own. The second result was a permanent physical division of the manuscripts. When Martha Bianchi died, her heir sold the Dickinson papers to Harvard University, which thus became the owner of Dickinson's literary property and articulated claims over the manuscripts held by Todd's heir, Bingham. Bingham, however, disputed the claim and elected to give her manuscripts to Amherst College, where they remain, according to Franklin, by "an agreement between the two institutions" (*Variorum* 6).

Thus Dickinson readers discovered her poetry for years in altered forms, with titles added and standardized texts, out of order and woefully incomplete in comparison to her overall output. Additionally, contemporary scholars of Dickinson still have to contend with the challenge of accessing manuscripts from two different libraries. Scholars and readers alike, however, are indebted to Susan Dickinson and Mabel Todd for their numerous transcriptions of manuscripts that were later returned to Lavinia and subsequently lost.

The choices made by the editors and executors of the works of Roethke, Dickinson, Ellison and Woolf all attest to the challenge created in the posthumous by the instability of the author. Editorial choices may render a text more readable, but they may also complicate or alter its language, sense or meaning. Executors are responsible for following authors' wishes with regard to their work, but may be subject to their own motivation in the decision to publish. Ultimately, the consideration of editor and executor confirms the fundamental problem of the posthumous: the reconstruction of the posthumous author is always a fiction, brought about equally by the uncertainty of intention, the construction of the literary myth, and the involvement of others in the posthumous text.

IV. THE DEAD AUTHOR SPEAKS: CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE QUESTIONS

The author may be dead, but the concept of authorship is certainly dynamically alive. Authors have experienced and adapted to vast theoretical changes of opinion throughout their development from the time of bards to the present. Initially given little credit as the fortunate few inspired by the muses, whose works were more admired in performance by great orators than for their content or stylistic merit at the hands of their creators, the next stage made authors little more than pawns in the hands of an increasingly commercialized society. As critics have posited, the author is a modern construct. Yet even in this construction, authors as individuals have never had a firm footing; rather the forwarding of their texts through the advent of printing and the subsequent granting of literary property simultaneously legalized and destabilized the bonds between author and text. Through copyright, authors acquired their most concrete link to their work and their legacies after death through literary property, yet the perpetual physical estrangement of printing and the necessity (for purposes of the discourse of textual ownership initially and later in questions of interpretation) to understand the literary text as separate from its physical manifestation, the work, resulted in the author's text simultaneously acquiring "the right to kill, to become the murderer of its author" (Foucault 1624). Even as they first assumed a position of authority over their texts, authors were already becoming fictionalized.

Authors have historically understood that they are writing toward uncertainty. Separated from their readers through time and distance—this is Ong's lack of "circumambient actuality"—authors have to fictionalize their readers, and write toward their own subjective construction of them. Following the accession of copyright, authors must also take into account the lives their works will take on after their deaths. Although the parental trope is materially flawed in terms of authors and texts, in consideration of the immediate effects of the author's death it is effective:

authors must plan for the posthumous management of their unfinished or unpublished works much as they would plan for the care of their children. Yet, as the latter chapters of this thesis demonstrate, in forwarding such plans, authors are attempting control of something that is incurably beyond their reach. As Foucault has said, authorial attempts to provide a legacy through written texts may just as easily result in self effacement. The literary work, by its dual nature as physical object and (according to Barthes) limitless ‘methodological field’, is both the real work of the author and a representation; the text has the power to achieve for its author either identity or alienation. Just as the author’s reader will always be a fiction, the author’s ability to see his or her will and intention perfectly realized from beyond the grave is untenable—an improbable fiction, much like the posthumously constructed author.

The posthumous author, although resuscitated, lives but a half-life, caught up in the tensions of the duality of representation and reality. This is brought about by the unique challenges created in the unavoidable uncertainty of the posthumous. In direct opposition to Stillinger’s requirements for “practical criticism,” the posthumous can offer at best only instability of both text and author. The existence of multiple versions, fragments, and drafts as well as the obvious but no less important lack of a clear decision to publish on the part of the author renders the text unstable. Likewise, the complexities brought to bear through editorial choice, familial concerns over reputation or monetary gain and the judgments of executors render the posthumous author a product of representation. The aura of the literary myth that obscures the posthumous author renders real certainty as to authorial intention (assuming the scholar ascribes authority to intention at all, following the New Critics’ disparagement of it) a complete impossibility. Posthumous authors are always, as a construct of the critic or scholar who “reads” them, necessarily and unavoidably, fictionalized.

“Fiction” lies at the heart of the posthumous. Both fiction and its longstanding counterpart, nonfiction, have a staid tradition in literary criticism. Yet, in a poignant parallel to the roles of author and reader, neither fiction nor nonfiction are as clearly or easily delineated as the shelves in the local Barnes & Noble would suggest. As Ong explained, the work of the historian is no less a selection and interpretation of events and ideas than that of the author of fiction. Likewise, fiction, as Shakespeare’s Fabian attested, can at times have striking resemblance to reality. The necessity of engaging in this “play” between simultaneous reality and representation is an inevitable part of human communication, and of reading both published and unpublished works. Mallarmé’s “universal language” does not exist. The “immanent poem[s]” of humanity must be approached through Ong’s inevitable ‘masks,’ just as Shakespeare’s audiences had to don a mask of complicity in watching the choices and actions of the character Viola—a boy playing a woman playing a man—or the observations of Fabian in characterizing his reality as an “improbable fiction”. Masks within masks, the impossibility of language requires readers—be they scholars, critics, or anyone else—to engage in a suspension of disbelief. Similarly, the posthumous requires its readers to acquiesce in a fictionalization of the dead author.

The posthumous author is always a fiction. What then, should be done with the posthumous text? The questions resulting from the improbable fiction of the posthumous author are too far-reaching to be fully answered by this thesis: at the heart of the issue lie questions of motivation, the relationship between scholarship and art, and ultimately, the question of the value of the posthumous as a genre within literary criticism. Careful critics will always be wary of issues of motivation in consideration of the posthumous text. While some executors, like Callahan in his cautious acquiescence to the adaptation of Ellison’s *The Invisible Man*, claim disinterestedness in posthumous publication, others have few qualms about using the

posthumous for their own interests, as in the case of *Esquire*'s publication of Hemingway's "Bimini." Yet motivation, like authorial intention, is difficult to identify with certainty due to its deep-seated subjectivity, and often remains unanswered.

The relationship between scholarship and art, though still a tortuous negotiation, is perhaps slightly more accessible. Here again, the nature of "fiction" plays a starring role. The continuum between art and scholarship is based largely on conceptions of accuracy; the level of "fictionalization" is what lends doubt to a work's credibility. Spence's biography of Austen seems credible given the wealth of references and citations; the film adaptation of Austen's purported romance, perhaps less so. Where, then, do scholars draw the line between truth and fiction? What degree of fictionalization is acceptable as plausible scholarship? After all, as Ong claimed, even in history fictionalization is inevitable. Or is art valuable for its own sake?

This claim regarding the value of "art" seems, quite often, to be the unspoken objective in publication of the posthumous. In spite of any misgivings on the part of editors, executors, family members or publishers—and as the numerous cited introductions and prefaces in the pages of this document attest, such misgivings and disclaimers are almost as innate a characteristic in the posthumous as the assertion of their ability to provide insight and contextualization—posthumous works have a lengthy history of publication, and they continue to be published for their own sake, usually as productions of scholarship, but occasionally also as unique works of art in their own right. Just as posthumous authors are wrapped in uncertainty, products of the literary myth created by themselves and others, posthumous collaborators seem mired in the quandary of the worth of the posthumous, simultaneously convinced of the value of posthumous publication, and chary of making such important decisions on someone else's behalf. Ellison's executor phrased it most eloquently: "I've long had to wrestle with that demon"

(Jones). It seems, however, in cases of the posthumous, that the decision to publish nearly always wins.

It is both premature and unjustified in this thesis to pronounce judgment on the ultimate value of posthumous works in literary study. Nevertheless, historical precedent offers a strong argument for their value. Scholars and critics continue, in spite of cautions against reliance upon authorial intention and biographical criticism, and in spite of their own misgivings, to plumb the depths of the posthumous in support of their claims. Perhaps these individuals are convinced, like C.S. Lewis, that the words of the authors themselves have greater power than those of the critics who evaluate them, and thus they turn to the original sources. Or perhaps the prevalence of the posthumous is merely a result, as Lewis also indicated, of the innately human desire “not only to have but also to analyse, understand, and express our experiences. And... to ‘compare notes’” (124). It is not enough to read the authors’ published texts or to read the evaluations of the critics. Some readers approach the author like the latest Hollywood scandal or drama; they are possessed of an insatiable appetite to consume anything ever written by or about their favorite authors, to gain as personal and complete an experience of the author as humanly possible. It is this voracity, this fascination with dead authors that will perpetuate the posthumous, regardless of its artistic merits as recognized or rejected by critics. The author is both modern construct and, as Tomaševskij indicated, public figure, and the public will continue to demand more understanding.

These three questions—motivation for posthumous publication, the relationship between art and scholarship, and the ultimate value of posthumous works—are among the most important broached in this thesis. In claiming the fictionalization of the author in the posthumous however, it also leaves many other questions unanswered due to the necessary limitation of its scope.

Other issues of the posthumous deserving of further analysis and research include dealing with posthumous texts where authorship is in doubt, dealing with the challenges of encountering texts in translation, and the vast field of inquiry brought about by the advent of the digital text, all of which significantly expand the complexities of posthumous authorship, and which certainly do not exhaust the possibilities for consideration of the posthumous.

The very instability and complexity of language renders textual interpretation a virtually limitless field. The existence of specifically posthumous material vastly enlarges fields of literary inquiry, and due to humanity's inability to predict its own mortality, scholars may be reasonably sure that the prevalence of posthumous texts will not cease in the near future. As Foucault claimed for the authorless text, the posthumous releases "fluid functions" and allows for exciting new inquiries "along its gaps and fault lines" (1626). Even as new authors continue to make their appearance, dead authors' works will remain an intriguing ground for literary study.

WORKS CITED

- American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language*. 4th Ed. New York: Houghton Mifflin, 2006.
- Austen, Jane. *Lady Susan, The Watsons and Sanditon*. Ed. Margaret Drabble. London: Penguin Books, 2003. Print.
- “Author.” *The Oxford English Dictionary*. 2nd Ed. 1989. Print.
- Barthes, Roland. “From Work to Text.” *The Norton Anthology of Theory & Criticism*. Ed. Vincent B. Leitsch. New York: Norton, 2001. 1470-1475. Print.
- Barthes, Roland. “The Death of the Author.” *The Norton Anthology of Theory & Criticism*. Ed. Vincent B. Leitsch. New York: Norton, 2001. 1466-1470. Print.
- Brontë, Charlotte. *The Letters of Charlotte Brontë: With a Selection of Letters by Family and Friends*. Ed. Margaret Smith. Vol. 2. Oxford: Clarendon, 1995-2004. Print.
- Burke, Sean. “Reconstructing the Author.” *Authorship: From Plato to the Postmodern*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh UP, 1995. Print.
- Chapman, R.W. Introduction to the First Edition. *Jane Austen’s Letters*. Ed. Deidre Le Faye. 3rd Ed. New York: Oxford UP, 1995. ix-xiii. Print.
- De Leeuw, Ronald. Introduction. *The Letters of Vincent Van Gogh*. Ed. De Leeuw. Trans. Arnold Pomerans. London: Penguin P, 1997. ix-xxvi. Print.
- Drabble, Margaret. Introduction. *Lady Susan, The Watsons and Sanditon*. By Jane Austen. London: Penguin Books, 2003. 7-31. Print.
- Eliot, T. S. “Tradition and the Individual Talent.” *Authorship: From Plato to the Postmodern*. Ed. Sean Burke. Edinburgh: Edinburgh UP, 1995. 73-80. Print.

- Foucault, Michel. "What Is An Author?" *The Norton Anthology of Theory & Criticism*. Ed. Vincent B. Leitsch. New York: Norton, 2001. 1622-1636. Print.
- Franklin, R.W. Introduction. *The Poems of Emily Dickinson: Variorum Edition*. Ed. Franklin. 3 Vols. Cambridge: Belknap P of Harvard UP, 1998. 1-43. Print.
- Franklin, R.W. Introduction. *The Poems of Emily Dickinson: Reading Edition*. Ed. Franklin. Cambridge: Belknap P of Harvard UP, 1999. 1-10. Print.
- Grey, J. David. "Henry Austen: Jane Austen's 'Perpetual Sunshine'." *Persuasions Occasional Papers* 1 (1984). No pagination. Web. 21 Jan. 2012.
- Haight, Gordon S. Ed. *Selections from George Eliot's Letters*. New Haven: Yale UP, 1985. Print.
- Hemmingson, Michael. "Esquire's Failure with Hemingway's 'Bimini'." *The Hemingway Review*. 29.1 (2009): 140-144. *Project Muse*. Web. 22 Sept. 2011.
- Hirsch, E. D. Jr. *Validity in Interpretation*. Clinton: Yale UP, 1967. Print.
- Iser, Wolfgang. "Interaction Between Text and Reader." *The Norton Anthology of Theory & Criticism*. Ed. Vincent B. Leitsch. New York: Norton, 2001. 1673-1682. Print.
- Jarrold, Julian, Director. *Becoming Jane*. 2007. Film.
- Jones, Chris. "An Invisible Man, Live on Stage." *Chicago Tribune*. Chicago Tribune, 12 Jan. 2012. Web. 21 Jan. 2012.
- Knox, Bernard. Introduction. *The Odyssey*. By Homer. Trans. Robert Fagles. New York: Penguin, 1990. 3-60. Print.
- Leaver, Robin A., Ed. Introduction. *J.S. Bach and Scripture: Glosses from the Calov Bible Commentary*. St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1985. 13-35. Print.
- Le Faye, Deidre, Ed. *Jane Austen's Letters*. 3rd Ed. New York: Oxford UP, 1995. Print.

- Le Faye, Deidre. Preface to the Third Edition. *Jane Austen's Letters*. Ed. Le Faye. 3rd Ed. New York: Oxford UP, 1995. xiv-xviii. Print.
- Leitsch, Vincent B. Ed. *The Norton Anthology of Theory and Criticism*. New York: Norton, 2001. Print.
- Lewis, C.S. *An Experiment in Criticism*. New York: Cambridge UP, 1961. Print.
- The Lutheran Study Bible*. St Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 2009. Print.
- Mallarmé, Stéphane. "Crisis in Poetry." *The Norton Anthology of Theory & Criticism*. Ed. Vincent B. Leitsch. New York: Norton, 2001. 845-851. Print.
- Mallarmé, Stéphane. "From 'Crisis in Verse'." *Authorship: From Plato to the Postmodern*. Ed. Sean Burke. Edinburgh: Edinburgh UP, 1995. 51-53. Print.
- Mills, Ralph. Introduction. *On the Poet and His Craft: Selected Prose of Theodore Roethke*. Ed. Mills. Seattle: U of Washington P, 1965. xi-xvi. Print.
- Mitchell, Kaye. "Preface: Intentions." Preface. *Intention and Text: Towards an Intentionality of Literary Form*. London: Continuum International, 2008. vii-xii. Print.
- North, Michael. A Note on the Text. *The Waste Land*. By T.S. Eliot. Ed. Michael North. New York: Norton, 2001. xi-xiii. Print.
- Ong, Walter J. S.J. "The Writer's Audience is Always a Fiction." *PMLA* 90.1 (1975): 9-21. *JSTOR*. Web. 25 Jan. 2011.
- Poulet, Georges. "Phenomenology of Reading." *The Norton Anthology of Theory & Criticism*. Ed. Vincent B. Leitsch. New York: Norton, 2001. 1320-1333. Print.
- Poulet, Georges. "From 'Criticism and the Experience of Interiority'." *Authorship: From Plato to the Postmodern*. Ed. Sean Burke. Edinburgh: Edinburgh UP, 1995. 101-107. Print.

- Roethke, Theodore. *On the Poet and His Craft*. Ed. Ralph Mills. Seattle: U of Washington P, 1965. Print.
- Rose, Mark. *Authors and Owners: The Invention of Copyright*. Cambridge: Harvard U P, 1993. Print.
- Sartre, Jean-Paul. "Why Write?" *The Norton Anthology of Theory & Criticism*. Ed. Vincent B. Leitsch. New York: Norton, 2001. 1336-1349. Print.
- Saussure, Ferdinand. "A Course in General Linguistics." *The Norton Anthology of Theory & Criticism*. Ed. Vincent B. Leitsch. New York: Norton, 2001. 960-977. Print.
- Seager, Allen. *The Glass House: The Life of Theodore Roethke*. Ann Arbor: U of Michigan P, 1991. Print.
- Shakespeare, William. *Twelfth Night*. New York: Signet, 1998. Print.
- Spence, Jon. *Becoming Jane Austen*. New York: Hambledon Continuum, 2003. Print.
- Spence, Jon. Introduction. *Becoming Jane Austen*. By Spence. New York: Hambledon Continuum, 2003. ix-x. Print.
- Stillinger, Jack. "The Multiple Versions of Coleridge's Poems: How Many *Mariners* Did Coleridge Write?" *Studies in Romanticism* 31.2 (1992): 127-146. *JSTOR*. Web. 13 Oct. 2011.
- Sutherland, Kathryn. Introduction. *A Memoir of Jane Austen and Other Family Recollections*. By J.E. Austen-Leigh. New York: Oxford UP, 2002. xiii-xlviii. Print.
- Tomaševskij, Boris. "Literature and Biography." *Authorship: From Plato to the Postmodern*. Ed. Sean Burke. Edinburgh: Edinburgh UP, 1995. 81-89. Print.
- Wagoner, David, Ed. *Straw for the Fire: From the Notebooks of Theodore Roethke*. Port Townsend: Copper Canyon P, 1972. Print.

Wagoner, David. Introduction. *Straw for the Fire: From the Notebooks of Theodore Roethke*.

Ed. Wagoner. Port Townsend: Copper Canyon P, 1972. 3-7. Print.

Walker, Linda Robinson. "Four Unpublished Poems by Theodore Roethke." *Michigan*

Quarterly Review 44.4 (2005): 636-47.

West, James L. W. III. Introduction. *Trimalchio: An Early Version of The Great*

Gatsby. Ed. West. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2000. xiii-xxii. Print.

Wimsatt, William K. Jr. and Monroe C. Beardsley. "The Intentional Fallacy." *The Norton*

Anthology of Theory & Criticism. Ed. Vincent B. Leitsch. New York: Norton, 2001.

1374-1387. Print.

Woolf, Virginia. "Jane Austen." *The Common Reader*. New York: Harcourt, 1984. 134-145.

Print.

Woolf, Virginia. "The Patron and the Crocus." *The Common Reader*. New York: Harcourt, 1984.

206-210. Print.

Woolf, Leonard. Preface. *A Writer's Diary: Being Extracts from the Diary of Virginia Woolf*.

Ed. Leonard Woolf. London: Hogarth Press, 1953. vii-x. Print.

WORKS CONSULTED

- Altman, Meryl. "Posthumous Queer: Hemingway Among Others." *The Hemingway Review* 30.1 (2010): 129-141. *Project Muse*. Web. 22 Sept. 2011.
- Benjamin, Walter. "The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction." *The Norton Anthology of Theory & Criticism*. New York: Norton, 2001. 1166-1186. Print.
- Bode, Lisa. "No Longer Themselves? Framing Digitally Enabled Posthumous 'Performance'." *Cinema Journal* 49.4 (2010): 46-70. *Project Muse*. Web. 6 Sept. 2011.
- Crowder, Ashby Bland and John Churchill. "The Problem of Interpretation: A Case in Point." *College Literature* 13.2 (1986): 123-140. *JSTOR*. Web. 24 June 2011.
- Drew, Bernard A. *Literary Afterlife: The Posthumous Continuations of 325 Authors' Fictional Characters*. Jefferson: McFarland & Company, 2009. Print.
- Eliot, T. S. *The Use of Poetry & Criticism*. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1933. Print.
- Harrison, Bernard. "Always Fiction? The Limits of Authorial License in *Our Mutual Friend*." *Partial Answers* 9.2 (2011): 405-430. *Project Muse*. Web. 12 Oct. 2011.
- Haynes, Christine. "The Politics of Authorship: The Effects of Literary Property Law on Author-Publisher Relations." *Nineteenth-Century French Studies* 39:1- 2 (2010-2011): 99-118. *Project Muse*. Web. 12 Oct. 2011.
- Kiskis, Michael J. "Dead Man Talking: Mark Twain's Autobiographical Deception." *American Literary Realism* 40.2 (2008): 95-113. *Project Muse*. Web. 6 Sept. 2011.
- Massey, Irving, Ed. *Posthumous Poems of Shelley: Mary Shelley's Fair Copy Book*. Montreal: McGill-Queen's UP, 1969. Print.
- McInerny, D. Q. *Being Logical: A Guide to Good Thinking*. New York: Random House, 2004. Print.

Philpotts, Trey. "Dickens, Invention, and Literary Property in the 1850's." *Dickens Quarterly* 24.1 (2007): 18-26. *Academic One File*. Web. 7 Nov. 2011.

Saper, Craig. "Posthumography: The Boundaries of Literature and the Digital Trace." *Rhizomes* 20 (2010) : 1-10. Web. 7 Nov. 2011.

Stecker, Robert. "Moderate Actual Intentionalism Defended." *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 64.4 (2006): 429-438. *JSTOR*. Web. 24 Jan. 2011.

Van Vliet, H.T.M. "Compositional History as a Key to Textual Interpretation." *Text* 16 (2006): 67-78. *JSTOR*. Web. 13 Oct. 2011.